Commentary

Volume Seventy-six, Number Six, December 1983

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The Greatest Living American Philosopher
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Morality and Deterrence—An Exchange

Albert Wohlstetter & Critics

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

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

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Cover: The Drawing Board, Inc.

COMMENTARY (ISSN 0010-2601) is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee—Single Copy is $3.00, $30 a year; 3 years $81; 5 years $120—Add $5.00 per year for all foreign, including Canada and Latin America—Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to COMMENTARY, 165 East 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

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Morality and Deterrence

Albert Wohlstetter & Critics

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The American bishops are losing faith in deterrence, to the scandal of the "clerks strategic," including their dean, Albert Wohlstetter. On May 3, 1983, they posted their five radical theses on the limits of deterrence at the door of the nuclear-war room in their pastoral letter on war and peace, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response*. In June, Albert Wohlstetter replied in COMMENTARY in his article, "Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents," inaugurating what promises to be a decisive national debate on the meaning of security in the nuclear age.

Fortunately, these protagonists share several fundamental beliefs about the imperatives of national security: (1) the intentional targeting of civilians is anathema to Western civilization; (2) present strategy for the defense of Europe, which allows NATO forces to remain decisively inferior to the Warsaw Pact armies they face, is a mad gamble waiting to be lost. Enhancement of conventional forces (and revision of NATO strategy) therefore is a premier obligation incumbent on Western leaders; (3) unilateral dismantling of the present U.S. nuclear strategic arsenal would be politically destabilizing, militarily risky, and diplomatically self-defeating. Hence, unilateralism is morally repugnant. Each of these somewhat surprising points of consensus deserves comment.

1. A dramatic shift in moral sensitivity has occurred since 1945. Albert Einstein was for once wrong in judging that the splitting of the atom had changed everything but our way of thinking. For, in responding to the threat of atomic weapons, the arms-control community stood the ancient tradition of civilized warfare on its head. While Western civilization had, for at least 1,600 years, defended the principle of civilian immunity from intentional targeting, the "minimal-deterrence" school of strategists, whom Mr. Wohlstetter castigates, has sought to limit the size and instability of weapons systems by pleading for a "cities-only" strategy which could be reliably executed by a relatively small (and thus economical) and invulnerable (and thus stable) force of submarine missile-launching platforms. Aghast at this (conditional) acceptance of civilian slaughter as the price of peace, Mr. Wohlstetter has long pleaded for a more humane and traditional strategy which would spare civilians from direct attack. In this he is joined by the bishops.

2. Mr. Wohlstetter and the bishops agree as well on the urgent need for a conventional-force build-up (to be accompanied by a revision of NATO strategy) in order to avoid the resort to nuclear force. The only residual disagreement between them on this issue lies in the markedly more hopeful episcopal estimate of the political feasibility of such a radical shift in political attitudes. Faith perhaps begets hope.

3. Mr. Wohlstetter recognizes, only to ridicule, another component of the bishops' teaching which resembles his own convictions: the rejection of unilateral nuclear disarmament. While rejecting unilateralism himself, however, Mr. Wohlstetter is cavalierly skeptical of the pastoral letter's confidence that the arsenal itself (even apart from a declaratory policy to use it) constitutes an effective deterrent. Deterrence, as the bishops understand it, is in the eye of the (Soviet) beholder. Since they agree with Mr. Wohlstetter that the leaders of the Soviet Union are indeed "deeply suspicious" and "hostile," they are persuaded that this adversary would virtually invincibly discount any U.S. shift to a declaratory policy of "use, never" as a cheap propaganda ploy, presuming that an expensive arsenal is maintained to be used in a crisis. Perhaps here the bishops assess Soviet response to such a shift in policy more shrewdly than the strategists, reflecting in their judgment the skeptical interpretation that Western nations give to present USSR declarations of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons. Finding that this declaratory policy of the Soviets leaves undiminished the deterrent power of their mounting stockpiles of nuclear warheads, the bishops assume that Soviet officials would be equally incredulous of any Western renunciation of the use of its own strategic arsenal. Bishops rely more readily on Soviet skepticism than do strategists, judging deterrence to be a function of distrust and of historical conditioning. At issue is not whether "country X" and "country Y" would be mutually deterred by a balanced nuclear arsenal whose use had been renounced in declaratory policy. What counts is whether the United States (with its German ally) and the USSR would be so deterred. In arriving at such a political judgment about a sinful world, it is by no means self-evident that the biblical education of the bishops is less helpful to interpreting the meaning of deterrence than is a training in mathematics.

There is then between Mr. Wohlstetter and the bishops a surprising convergence of views on the imperatives of security. Despite their differing estimates of Soviet credulity in the face of a declaratory policy eschewing use of the nuclear arsenal, the bishops share Mr. Wohlstetter's abhorrence of city-targeting, his anxiety about the insufficient provisions being made to resist conventional aggression conventionally, and the common-sense rejection of unilateral disarmament.

Given this ample evidence of agreement, it might appear that the impending debate will be merely a skirmish between competing schools of strategic theology. Indeed, if the bishops had finally endorsed the posture adopted in the first draft of their pastoral letter (circulated in June 1982), Mr. Wohlstetter could have subscribed to most of the findings in the document. For he has long labored to discredit counter-city targeting and to restrict U.S. targeting options to some range of hostile military installations. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the bishops themselves adopted such a deterrent posture in their first draft.

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While cautioning that grievous doubts remained about the controllability of such counterforce exchanges, they gave grudging approval to controlled retaliatory strategic targeting of military installations, excluding only strategic forces (that is, ICBM's). This somewhat startling concession was won from the bishops by their desire to preserve for national-security officials the "freedom of choice" which Mr. Wohlstetter demands, that is, the capacity and public authorization to retaliate against military targets if deterrence fails. If this position had survived the series of revisions and debates that led to the final draft, the present debate would have focused exclusively on the level of nuclear strikes adequate to reinforce deterrence.

That early episcopal tolerance for limited and controlled nuclear strikes on Soviet military targets was, however, among the happy casualties of the process of consultation and reflection which occurred before the final debate in Chicago in May 1983. Indeed, when the second draft was circulated for review in October 1982 the bishops had already reversed themselves on this fundamental issue. In all succeeding drafts, including the definitive text, they reject any militarily meaningful use of the nuclear arsenal. This change was effected by the storm of criticism that broke over their toleration of counterforce nuclear war. After reviewing 700 pages of critical comments in response to the first draft, the committee paused to reassess the moral arguments that had led them to approve such strategies.

Their reassessment presumably crystallized around the meaning of "free choice" in regard to nuclear war. Sharing Mr. Wohlstetter's reluctance to discard any military option which can meet the legitimate imperatives of defense, they asked once more whether the option for counterforce nuclear war was morally justifiable. On second thought, they judged it was not.

This revision emerged from their review of the testimony (and literature) concerning the controllability of nuclear war. Given the high risk that a significant nuclear exchange would irreversibly disrupt the command-and-control network that links the national command center to the field commanders (as well as to the adversary), they contemplated the course that nuclear war might follow once the national command center was *hors de combat*, including two possibilities. One was the unlikely scenario of a simultaneous, uncoordinated, and mutual cessation of nuclear hostilities. The alternative scenario appeared to them more probable: uncontrolled nuclear exchange, culminating in the destruction of the northern hemisphere. Realizing that this apocalyptic scenario was universally recognized as a "less than improbable" outcome of any (even counterforce) nuclear exchange, they retraced their steps, declaring the waging of (even counterforce) nuclear war incompatible with human freedom. Mr. Wohlstetter, as we know, holds the opposite view, that renouncing nuclear war negates freedom.

It was fortunate for the bishops that the capital issue dividing them from Mr. Wohlstetter is a theological, or at least a philosophical, one: the nature of freedom. Here bishops feel at home, experiencing no misgivings when they condemn any act which risks abandoning rational deliberation about future acts. Deliberately rendering oneself incapable of making rational and effective choices is an immoral abdication of freedom.

Fighting nuclear war, they now came to realize, would be such an abdiction of freedom. For nuclear war might be unstoppable. If the national command center were to be cut off from subordinate commanders, certain U.S. nuclear warheads could be launched against the Soviet Union either by preauthorized or unauthorized firings. If the Soviet leaders were similarly deprived of their command-and-control network, they would be physically unable to communicate to their commanders their conceivable choice to surrender in the face of American escalation. Possibly Soviet missiles too would be launched independently of their national command center. Literally no one might be in control of the war. Exit free choice.

Having forced themseves to contemplate this possibility, the bishops reversed their previous decision to tolerate controlled counterforce war-fighting. Their second thoughts find expression in these sober words: "We are sure that we must reject nuclear war." Human freedom may not legitimately be construed to include options which significantly risk abandoning future choice.

The schism between the bishops and the strategists on deterrence rests finally on differing views of

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freedom. In the Catholic tradition, at least, freedom does not mean the capacity to do whatever is feasible, but only whatever is reasonable, that is, what promises to enhance human welfare. Freedom includes, therefore, the refusal to do what risks wreaking (literally) inestimable human destruction, as a nuclear war does. Freedom, the bishops believe, is also a self-denying faculty, in this case the capacity to say "no" to nuclear war.

Have the bishops got it wrong? Or have the strategists?

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TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have long regarded Albert Wohlstetter as a serious, informed, and usually responsible strategic analyst. His article makes some useful points about the possibility—the necessity—of a nuclear-deterrent policy that does not deliberately target civilian populations. But in too many places the article lacks the virtues I hope to find in Mr. Wohlstetter, virtues that it is essential to retain in the debate on nuclear strategy.

I was particularly distressed by his distortion of the position adopted by the United States Catholic bishops in their recent pastoral letter on war and peace. (I was the principal consultant to the committee that drafted the bishops' letter.) He repeatedly characterizes the bishops as having reluctantly accepted the continued possession of nuclear weapons by the United States, but at the same time of fatally undermining deterrence by a "doctrine of 'use, never' (i.e., no use—first-second-or ever)." But the fact is that at no point in the pastoral letter do the bishops adopt the "you-can-have-it-but-you-can't-use-it" position.

It is true that the second draft (October 1982) of the letter was ambiguous—deliberately so—on this matter. While even that draft contained no passage explicitly saying *no* use would be permissible, it was imbued (properly) with a strong rhetoric of "saying no to nuclear war," and contained a few passages whose full meaning was obscure. Most troublesome in this respect was the quotation from Cardinal Krol, which said "not only the *use* of strategic nuclear weapons, but also the *declared intent* to use them involved in our deterrence policy, are both wrong." (Emphasis in original.) In context this statement could be taken to refer to any use of nuclear weapons, or only to the use or declared intent to use them indiscriminately, i.e., against cities. Since counterpopulation warfare was still an element of American declaratory policy at the time of Cardinal Krol's statement in 1978, he was not necessarily condemning *any* use or threat. Similar ambiguity arose regarding advice, in the pastoral section at the end of the second draft, to men and women in defense industries because ". . . your industry produces many of the weapons of massive and indiscriminate destruction which have concerned us in this letter. We have judged immoral even the threat to use such weapons." I believe that, in context, the operative qualifier is "massive and indiscriminate destruction," but can understand how some readers could have taken this passage as a blanket condemnation.

This ambiguity was intended to mollify critics who chose to interpret some passages in the first draft —notably, "If nuclear weapons may be used at all, they may be used only after they have been used against our own country or our allies, and, even then, only in an extremely limited, discriminating manner against military targets"—as the bishops giving some "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval" to limited nuclear war. Of course it was nothing of the kind. Predictably, the ambiguity of the second draft opened the bishops up to ridicule or mischievous charges from conservative critics that, despite their disclaimers, the bishops were "really" adopting a stance of unilateral nuclear disarmament.

Fortunately, the ambiguous passages were removed in the third draft and in the form adopted in the final Chicago meeting. In fact, a proposed amendment by Archbishop Quinn, of "opposition on moral grounds to any use of nuclear weapons," was not adopted. Despite his various references (without quotation or citation) to works by Father Bryan Hehir, Mr. Wohlstetter does not—nor *can* he—cite any passage in the third draft or final version of the letter that rules out any use.

Mr. Wohlstetter's criticism therefore is not just wrong, it borders on the irresponsible. Perhaps he was unable to read the third draft (available to the public on April 6) before writing his article for the June issue of COMMENTARY. But if so, why not say so, rather than alluding to having seen "various drafts"? Or why not delay the article a month or so to get it right? (He was able, after all, to incorporate a reference to President Reagan's March 23 *Star Wars* speech.)

Mr. Wohlstetter clearly shares the bishops' abhorrence of deliberate strikes against innocent civilians. His preferred deterrent policy is one which would rely on counterforce targeting, with efforts to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties ("bonus" effects) by the use of *relatively* small and accurate weapons. In principle it is hard for me to quarrel with this prescription, which appears consistent with "just-war" precepts of discrimination and proportionality. For this reason Mr. Wohlstetter can praise the reduction of the American nuclear stockpile in terms of megatonnage, and, allegedly, also a reduction in the number of "weapons." What the referent for this latter reduction is, however, I cannot tell from such a loose definition. Much worse, this praise ignores a 60-percent increase, in a decade, in the number of "force loadings" (warheads and bombs) in the strategic arsenal.

And that points to the flaw in Mr. Wohlstetter's prescription: even given reduction in megatonnage and improvements in accuracy, the number of strategic bombs and warheads (approximately 20,000 for both sides together) means that even "discriminating" use could wreak horrendous damage. The American SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) has identified 60 "military" targets for such weapons in Moscow alone. A Muscovite's prospects of surviving a strike against those targets would not be much better than if civilians had been deliberately struck. Mr. Wohlstetter faults some of the studies of the effects of nuclear weapons that are cited by the bishops, indicating they do not consider the kind of "limited" strike he has in mind. But even a Soviet attack on the 1,052 American ICBM silos, 46 SAC air bases, and two bases for missile-launching submarines would result in 7 to 15 million "prompt" deaths, as many wounded, and untold eventual deaths from fallout and economic and ecological disruption. These targets do not include the many command-and-control centers, tactical military forces, transportation facilities, or "militarily significant" industry that are

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included in the American SIOP and no doubt in its Soviet equivalent. The number of civilian deaths might be fewer than if civilians were directly targeted, but hardly such a low number as to make "limited" nuclear war an option of rational policy.

Perhaps Mr. Wohlstetter does not intend something as massive as this in his example of "limited" nuclear war. In theory, it is possible to imagine much more restricted strikes, possibly as some form of implicit intra-war bargaining, that would produce a negotiated end to the war before escalation became overwhelming. One cannot definitively rule out the possibility, but neither should one bet the future of civilization on it. Probably the two most knowledgeable experts on this matter are Desmond Ball and John Steinbruner, who offer nearly identical skeptical views. In Steinbruner's words: "If national commanders seriously attemped to implement this strategy [controlled response] in a war with existing and currently projected U.S. forces, the result would not be a finely controlled strategic campaign. The more likely result would be the collapse of U.S. forces into isolated units undertaking retaliation on their own initiative against a wide variety of targets at unpredictable moments."

In other words, Mr. Wohlstetter's aim may be laudable, but its realism leaves something to be desired. The further risk is that other strategic planners may not be as prudent or responsible as Mr. Wohlstetter. To encourage belief in the probability of morally acceptable limited nuclear war is to play into the hands of the war-fighters, the "prevailers," those who think "victory is possible" and would have some meaning. It would encourage those who want to continue to rely on a threat of first use of nuclear weapons to deter a wide range of acts in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. It would encourage brinksmanship and crisis risk-taking at the expense of building up alternative, non-nuclear means of defending ourselves and our allies. (Mr. Wohlstetter chides the bishops for only "grudgingly" supporting conventional alternatives. But they are, after all, bishops, and cannot be expected to enthuse about more outlays for conventional weaponry. The fact is they do acknowledge an essential piece of realism, the likelihood that "some strengthening of conventional defense would be a proportionate price to pay, if this will reduce the possibility of nuclear war.")

A key element of the bishops' analysis is their advocacy of a policy of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons. They require that non-nuclear attacks be resisted by other than nuclear means. That advocacy does not stem, as Mr. Wohlstetter would have it, from a more general "no-use-ever" policy. It stems from a candid reflection on the probability, whatever the desirability, of truly "limiting" nuclear war.

While I have substantial sympathy for much of Mr. Wohlstetter's position, I would have more if he would acknowledge the desirability of a no-first-use posture. It cannot be achieved readily—though it is a more plausible achievement than is the command-and-control and discrimination capability for reliably fighting "limited" nuclear war. The risks of escalation in wartime are high under the best of circumstances. If the opponent should begin nuclear war, *some* of those risks would already have been taken. To deter that act, and to bring the war to a negotiated halt just as soon as possible, we must plan certain very restricted forms of retaliation. But the risks of first use of nuclear weapons are too high to justify us in ever setting the process in motion.

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To the Editor of Commentary:

I believe that Albert Wohlstetter's article is by far the best logical and historical exposition of the development of the strategic debate; that it is the most rigorous and convincing articulation of the only sane direction in which to go, once one realizes that neither Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) nor disarmament is a tenable goal; and that it is the most exciting (and in a way the first) challenge to the idea that the nuclear age has introduced fundamentally new theoretical, moral, and political dilemmas and paradoxes, or has immensely sharpened permanent ones already articulated by Clausewitz.

Mr. Wohlstetter is entirely convincing about what one should do if deterrence fails (provided it is feasible, and here I completely accept Mr. Wohlstetter's argument that something is always feasible in the direction of discrimination and control, that the possibilities in these areas have improved enormously, and that at any rate one should always try). But I find Mr. Wohlstetter least strong on the question of giving reassurance not only to our establishment but also to our population, and particularly to the population of the European allies. Mr. Wohlstetter has to counter the argument of people who will say that though he may be right on paper, he doesn't take human realities (or Murphy's law) into account. Such people argue that in the case of Europe, distinctions between types or degrees of conventional and nuclear war make a lot more sense if you are an American than if you are a European, particularly a German, and they say that since such ideas come mostly from American analysts, it shows that the latter are more preoccupied with avoiding escalation to their own territory than with deterring any war at all.

On the essential point of deterrence, how it looks to the enemy, I believe Mr. Wohlstetter puts it too neatly by affirming that whether to deter or to fight, whether with conventional or nuclear weapons, the answer is always and exclusively discrimination and control. I think that no matter how much we try, there is still a strong possibility that the process will get out of hand. In fact, the belief that one would be entering unknown territory and might be carried all the way to mutual suicide is likely to have contributed to the nuclear taboo and hence to deterrence. After all, we have had and continue to have an endless number of conventional conflicts but so far no nuclear one.

In the case of the Soviets, Mr. Wohlstetter very elegantly solves the dilemma with his argument that, given their regime, they care about military power, not about innocent bystanders; hence the more discriminate the response, the more effective both deterrence and defense or war-fighting. He may well be right, although Stalin's crimes, the losses of World War II, and the acceptance of tens of millions of deaths in a "nuclear exchange" may be very different psychologically and politically. But assuming (as, on balance, I do) that he is right in the case of the Soviets, that does not, it seems to me, take care of the broader problem of nuclear deterrence.

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Two polemical ways of putting it, both of which in my view would be unfair but both of which may contain some truth, are:

1. Mr. Wohlstetter makes the possibilities of control and discrimination in nuclear war sound so good that one does not see why he puts such stress on substituting conventional for nuclear weapons whenever possible, or why, so far, there have been, on all sides, including the Communist, more restraints against the use of nuclear weapons than against that of conventional ones.

2. He tends not to give enough weight to "uncertainty," both in deterrence and in war-fighting, which would make the balance less delicate (and deterrence less unstable) and the war less controllable (and hence less appealing to an aggressor) than Mr. Wohlstetter has made them out to be.

I myself believe that this "uncertainty," though it makes it impossible to stabilize the arms race, does act as a stabilizing factor in deterrence: not being quite sure of what an opponent has up his sleeve and how his systems and one's own would actually respond, means that one is always trying to improve one's posture, but it also means that you can never completely trust the calculation which would give you victory in a first strike.

It seems to me there are four positions:

1. Deterrence only, implying that any attempt at defense or even thinking about what happens if deterrence fails detracts from deterrence. This implies that if deterrence fails one has the choice only between a suicidal and criminal spasm and preemptive surrender.

2. Deterrence as identical with defense, or as a by-product of a realistic defense posture. This is Mr. Wohlstetter's position, if I understand him correctly.

3. A deterrent declaratory posture based on the threat of massive retaliation but including as well an operational posture which permits a war-fighting strategy based on limitation and discrimination (the Soviet position, according to Mr. Wohlstetter).

4. A deterrent declaratory posture based on serious, credible threats backed by a corresponding military posture, but a posture which acknowledges that while the lower level will always be preferred, both the sanctity of commitments and the difficulties of control may lead to escalation to undesirable and unpredictable levels.

I confess that I still favor this last approach. I see military force as a last resort if non-military pressures and negotiations fail, nuclear weapons as a last resort if conventional ones fail, strategic if theater nuclear weapons fail, and massive (never singling out cities deliberately but no longer avoiding any valuable military target in order to spare them) if discrimination is not reciprocated or is deliberately used by the other side to protect valuable military targets.

Perhaps it is all only a matter of presentation, but I would say that the more convincingly and eloquently Mr. Wohlstetter argues for the desirability and possibility of control and choice, of limitation and discrimination, the more he exhibits an awareness that war, no matter how controlled and discriminating, and particularly nuclear war, remains a dirty, bloody, messy, and unpredictable business.

A last point: it seems to me not entirely fair to accuse the MAD bombers of actually wanting to bomb innocents or even of claiming that they can deter only by threatening cities. Actually, I think what they are saying is that threatening cities is the only way to deter without provoking, i.e., without raising the suspicion that you are preparing a first strike and hence increasing the danger of preemptive or launch-on-warning from the other side.

Finally, let me emphasize that I believe that fundamentally and in the long run Mr. Wohlstetter provides the only answer to the dangers of war and of surrender, of destruction and of pacifism.

PIERRE HASSNER
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Paris, France

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Albert Wohlstetter's incisive commentary on the problem of nuclear-war moral theory certainly clarifies and improves greatly upon the final position of the Catholic bishops. They should be pleased by his penetrating effort. We can, of course, regret that he was not included in the formulation of their now famous document.

Mr. Wohlstetter has outlined to the bishops and the rest of us what they should have said about their own just-war tradition, particularly the doctrine of the actual protection of the innocent, and of how this is done in the present circumstances. He has also traced the facts of the current nuclear posture in the light of developments in strategic thinking before, during, and after World War II. He is evenhanded, precise. His article is an excellent example of the Thomist principle that moral thinking is natural-law thinking at its best, that it is not exclusively a religious endeavor, however much it does not exclude religious contributions to what can be learned by reasoned reflection. Politics is not revelation. Hence there is true common discourse about its realities. When religion speaks about politics, it must be tested by politics. This is what Mr. Wohlstetter did, and this is why, in a strict way, he laid a claim to be "moral" in a much more rigid fashion than did even the episcopal document.

I was especially struck by his analysis of what might be called "the ideology of dialogue." . . . "Dialogue," in fact, does not necessarily consist of political pacts or lofty conversations in some Soviet, Swiss, or Virginia spa. Rather, while the other watches from a distance, it is a clear understanding of the enemy's political philosophy, his habits, what forces he has put into being, together with a solid grasp of what one must oneself do to make defense policy moral in one's own intellectual terms and realistic in the enemy's eyes. When this is carefully done, "dialogue" will have silently taken place, whether or not a sound is uttered or an official document signed.

If the bishops can look upon their own document as a very imperfect initial effort, as they seem to suggest themselves, then such analyses as that of Mr. Wohlstetter will go a long way to guide them in the two essential things they must keep in mind, as John Paul II has emphasized: how to be moral and how to be free. The first, morality, is, in fact, a function of the second. Failure to realize this fully almost forced us into a "worst-regime" thesis, which would hold that to be "moral" we had to give ourselves up freely to the worst regime, while to be free, we had to be immoral. Demonstrating how to be moral while being free—such is the merit of Mr. Wohlstetter's article.

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To the Editor of Commentary:

Official Catholic pronouncements on nuclear deterrence and defense have been deficient in their characterization of the empirical concepts and facts. The bishops' 1983 pastoral letter reflects a more serious empirical base than was evident in earlier pronouncements. However, Albert Wohlstetter's article reveals major inadequacies on the empirical side which result in inadequacies in the moral guidance offered.

The bishops have relied on one set of empirical assumptions and scenarios, rejecting all others, and declared only one nuclear option to be available. That option is Mutual Assured Destruction, MAD, based on the assumption that nuclear war is intrinsically uncontrollable and, if ever initiated, will inevitably escalate to a worst-case scenario of mutual annihilation that "threatens the existence of our planet."

The logic of this empirical analysis led to MAD deterrence policies. But the bishops, reiterating classic just-war doctrine, reject any actual implementation of a MAD deterrent threat as self-evidently disproportionate to any just end and indiscriminate. Without any serious discussion of the just-cause referent of proportionality or evaluation of the threats to just causes, the bishops reject any alternative limited deterrence/defense posture as unfeasible and, apparently, unnecessary. Thus, they condone the existing deterrent as a necessary evil pending arms-control progress that will eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.

Since the bishops explicitly reject all indications of a change in U.S. deterrence policy in the direction of controlled, discriminate response, how can they reconcile even an ephemeral toleration of a nuclear-deterrent posture that, if ever translated into a war-fighting reality, would, in their opinion, inevitably escalate to all-out nuclear war?

The answer is the "bluff deterrent," developed by the bishops' national-security adviser, Father Bryan Hehir. In a bluff-deterrent posture, as outlined by Mr. Wohlstetter, one threatens implicitly immoral responses that one has publicly renounced. This is achieved by "possessing" the nuclear means to implement the MAD threat while declaring that they are immoral and will never be used.

How could responsible people adopt such a dubious position? Mr. Wohlstetter shows, from perspectives that are more mature and profound than those of many of the experts cited by the bishops, that this bluff deterrent, this "volubly revealed deception," is a natural product of the "deterrence-only" concepts evolved by MAD strategists. A nuclear nominalism, heavily influenced by the view that deterrence is almost entirely psychological, a matter of perceptions rather than substance, has encouraged the notion that deterrence-only postures require no war-fighting contingency plans.

Mr. Wohlstetter traces authoritatively the history of deterrence-only strategies based on the assumption that nuclear war must inevitably assume catastrophic proportions. He scores the underlying error of deterrence-only strategies: the claim that limited nuclear defense consonant with just-war requirements is impossible. This is the position the bishops take.

Given the dangers of any nuclear war, the bishops' position would make sense if nuclear deterrence based on a credible and morally permissible war-fighting posture were dispensable, but it is not, if the free world is to be protected from nuclear aggressors. As Mr. Wohlstetter reminds the bishops, there is no effective deterrence without the capability, intention, and will to resist nuclear aggression with nuclear means if deterrence should fail. A bluff deterrent cannot convey this resolve, particularly for the protracted period that even the most optimistic expectations of arms-control progress would envisage.

In fact, MAD is dead, all trends in U.S. policy are toward war-fighting strategies that would increasingly respect just-war standards of proportionality and discrimination. Bluff deterrents . . . based on MAD deterrence-only postures are even less credible than formerly. The empirical assumption that just and limited nuclear deterrence, based on a war-fighting posture consonant with just-war standards, is and will forever be impossible, is refuted by Mr. Wohlstetter. He holds out just- and limited-war options that are indispensable both for the defense of the free world and as a basis for serious arms control. This is an important contribution in what is only the beginning of a new great debate on morality and nuclear deterrence and defense.

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To the Editor of Commentary:

The final version of the American bishops' pastoral letter on war and peace is a valuable contribution to contemporary moral debate on questions of war generally and on nuclear arms in particular. It is, however, only a contribution to that debate, representing judgments made by the authors of the document and the bishops as a whole in their Chicago meeting. Where these judgments reflect the Christian principles laid out earlier in the document, that is one matter; where they reflect other principles or assumptions about the nature of contemporary military issues, that is another matter entirely.

Unfortunately, while the final document goes to some lengths to declare that the bishops are aware of this dichotomy (unlike, for example, the second draft), some confusion remains in the use of Christian and other assumptions jointly to form specific judgments regarding policy. In particular, this confusion has led to an unfortunate analysis and set of judgments in the subsection, "Moral Principles and Policy Choices," where the criteria of discrimination and proportionality that are taken from the just-war tradition are associated with three "specific evaluations" of deterrence. The problem is that the reasoning applying these just-war criteria to the case of nuclear war-fighting has no obvious connection to the three "specific evaluations" of the bishops, and that in fact just-war reasoning points toward what the bishops reject rather than toward what they endorse.

The first of these "evaluations" contrasts nuclear deterrence "to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others" with "proposals to go beyond this to planning for prolonged periods of repeated nuclear strikes and counterstrikes, or 'prevailing' in nuclear war." Such proposals are "not acceptable," though the pastoral letter accepts the existence of a nuclear deterrent force as morally tolerable, at least in the short run. In the second draft, where this item first appeared, it was called simply "war-fighting

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capabilities." In either case, one suspects the bishops have been led astray in their reasoning by the assumption that strategic deterrence has only to do with ICBM's, SLBM's, and SAC bombers, for the deterrent value of the weapons linked to the idea of "war-fighting" is not only not explored by them, it is not even conceded to exist. In a purely political debate, it might be to the advantage of opponents of such weapons . . . to depict them as enhancing the possibility of nuclear war; yet there is another side to this argument as well; it is not enough, morally speaking, simply to accept the political case against these weapons as the Christian option. Let us look a bit more closely at this.

In the first place, there is considerable tension between the bishops' argument . . . and just-war reasoning as it has taken shape historically. For this moral tradition the priority has always been first to decide the rightness or wrongness of participation in war, then to assess the means of force available and define moral limits to that force. If the priorities are now to be reversed, we should at the least be told why. That is, we should be told why if just-war reasoning is actually what matters, and I have already expressed my doubts as to the relevance of the just-war principles used by the bishops in this context to the "specific evaluations" made. But if the intent is to employ just-war reasoning, then there must be an effort to weigh the reasons that might justify Christian participation in war first, before turning to judgments about the means of war.

Second, it is not clear why planning for prolonged nuclear war is any more morally objectionable than planning for deterrence by means of MAD. On the bishops' own terms, reiterated in various forms from Cardinal Krol's Senate testimony in 1979 to the present pastoral letter, it is the use of nuclear weapons that is to be morally rejected by Christians. To reject plans that may enhance deterrence by making plain that this country could withstand and fight back in a nuclear war simply does not follow, and it suggests that something else is at work in this rejection than the consistent application of principles, Christian or otherwise.

Third, good reasons exist from the very principles of discrimination and proportionality to prefer deterrence by means associated with the idea of limited nuclear war over deterrence associated with the idea of MAD. The bishops deny that these just-war principles could be observed in an actual nuclear conflict; for my part, I would rather take the chance that they could be observed than continue to know that an all-out thermonuclear war with present "strategic" weapons might destroy the earth. Just-war tradition has always and consistently preferred restraint in the means of force. Why should Christians now prefer unlimited force in the form of a MAD-based deterrent?

Behind the bishops' judgment in this matter lies a fundamental confusion—the belief that somehow deterrence can be separated from use in war. It is difficult to see how this belief arose, for common sense suggests that no threat will deter another's act if he judges it is only a threat. Deterrence by threat alone depends on the ability to lie convincingly. Thus we are left with the conclusion that the American Catholic bishops would have Christian statesmen systematically and convincingly lie in order to achieve nuclear deterrence—a strange bit of moral advice for Christians.

A related matter is the idea that nuclear deterrence depends only on the "possession" of nuclear "stockpiles" (an idea that suggests that strategic nuclear weapons are stored in some National Guard armory alongside the howitzers and small arms). These forces are in fact deployed, not "stockpiled," and their "possession" most certainly implies their use in the case of a nuclear emergency. It does no service whatsoever to the moral debate over deterrence strategy to maintain that the present strategic nuclear force would not be employed in case of war. Rather, its deterrent effect depends on the likelihood of its use. No one should realistically expect that, in the case of a general war between the United States and the Soviet Union, strategic forces would be withheld. If the result of using these weapons is too awful to contemplate (as I agree with the bishops it is), then clear-headed moral analysis should point toward reducing our reliance on them. . . . Indeed, a cruel irony is that if this country were to follow the course laid out by the bishops, forgoing the development and deployment of less massively destructive (more proportionate) and more accurate (and discriminate) weapons and the plans for their utilization, then we would be locked into the same MAD strategy that the bishops so roundly (and rightly) condemn as immoral.

I conclude by noting that the ideas of deterrence "sufficiency" and "progressive disarmament" (endorsed by the bishops in their second and third "specific evaluations") might be enhanced by a force posture that did not depend so one-sidedly upon weapons of the present strategic types. In the past, those arms-limitation or reduction efforts that have succeeded best have been those aided by such non-moral factors as lack of military utility and obsolescence. But so long as strategic nuclear weapons are regarded in moral analysis as the only game in town, then the moral pressure works against the development of defenses that would reduce military utility or new weapons systems that would make outsize silo-busters obsolescent or obsolete, once more serving to lock us into place with a deterrence system decried as immoral.

JAMES TURNER JOHNSON
Department of Religion
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

It seems a logical conclusion that if the U.S. is to achieve peace, or at least long-term stability, with the Soviet Union, we must, as the USSR has, establish a policy of expanding influence and control. If we do not do this, then all the other nations of the world are presented with the choice of either (1) accepting Soviet influence; (2) resisting without assistance; or (3) asking for our support. In "real-world" situations, accepting Soviet influence is by far the most likely result. In view of this, it seems obvious that U.S. policy should be to proclaim the truth that the Soviet Union is our prime competitor for world influence and control. We do not have to be enemies or antagonists to be competitors. Let us tell the world that this is the case and provide other nations with the choice of accepting our influence and control.

In addition, the point should also be made that discussions of nuclear arms control cannot be separated from discussions of "conventional" arms control. Although it is healthy to be in constant dialogue concerning these issues, no nation interested in expanding its

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influence would ever make an agreement that it perceived as weakening its ability to wield influence. Neither does history offer any evidence that political leaders are concerned with the extent of destruction or loss of life that would result from the use of any weapons system that would help achieve the goal of expanding influence and control over others. . . .

HOWARD SALASIN
Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Many of us in areas of research directly or peripherally related to military technology have witnessed developments that made possible, without detriment to our strategic security, a significant reduction in the numbers and destructiveness of our strategic nuclear weapons. Further pursuit along these technological lines may even give us a basis for negotiating the complete elimination of such weapons.

For reasons not clear to me, this situation has received little attention in the general press, and COMMENTARY has thus taken an important step with its publication of Albert Wohlstetter's article, Mr. Wohlstetter dissects the arguments of MAD supporters, showing their grotesque inconsistency with the humanitarian principles that provide their motivation.

One may hope that this essay by a man of experience and authority in the subject will initiate an informed public discussion, and put an end to the current battle of slogans that does little credit to our press and our campuses.

MORTON G. WURTELE
Department of Atmospheric Sciences
University of California
Los Angeles, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Albert Wohlstetter shows incisively that our "statesmen" and "strategists" (and not just our bishops) need to do some basic rethinking. The article by Robert S. McNamara in the Fall 1983 issue of *Foreign Affairs* illustrates how widespread and urgent that need is. In the article, Mr. McNamara says that he and at least two Presidents believed that nuclear weapons have no use if deterrence fails. His "use-never" sermon at the White House preceded that of Cardinal Krol. But can we deter the Soviet use of nuclear force in a crisis if we are unwilling to plan seriously to employ nuclear weapons in response? Can we protect the free world from coercion if it is obvious that we think a response would be uncontrollable and would amount to suicide?

The United States, in the mid-70's, looked more soberly at policies for the employment of nuclear weapons in response to nuclear attacks and adopted a dual criterion for any possible use of this awesome force: to destroy Soviet military capabilities selectively and, at the same time, to minimize harm to innocent bystanders. We need limited nuclear options if we are to deter limited nuclear attacks by the Soviets. Much remains to be done, but what has already been done is widely misunderstood. The bishops and some former officials rely on the dubious statements of strategists like Desmond Ball who hold that any possibility of controlled use of nuclear weapons is a "chimera," and that we can and must convince the Soviets that we would reply to a limited Soviet first strike by initiating an insane, massive exchange against civilians. But in fact, our command and control is flexible enough to release exactly the number of nuclear weapons necessary to execute a selective-employment plan.

Additionally, technical advances in the accuracy of delivery now permit us to use highly effective non-nuclear munitions to accomplish missions which until recently could only be carried out by nuclear weapons. The recent European Security Study, "Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe," in which I participated (I was Assistant for Atomic Energy to Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger, Rumsfeld, and Brown), describes how accurately delivered non-nuclear weapons can perform missions against air fields, bridges, and other key lines of access which now call for the use of nuclear-armed aircraft or Pershing missiles. Similar improvements in "smart" conventional submunitions can replace the use of short-range nuclear artillery to defeat massed armor. But the possibility of our actually using nuclear weapons against massed military forces is still an essential condition for fielding an improved and adequate conventional capability.

If we pursue them seriously, we can secure options that would lessen our dependence on nuclear weapons and, most important, reduce our reliance on threats whose execution would mean the intended or unintended destruction of large civilian populations.

DONALD R. COTTER
Arlington, Virginia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Albert Wohlstetter's article is by far the best piece ever done on this subject. But the debate, I believe, is not mostly about foreign policy; foreign policy has become the pursuit of domestic policy by other means.

AARON WILDAVSKY
University of California
Berkeley, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I was struck by the contrast between the importance of the issues Albert Wohlstetter raises and the way his message has been coming across in the popular debate: it is a sorry comment on the state of public discourse that Mr. Wohlstetter's position has been so concealed.

A. LAWRENCE CHICKERING
Executive Director
Institute for Contemporary Studies
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TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I think Albert Wohlstetter's article on the bishops and the bomb is absolutely superb. It should be required reading for any participant in this great national debate.

BRENT SCOWCROFT
Bethesda, Maryland

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

"Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents" is an absolutely first-rate dissection of the ambiguities and contradictions in the bishops' statement, as well as a most persuasive delineation of the direction in which we must move in order to bring morality and strategy back together.

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON
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Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Albert Wohlstetter's article is an astonishing intellectual feat—by all odds the best and most original work I have read on the subject (or many others) in a long time.

EUGENE V. ROSTOW
New Haven, Connecticut

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ALBERT WOHLSTETTER writes:

The letters to the editor, as well as comments on my piece in other journals, both for and against, raise basic issues about the morality and prudence of the Western use of apocalyptic threats, about the changing role of technologies of destruction and technologies of control and discrimination, and about uncertainties in the control of nuclear and non-nuclear conflict. The Western strategic views reflected by the bishops have collapsed into so many incompatible parts that we may at last have reached the point where it is obviously necessary to rebuild.

An apocalyptic view of nuclear war has become orthodox across a wide spectrum of opinion. Publications ranging from *National Review* on the Right to the *New Yorker*, the *New York Review of Books*, and the *Village Voice* on the Left, link the use of nuclear weapons to the mass destruction of populations and frequently to the uncontrolled destruction of Western civilization. Harold Brown, President Carter's Secretary of Defense, for example, followed a practice introduced by his predecessor, Robert S. McNamara, when in 1975 he defined "deterrence" as the perceived capability and intention of annihilating a substantial portion of the population and civilian industry of the nation attacking oneself. So do the editors of *National Review*, who said recently: "Counterpopulation warfare . . . *is* what deterrence threatens" (emphasis added). *Tout court*. The Soviets, in a crisis or some future conventional war, might be stopped from using nuclear weapons by the realization that, if they did, they would very likely lose decisively important elements of their ground and tactical air forces and face a possible political disaster. That, however, by this now standard definition, would not be "deterrence."

Moreover, the apocalyptic character of deterrent threats has been escalating. It seems that to deter we must now literally threaten the end of the world, or at least the end of the northern half of it. Harold Brown, to take a moderate example, believes that a nuclear exchange is likely to have no limits on either side. Desmond Ball is the most prolific source not only for the bishops but for almost everyone else of the view that any nuclear exchange will lead uncontrollably to the direct massive destruction of urban populations. And several studies are in process now, which purport to show that the indirect or global effects of a nuclear war on the atmosphere would be to alter the climate in the entire northern hemisphere long enough to make it uninhabitable. Some of these results were presented at a conference which included many eminent Western and some Soviet scientists held in Sicily last August. A large conference, called "The World After Nuclear War," sponsored by an impressive list of professional societies, was held at the end of October. And by the time this issue of COMMENTARY appears, a report by the National Academy of Sciences, involving some of the same physicists and experts in the physical chemistry of the atmosphere, should be ready to come off the press. It appears that Jonathan Schell's hyperbole may be given some appearance of firm scientific support.

These nightmare prospects have led not only to a call for unilateral disarmament by Western counter-establishments, but to some establishment strictures against any actual use of nuclear weapons, even if we continue to threaten their use, and to injunctions against threatening their use, even though we continue to keep them in stock. It has long been clear to many of us that the West needs urgently to improve its conventional forces enough so that we could expect them to defeat non-nuclear threats whenever they endanger critical interests of the alliance. However, that still leaves open the question of what we do in the interim; or even what we would do when we have obtained such forces, if our expectations should be disappointed in an actual conventional conflict and if we should suffer an overwhelming disaster at conventional arms. In fact, proponents of a "no-first-use" pledge never face squarely a somewhat easier but quite central question: if we should defeat by non-nuclear means a Soviet conventional invasion of a NATO country and the Soviets resort to a confined use of nuclear



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weapons first, how should we respond?

Proponents of a "no-first-use" pledge, like Robert McNamara today, for the most part not only fail to deal with these three questions, they use arguments against first use which would serve equally well to rule out second use. Mr. McNamara, for example, has said recently—to the consternation of our European allies—that nuclear weapons have no military use at all, and that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson shared his view. All such arguments would effectively remove any content to the American guarantee to NATO countries or to Japan that we would respond to a nuclear attack that was confined to an allied country.

Mr. McNamara made Mutual Assured Destruction a formal declaratory policy in the mid-1960's. It has never been operational policy in the United States. Indeed, it could not be. Not only doesn't it fit reality, but various of its essential parts don't fit each other. But while it's necessary to understand the defects of this frightening doctrine, it's even more essential to sketch an alternative to it.

It's hard to resist taking just a few well-aimed smacks at such fierce but hollow defenders of this establishment faith as Theodore Draper, who nowadays appears regularly in the *New York Review of Books*. However, even rhetorical wars should be limited and discriminate. I agree with Pierre Hassner that on these muddled issues of life and death it is more important to clarify the muddle and suggest persuasive alternatives to mass destruction as deterrent than to score points. And (to answer one of his questions) I do not hold that proponents of the now standard Western threats to destroy population on both sides of the Iron Curtain would prefer to surrender (or, still less, to execute such threats) *rather* than to deter. It is their way of trying to deter. Harold Brown, for example, who defined "deterrence" in terms of annihilating population, said and meant that the purpose is to prevent attack. Similarly, the editors of *National Review* say that deterrence threatens counter-population warfare as a means of avoiding it. All this is reckless, in my view, and likely, in some crucial cases, to fail disastrously; but not willfully.

By the same token, proponents of threats of Mutual Assured Destruction should avoid the much more widespread distortion that calls anyone a member of the "war party" who talks of surviving a nuclear war and who believes that you can reliably deter only if you are prepared and willing, if deterrence fails, to fight with at least a rough discrimination that preserves the values we are defending. Charles Krauthammer, in "On Nuclear Morality" in the October COMMENTARY, is more discriminate on this than Leon Wieseltier, his fellow senior editor of the *New Republic*, in *Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace*.

The basic question is which of these differing kinds of policy is more likely to avoid a ruinous war. Father Winters begs that question. He, like the bishops' strategists, assumes that a "war to end all choice" will be made less probable if we restrict our ability to introduce less indiscriminately deadly and less vulnerable weapons, which are also less subject to accidental detonation or unauthorized seizure and use. The freeze would so restrict us. Moreover, he assumes that a policy which rests on an implicit threat to use the more deadly weapons to bring about the uncontrollable destruction of the world is more likely to prevent both deliberate and accidental war.

My own view is that such a bluff of total destruction increases the likelihood of nuclear war by accident or by design. And it increases the devastation such a war could be expected to inflict:

1. It reduces the basis for deterring a deliberate attack by destroying the credibility that we would respond to any nuclear attack that left all or most of our urban population surviving.

2. Then to save some small credibility that we would respond to a limited attack even though we thought that doing so would mean universal ruin, it encourages moves toward delegating the responsibility for decision to a computer. Advocates of the MAD distortion of second-strike theory, during the 1969 ABM debate, revived the bad idea of launching our missiles irrevocably on the basis of electromagnetic indications that a Soviet attack might be on the way. They suggested that instead of defending missile sites with ABM's, we could launch our missiles before enemy missiles arrived. And it was the Carter administration that later advanced "launch-on-warning" as a formal government option.

3. Advocates of this reckless bluff oppose any attempt to increase our ability to control the devastation done to our adversaries or to ourselves on the grounds that the U.S. might precipitate a war unless it were nearly certain the war would be totally devastating. (On the other hand, they assume that it takes only a small probability of extensive harm to deter the supercautious other superpower.)

4. By fostering the notion that even a small probability of a recklessly suicidal Western attack would be enough to deter any enemy use of nuclear weapons, no matter how confined, they justify the acquisition of nuclear strike forces by any small power nominally concerned to deter nuclear attack. (In fact, MAD originated in the mid-1950's among middle powers in Europe as a justification for the spread of nuclear strike forces even to very small countries.)

5. MAD doctrine focuses attention on the problem of deterring a wholly rational, "all-out" attack against all of NATO by a very cautious and exclusively defensive Soviet adversary, faced with no desperate alternatives, who needs only to be convinced that we ourselves may be irrationally suicidal. (In so relaxed a circumstance, a zero probability that we would launch a suicidal response might suffice rather than the near-zero probability advocates of MAD think is enough.) MAD theory neglects more likely circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons and much more serious issues: how, for example, to avoid the general holocaust if a politically responsible Soviet authority, facing disaster in a conventional war, should use nuclear weapons in a confined way on the territory of an ally nominally protected by our nuclear guarantee; or how to avoid the holocaust if nuclear weapons are seized and used against us by men without the authority to use them; or if the authority over nuclear weapons should be acquired along with a small nuclear force by an unpredictable leader, like Qaddafi.

Perhaps most damaging, relying on reckless and improbable threats to deter attack, and the concentration of government attention in defense on nuclear arms and arms control, distract us from the important task of getting a sober non-nuclear answer to any of several critical conventional threats.

In short, the immediate foreclo-

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sure of choice suggested by proponents of Mutual Assured Destruction seems to me to increase the likelihood of conventional as well as nuclear war and to magnify the probability that the war itself would get out of hand, and grow uncontrollably to the much more extensive foreclosure of future choice that Father Winters fears. And the most plausible danger to our future freedom of choice, by far, would stem from the surrender of military resistance to Communist rule, which Cardinal Krol, in a sermon he gave at the White House in September 1979, held is more acceptable morally than any use of nuclear weapons ever.

I don't think that the differences between the strategy the bishops advocate and a strategy emphasizing discriminate and proportionate responses can be settled by an appeal to theology or even to philosophy, as Father Winters suggests. Aristotle makes the common-sense point that moral problems have to do with the contingent, with those things that can be affected by choice. (Paul Ramsey and Father Schall understand that very well.) While one expects the entire thrust of the pastoral letter to emphasize moral choice, unfortunately in several key passages the letter relies on physicists who claim that on these matters policy choices are excluded by the laws of physics.

Father Winters is quite right in observing a convergence between my own view and that of the bishops that security policies which rest on intentional targeting of civilians raise cardinal moral issues, with the one qualification that the word "convergence" might suggest erroneously that one or the other of us hasn't held this all along. That view distinguishes us from Theodore Draper who has said in the *New York Review of Books* that we should all "bite off our tongues" before uttering the word "morality" when discussing kinds of nuclear conflict. Mr. Draper believes that deterrence must rely on threats whose execution would lead to the annihilation of both sides and possibly universal ruin. He also believes that deterrence in one of its forms relies on the fact that it is highly probable that an adversary's preparations for a successful first strike would provoke us to get in our own first strike before he had even launched. This notion of launching irreversibly a strike that we think would annihilate ourselves on the basis of an enemy's logistic preparations and other reversible readying moves is even more extreme than the most reckless proposals for launching on the basis of electromagnetic signals of an adversary attack under way. With views like that, it is easy to understand why Mr. Draper would like discussions of the morality of various nuclear policies silenced, though perhaps less violently.

The pastoral letter condones the continued stocking of nuclear weapons and the deterrent threat implicit in it. But since it holds that destroying populations or threatening to destroy them are both wrong, and that any nuclear war will lead to unlimited destruction, the moral choices facing the bishops seem especially hard, although, I would contend, not much harder than those of the strategists they reflect. Bruce M. Russett believes that I have misstated the message of the pastoral letter in its third and final version. Since the bishops only amplify the difficulties in a view now standard among Western statesmen and strategists, a discussion of their position on the use of threats of mass destruction has a wider interest than any normal explication of texts.

If you believe any nuclear exchange will almost surely destroy Western civil society and even bring on universal ruin, you may say you would respond to a limited nuclear attack, but if you are even moderately thoughtful, you will almost surely not really mean it. Even if you had so awesomely suicidal and homicidal a *conditional* intention, you would be unlikely, in the event of an adversary's limited use of nuclear weapons, *actually* to be willing to reply by ending the world. If your adversary understands that you believe a nuclear reply would be suicidal, he may count on your being unwilling to reply, even if you say you will. But in more recent times, Western elites have ceased even to say it. During the period of détente following the Cuban missile crisis, they came increasingly to say the opposite, with varying degrees of clarity: that nuclear weapons have no use if deterrence fails, and that one may deter but one should not even talk about actually fighting, much less plan to fight.

Statements since the mid-1970's by the American Catholic bishops are perhaps the most explicit illustration of this trend. In formal testimony representing the American bishops' organization, the U.S. Catholic Conference, as well as in his sermon at the White House, Cardinal Krol, a member of the *conservative* wing of the bishops, said bluntly: "Possession, yes. . . . Use, never!" And I believe that this is the substance of the final as well as the two preceding versions of the bishops' pastoral letter. However, as Donald R. Cotter's letter stresses, the bishops do not differ substantially from a wide variety of Western statesmen, strategists, and members of the press who for years have chorused in horror whenever a member of any American administration is caught out suggesting that a nuclear war might conceivably be limited. Robert McNamara's sermon at the White House preceded Cardinal Krol's. And "use, never" is, after all, the direct meaning of the standard establishment view known as "deterrence only."

The final pastoral letter rules out the mass destruction of populations, whether that slaughter is intended or unintended but probable (page 15, col. 1 and page 11, col. 3). It also holds that any nuclear exchange will almost surely lead to the unlimited mass destruction of population. (Page 15, col. 2 says that "The chances of keeping use limited seem remote." Page 16, col. 1 expresses the hope that "leaders will resist the notion that nuclear conflict can be limited [or] contained." Page 13, col. 3 approves the view that "talk about . . . even surviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appreciate medical reality.") In brief, then, the final letter rules out any use of nuclear weapons, first, second, or ever.

The second draft of the letter spelled out this obvious meaning even more explicitly than the final version. Mr. Russett thinks that's an important substantive difference. Father Winters, who also consulted with the bishops during the successive formulations of the letter, is more candid. He says that all versions after the first reject not only attacks on cities but "any militarily meaningful use of nuclear weapons." And William V. O'Brien and James Turner Johnson have been clear about the matter throughout all the drafts.

The political history of the formation of the final text has only a limited interest for those who took

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no part in it. All four versions had obscurities, some deliberate. Such ambiguities have much less to do with deterring a possible Soviet attack than with keeping the peace among American Catholics of differing political views. The "centimeter of ambiguity" which Father Bryan Hehir, the principal begetter of the pastoral letter, likes to cite as enough to do the job of nuclear deterrence is a fig leaf covering a rather small area of the nakedness of the "use, never" position. Many conservatives as well as liberals seem grateful for even that tiny fig leaf. But the emperor *is* naked, as Messrs. O'Brien and Johnson insist.

In my view, the first draft came closest to endorsing a restricted and proportionate use of nuclear weapons in response to a limited nuclear attack and so came closest to facing hard choices. The second draft, because it rejected with the least ambiguity all nuclear weapons, had the greatest value for reflecting and exposing the dangerous bluff that has come increasingly to replace a serious defense policy among political elites in Western Europe as well as in the United States.

THE bishops rule out not only massive and indiscriminate destruction but also any threats of such destruction. But the phrase "massive and indiscriminate destruction" doesn't restrict, as Mr. Russett suggests it does, their condemnation of threats of any use of nuclear weapons, since they think that *any* nuclear exchange will lead to massive and indiscriminate destruction. Though I cannot agree that every potential use of nuclear weapons would lead to the destruction of innocents en masse, I am with the bishops when they condemn threats against innocents. The academics who, in the mid-1960's, thought it necessary to hold innocent populations as nuclear "hostages," and thought this harmless because it would never be necessary to execute the terror, might have had second thoughts a few years later when PLO and PFLP terrorists began using innocent airline passengers as hostages, in what they considered a good cause. Preventing World War III is, of course, a great cause we all share. But even so, to threaten universal ruin makes the Palestinian terrorists seem tame. On the major TV networks, on public radio, on literally hundreds of campuses, and in the churches and parish schools the current campaign to conjure up, in grisly detail—as the inevitable outcome of any nuclear war—images of burned children and horribly wounded mothers in the midst of total devastation, terrorizes primarily Western publics. Members of the Politburo, on the other hand, surely do not complain if Westerners fix firmly in their minds the idea that any Western use of nuclear weapons will result in such horrors.

Father Winters, once again, is more candid than Mr. Russett in acknowledging that the bishops condemn threats as well as actual mass destruction. The bishops think the threat involved in the potential use of nuclear weapons can only be indiscriminate, and they condemn such threats. Yet they condone maintaining a stockpile of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Father Winters's proposed solution to this insoluble dilemma is to say, as he does in his interesting essay, "The Bow or the Cloud?," that we needn't threaten; the weapons themselves will threaten. This is an ingenious twist on the old arguments about domestic gun control: that is, that people don't kill people; weapons kill people. Only Father Winters's formulation argues for keeping the stock of deadly weapons. While ingenious, the argument seems less than serious, and given the subject matter, even frivolous.

Father Winters argues that the Soviets, being deeply suspicious, won't believe us even if we *say* we will never use nuclear weapons. After all, we would not believe that the Soviets would abstain from using nuclear weapons, even if they made a "no-first-use" pledge. This is a particularly good example of Father Winters's imaginativeness in argument. I am impressed. I agree that it would be a great mistake for us to believe that the Soviets would not use nuclear weapons, simply because they promised not to. However, that is the reason we should make it clear to them that if they use nuclear weapons, we have a non-suicidal response, which would defeat the purpose of their using nuclear weapons. The problem with the declaratory policy Father Winters and so many strategists now propose is that it shapes our posture and plans in a way that would reveal we have nothing but a suicidal response and that we really mean it when we say we will not respond. The behavior of the Soviets, on the other hand, makes rather clear that they intend neither to commit suicide nor to surrender the use of nuclear weapons, if the alternatives during a conventional war should look even worse.

I HAVE said that the behavior of the Soviets in the past demonstrates that they value military power at least as much as they prize Soviet bystanders, and, therefore, that the prospect of losing key elements of their military power should deter their use of nuclear weapons at least as well as threats against their civilians. And the fact that they have frequently increased their military power at the expense of civilian lives suggests that centering on their military power may be an even better way to deter. My view contrasts with the now familiar one expressed, for example, by the editors of *National Review*, which I quoted earlier, that "counterpopulation warfare . . . is what deterrence threatens," by definition. On the other hand (to answer another of Mr. Hassner's questions), my view is not the opposite extreme of the familiar definition of deterrence. It does not imply that the Soviets place *no* value on their own citizens, even if they are not useful in war. Even if the Soviets attack our civil society, I believe that we can and should bring the war to an end most rapidly by concentrating on enemy military power. First, that will most directly interfere with his conduct of the war; second, it is a good intra-war deterrent; and third, other things being equal, we have no desire to destroy Soviet subjects, many of whom are potential allies, and in any case, do us no harm.

These last points, I recognize, call for a most drastic change in outlook. Nonetheless I think simple prudence may recommend it. In the Battle of Britain, Hitler erred when he switched to bombing British civilians from bombing fighter production and key elements of fighter command. If he had not, the battle might conceivably have gone the other way.

But Mr. Hassner is obviously right when he suggests that it is important to clarify and elaborate the differences between my own views of the feasibility of controlling unintended harm, and those associated with the use of threats

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of mass destruction as deterrent. The latter views are so widespread that most readers find it hard to understand any other.

The *New York Review of Books* again offers some choice examples: George Ball and, once again, Theodore Draper. I think it feasible and urgent to improve our capabilities for discrimination and control in both nuclear and non-nuclear war and to place some gross limits on the destruction of innocent bystanders. George Ball, who believes that any nuclear exchange of military significance will lead to unlimited destruction, concludes that I must think that a nuclear war directed at military targets would be "neat [and] well-mannered." Theodore Draper, at his surliest, suggests that I think a nuclear war would be like ping-pong. Like Mr. Ball, Mr. Draper, who has said justly that Jonathan Schell's mind operates only between extremes, cannot himself conceive of any use of nuclear weapons in between a neat well-mannered game of ping-pong and total mutual annihilation. They both believe that we have no alternative if we are faced with the need to respond to a limited nuclear attack other than to say, "Whee!" and let all the nuclear weapons go. Or do nothing at all. What Messrs. Ball and Draper conceal beneath their bluster about the impossibility of a neatness comparable to table tennis is that they are against trying even roughly to confine a nuclear conflict and to limit damage to bystanders on both sides.

I have never been in the slightest bit unclear about the slaughter involved in war, even a non-nuclear war. In my paper, "Alternatives to Mass Destruction," for *Pacem in Terris II*, I said, in brief, "war will in any case be terrible." That is not a good reason, however, for making the disaster complete and universal.

War would be terrible, even if we were able to confine the destruction effectively to military targets and to combatants. Slaughter on the beaches of Normandy or in the trenches of World War I was centered on men at arms. But even the direct and immediate harm in a conventional war was never neatly limited to combatants. What is more, there is aways the possibility that the violence of a conflict will mount in chain to higher levels than originally intended. That cannot, however, excuse the failure to try to control the mounting violence; nor does it excuse the abandonment of any serious attempt to discriminate between soldiers and innocent bystanders.

Moreover, there is an enormous difference (about three orders of magnitude) between the area that the grossly inaccurate ballistic missiles of the late 1950's would have destroyed and the area of destruction that would be subjected to blast damage by a cruise missile of today with mid-course guidance and a small nuclear warhead. (Many scientists and soldiers changed their view of the choices possible in nuclear war late in the 1950's when the expected accuracies for the coming ICBM's and SLBM's were at their worst.) And, as I have stressed, there is an enormous difference of even greater importance between the area of destruction by a cruise missile with mid-course guidance and a small nuclear warhead and the area that would be destroyed unintentionally by a cruise missile with autonomous terminal homing and a non-nuclear warhead suited to the military target attacked.

According to Mr. Draper, it is "insidious to urge that one type of nuclear war is immoral, but that another . . . is more morally acceptable." It didn't seem that way to opponents of the H-bomb when they supported a large expansion of fission weapons for use against military targets in the early 1950's, because they thought that H-bombs were so indiscriminately destructive that they could only be used against cities. And the liberal community that supports nuclear threats against cities today has had a remarkable amnesia about its decade-long struggle to protect civilians and to shift nuclear weapons to military targets. It is ironic that now, when such a shift is more feasible than ever, it should be regarded as "insidious."

On the other hand, even accurately delivered, small nuclear weapons will by no means make nuclear war, as Mr. Draper suggests in tones of horror, "even more precise and discriminating" than "any other kind of war." Most obviously, it will be vastly more indiscriminate than a war conducted with the extremely precise conventional weapons now feasible. A thousandth of a square mile subject to destruction by such a "conventional" weapon contrasts with an area three orders of magnitude larger that might be destroyed by a small, relatively accurate nuclear weapon.

The contrast, of course, is not merely in the direct damage done, but in the ability to keep the chain of violence under political control.

New ballistic and cruise missiles with conventional warheads can substitute for nuclear weapons in a variety of important missions. They will permit the raising of the threshold beyond which we might resort to nuclear weapons. However, they cannot completely replace nuclear weapons. For example, as an answer to an adversary's restricted use of nuclear weapons, we clearly need the ability to make a proportionate nuclear response. Moreover, as Mr. Cotter's letter mentions, if we have the capability of using *nuclear* weapons ourselves in a restricted, non-suicidal way, this can force an adversary to disperse his own military force in a conventional war in a way that makes it much easier to exploit our own improved conventional capabilities.

I suspect Mr. Hassner was only acting as devil's advocate when he anticipated some of Mr. Draper's arguments. But it was useful. There should be little doubt about the revolutionary strategic importance of the new technologies that permit the precise, effective, and discriminate delivery of long-range attacks on military targets with non-nuclear weapons. The implications of this revolution are only beginning to be grasped. The synonyms we use for "non-nuclear" as distinct from "nuclear" tend to obscure the revolutionary nature of the change —words like "conventional" or, in France, "classical," or even, in the words of the current French Minister of Defense, "archaic."

The change is not only by comparison with nuclear weapons. The contrast is almost as great between these new "conventional" weapons and the wildly imprecise conventional weapons that forced the British in 1940 to turn to saturation bombing of cities at night. And the new "conventional" missiles contrast even more obviously with the German V-1 and V-2 missiles of World War II.

The revolutionary change is obscured perhaps even more by the blurring of distinctions between effectiveness in destroying military targets and the massive destruction, even if unintended, of nearby civilian targets. Even before nuclear weapons were produced in order to

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compensate for the gross inaccuracy of our delivery system, saturation bombing with conventional weapons had largely obliterated the distinction between the strategic bombing of military targets and the destruction of civil society as a whole. Such extreme inaccuracy made infeasible the systematic application of the "dual criterion" whose importance Mr. Cotter stresses: it made it hard to destroy military targets and at the same time preserve civil society intact. Hard, in other words, to fight a war without destroying the values we are trying to defend. Even with revolutionary technical advances, that will never be easy. But it is absurd to talk—in the way now standard, for example, in the freeze movement—as if any improvement in weaponry increases the weapons' mass destructiveness. In fact, there seems to be an odd coalition, including some on the Left as well as on the Right, forming to block these new non-nuclear technologies. We are hearing a good deal lately about the costs and horrors of non-nuclear war.

CONSERVATIVES have often tended to argue against the anti-nuclear activists that if they think nuclear weapons are bad, they should realize that conventional weapons are almost as bad and maybe even worse. The anti-nuclear movement, which is usually anti-war in general, likes that particular conservative line of argument. Nonetheless, major figures in the wing of the Western establishment that opposes unilateral disarmament continue to use this argument and even to conjure up visions of greater horrors to come because conventional weapons are being "modernized." And on the unilateralist Left, members of a recent Pugwash conference and Michael Klare, of the radical-Left Institute for Policy Studies, have been spreading the alarm about the dangers of this "near-nuclear" modern conventional weaponry.

West Germany's Foreign Minister, speaking for the German middle, said recently, "We must reiterate our warning time and again against underrating the dangers of a conventional war, a war waged without nuclear weapons. Given the technological developments, such a war would be a thousand times more horrible than World War II." Since World War II killed some 50 million people, that suggests a new conventional war will

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destroy 50 billion. Rather difficult to manage, given the earth's present population. Even Michael Novak, whose courageous challenge to the unilateralism of the pastoral letter has been a major contribution to the debate, has sometimes fallen into this trap. He says, in *Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age*: "Even should the specter of nuclear war be lifted at last from the human race, we recognize the horrors of modern conventional warfare. The power and terrible accuracy of rocket-driven conventional arms, launched at great distances, became visible during the last days of World War II. These horrors have been magnified since. . . ."

On one meaning of the phrase "terrible accuracy," it would seem that the accuracy of the V-2 was terribly good; on another, that it was terribly bad. The passage is worth clarifying since it suggests some of the standard mix-ups about the implications of improvements in accuracy. It seems to say that the accuracy of Hitler's V-2 was terribly good, and that advances in precision since have increased the horrors, that is, increased the likelihood of indiscriminate destruction. However, the first V-2 was extremely inaccurate. It was essentially unguided. It had a median radius of error of eleven miles at a range of 200 miles. This is to say, half of a great many shots would fall *outside* a circle of a 380-square-mile area.

Second, the V-2's inaccuracy was the basic reason that it could be used only as a terror weapon against population. It would have taken infeasibly large numbers of V-2's to have even a small probability of destroying a moderately hard small military target. As the letter "V" suggests, Hitler used it as a purely vengeance weapon which he revived in reaction to the British area-bombing of Luebeck. Even then, of 230 rockets reaching the United Kingdom by the end of 1944, only 17 came within three miles of Charing Cross.

Third, the current accuracy of rockets without terminal guidance, even at intercontinental range, is about two orders of magnitude better than that of the V-2 at 200 miles. And the Pershing 2, which is a medium-range rocket, has an accuracy which is an order of magnitude better than that of our current ICBM's. That will permit it to use a non-nuclear warhead with kinetic-energy penetrators effectively against airfields with collateral damage that is extremely small by comparison with that done by a small nuclear weapon; or by the V-2 if the V-2 had been used in large enough numbers to be effective against a military target.

When proponents of a freeze talk indiscriminately about the "increased destructiveness" of new weapons, they frequently imply that improvements in accuracy that increase our ability to destroy a military target will thereby also increase the collateral damage, the "mass destruction." (They would freeze new conventionally-armed cruise missiles because they might carry a nuclear warhead instead.) Senator Claiborne Pell of the Foreign Relations Committee illustrated the confusion splendidly in the recent debate on the "build-down" which would allow the introduction of modern weapons and the simultaneous withdrawal of several older weapons. According to Senator Pell, that was much worse than a freeze precisely because it would permit the introduction of new weapons and therefore would increase mass destruction. In fact, the confusion on the subject of qualitative and quantitative "arms races" in debates on arms control is nearly total.

Willy Brandt illustrated a related confusion nicely in a dramatic speech to a crowd of 400,000 in Bonn, protesting this past October against the deployment of the Pershing-2 missiles—which his party had earlier requested the United States to install: "We don't need more means for mass destruction. We need less." But the Pershing 2 will reduce both the numbers and mass destructiveness of the Pershing 1 it will replace. It will replace only the number of Pershing 1's on launchers, not the substantial number of Pershing-1 reloads. The Pershing 2 is much more discriminate because it is more accurate and it enables a choice of nuclear yields, including a low yield that is much smaller than the yield of the Pershing-1 warhead. NATO gets no credit for that. Nor for the 1,000 nuclear warheads it has already removed from Europe. Nor will it for the additional 1,400 short-range nuclear warheads it is now scheduled to take out. The stereotypes about arms races and escalating nuclear arsenals are immune to fact.

My article did not deal extensively enough with the ways in which the bishops' references to the continuing arms race and the escalating nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers reflect the standard looseness and error on this subject. I mentioned in passing that the bishops, like almost everyone else, persist in talking about the steady accumulation of nuclear weapons by both superpowers and the increasing, indiscriminate destructiveness of their stockpiles, and I noted that, at the very least, such statements show a certain lack of seriousness. What they have failed to observe is that the American stock of nuclear weapons has been declining for fifteen years. It actually peaked in 1967—at a level one-third higher than the current levels. The number of megatons in the stockpile (which is most relevant for measuring indiscriminate mass destruction and especially for the apocalyptic global effects that are now so prominent in the debate) reached its highest level *twenty-three* years ago, *in 1960*. The number of megatons in our stockpile then was four times as high as now. The average destructive energy per weapon started to decline even earlier, in 1957. Then it was ten times as high as now.

Mr. Russett doubts the reduction in the number of nuclear "weapons" and believes that my wording was "too loose" to be meaningful. He is interested in strategic weapons. Mr. Russett, I'm afraid, mistakes inclusiveness for imprecision. My words had an exact and obvious meaning. They meant all the nuclear weapons in our stockpile, including not only strategic-offense and -defense warheads but fleet-defense weapons and all the main categories of tactical weapons. That total has gone down, not up. This most comprehensive total seems appropriate since the bishops are concerned about the possibility of nuclear war in overseas theaters and not only intercontinental war. Proponents of the freeze, similarly, are talking about freezing all nuclear weapons.

In the early 1970's, when it was fashionable to talk only about the "strategic arms race," to introduce a little reality into the discussion I published detailed figures on, among other things, strategic spending, the number of strategic vehicles, and the strategic stockpile. I succeeded in getting figures for the strategic stockpile as a whole, and for various subcategories of it, released in index form. Unfortunate-

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ly, most of the talk about arms races and about "increasingly destructive" and "ever-increasing" nuclear stockpiles ignores these figures, which have been available for nearly a decade now, not to say those that have become available more recently. Discussion of the arms race continues to proceed in great confusion and ignorance of the facts.

Mr. Russett's own recent book, *Prisoners of Insecurity*, characteristically identifies the "strategic arsenal" with the stockpile of strategic-offense weapons—even though current arms-race dogma takes strategic defense as particularly malign. He doesn't notice, therefore, the drastic decline in the strategic-defense part of the strategic-weapons arsenal which offsets increases in the offense. But confusion is very widespread. Mr. McNamara, whom I had always thought very good at numbers, recently has confounded the number of strategic-offense weapons with the number of all-nuclear weapons; and also, in talking of 17,000 new additions to the total nuclear stockpile, has confused these with *net* additions to the stockpile. He cited a New York *Times* article by Judith Miller, reporting long-term projections that might add 17,000 new weapons. Miss Miller had made it clear, however, that these projected additions would be offset by the withdrawal of older weapons. Dr. Helen Caldicott, president of Physicians for Social Responsibility, has completed the confusion. She not only describes these 17,000 weapons as a *net* addition, but thinks that they are all strategic weapons, and weapons in the megaton range. In any case, such long-term projections, even if correctly identified, are not firm commitments but only wish lists. And, in the period beginning in 1967, we were withdrawing about twice as many nuclear weapons as we added.

In general, discussions of the supposedly growing nuclear stockpiles and discussions of a quite hypothetical arms race have been deplorably loose, misinformed, and misleading. I have for many years believed that we can drastically further reduce our stockpiles both in number and in destructiveness if we pursue innovations in accuracy and discriminateness and related technologies more energetically. However, most discussions of both nuclear arms and nuclear spending have had almost no relation to actual history. They have, instead, rationalized unilateral restraints on Western arms spending and Western innovation. Meanwhile, the Soviets have continued to build their military force and to improve it qualitatively.

THE second-strike theory of deterrence in its origins in the early and mid-1950's placed risks and uncertainties at its center. It recognized that risk was ineradicable and that every decision meant a choice among risks. First of all, the design and operation of a strategic force had to compromise the likelihood that we could survive and respond to a deliberate nuclear attack with the need to reduce the risk that we would launch an attack irreversibly in response to a false alarm, or that we would increase excessively the risks of nuclear accidents or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. That was the reason that so much attention was given to command and control and to the development of low-cost, repeatable responses to ambiguous signals that did not commit us to war, as in the case of various degrees of ground alert and fail-safe operation of bombers. There is no great trick in deterring deliberate attack, if one is willing to be sufficiently irresponsible about accidental or mistaken war. And vice versa. (A proper concern for Murphy's law should affect both the design of responses to initial attack or to ambiguous signs of attack and also the strategy for conduct of a war.) That this matter is not well-understood today is illustrated by frequent blithe remarks about the great stability of the balance of terror in combination with ominous statements that the chance of our nuclear forces or the enemy's being used by "accident" increases year by year. A genuinely stable deterrent requires dealing with both sorts of risks.

Second, the second-strike theory recognized that the risks that would suffice to deter an adversary would depend not only on the absolute amount of damage we threatened, but on the probability that we would actually inflict the harm we threatened, which in turn had something to do with the risks we would face in responding to attack, that is, the damage we would expect to suffer. Moreover, we want especially to deter an adversary in the dangerous circumstances which are the most likely ones to impel him to resort to nuclear weapons. Our adversary might have embroiled himself in a conventional war with one or more of our allies in a place critical for both of us, and he might, if our conventional defense has been effective or lucky, find himself facing a politically disastrous defeat at conventional arms. Our ability to deter his use of nuclear weapons then will depend on whether we can make that alternative appear more dangerous to him than accepting the likelihood of defeat at the conventional level.

Our adversary then also must choose among risks. Criteria for deterrence like the later notion of "unacceptable damage" unfortunately suggest that there is some level of damage—say 20 percent to 25 percent of his population killed—which in an absolute sense is quite acceptable to him and that threatening a higher level of damage than that will invariably deter him. This later notion had some role as a bargaining device in the battle between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it has very little to do with the serious problem of deterrence. There is no great trick in deterring the Soviets from using nuclear weapons when there is little or no serious and immediate danger to them, if they do *not* use them. The authors of the second-strike theory never supposed that the Soviets were straining at the leash to start a nuclear war. They did believe, and still do, that Soviet predispositions might lead them to seize an opportunity for expansion in some part of the world that is unstable and vulnerable, yet critical for the West, and that, at some future date, we or our allies might be embroiled in a conventional conflict. And the course of that conflict could generate incentives for the Soviets to use nuclear weapons, most likely in ways appropriate to decide that conflict. That is when we would need our deterrent most. We might also be confronted with a decision of how to respond if our adversary actually did use nuclear weapons in the theater or in some restricted way against the sources of our support and of reinforcement of operations in the theater.

In all of these varied circumstances of the possible initiation of the use of nuclear weapons, the response to that use and the continuing conduct of a war to bring it to an end, both sides have enormous incentives to control the risks. And

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both sides are likely increasingly to exploit the new technologies of precision and control. The greatest weakness of exponents of the theory that we must threaten mutual annihiliation in order to deter, and that that is all that we have to do, is the failure to consider the risks, incentives, and uncertainties in the potential use of nuclear weapons in the most plausible concrete contingencies and the failure to consider the uncertainties and the strong incentives for controlling the risks. They consider almost exclusively question-begging extremes.

There are many plausible but false stereotypes about deterrence that are common even among sensible statesmen and strategists who reject basing our policy on threats of Mutual Assured Destruction. The familiar saying that uncertainty is the essence of deterrence could mean that any finite chance, no matter how small, that we would respond would be enough to deter the Soviet Union in any plausible circumstance. Or it might even mean that the more uncertainty the better, which would seem to have the far-fetched meaning that the smaller the probability that we would respond, the more likely we are to deter aggression. But at the very least it generally means that all that really counts is the enormous magnitude of the disaster promised, and so long as one's adversary cannot be absolutely sure that we won't inflict this disaster, he will never take the chance of using nuclear weapons. And he never can be sure that we won't be crazy enough to bring on that disaster, even though we know it would engulf us too. Not being crazy himself, therefore, he will be deterred.

This well-worn course of reasoning can be persuasive only if one sticks to abstractions and extremes and never considers the concrete contingencies in which an adversary might have incentives to use nuclear weapons because all alternatives confronting him look even more chancy. Then the fact that we are promising to end the world may look so outrageous that he will take his chances on our maintaining a modicum of sanity. In fact, there is recent statistical evidence and a long body of experience in the common law which suggest that deterrence of crime depends critically on the degree of certainty with which the crime will be punished, rather than merely on the magnitude of the penalty. The severity of the penalty can even work in reverse. It can increase the crime rate by making punishment less likely. In 18th-century England, Parliament had declared no fewer than 160 offenses to be punishable by death. "So dreadful a list," Blackstone wrote, "instead of diminishing, increases the number of offenders, because the injured party, through compassion, sometimes forbears to prosecute; or juries for the same reason acquit the accused or mitigate the nature of the offense; or judges likewise recommend mercy."

Now picture what the case might be if all the parties concerned in shaping the decision to hang the criminal—the victims, the prosecutor, the jury, the judge—recognized that if hanging were the verdict, they too would be hanged, along with their families and closest friends. And, in fact, so would just about everybody else. It would clear their minds considerably. Threats to bring down the world along with one's enemy need a lot of rethinking.

Reagan & the Poor

To the Editor of Commentary:

Michael Novak's article, "The Rich, the Poor & the Reagan Administration" [August], is perhaps the finest piece on politics and the budget that I have had the pleasure of reading since coming to Congress.

Of the numerous reports and analyses that cross my desk every day, Mr. Novak's article impressed me because of its careful and objective attention to the *facts*. As one involved in the newspaper publishing business throughout my life, I appreciate Mr. Novak's efforts in writing such an insightful piece.

I have wrestled for quite some time over this whole issue of "fairness" and come to the conclusion that there is no one word in the English language that is subject to more interpretation than the word "fair."

[Congressman] Denny Smith
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

To the Editor of Commentary:

Michael Novak's rebuttal of the Left's mean-spirited depiction of the Reagan administration as a heartless enemy of the poor was long in coming, though worth the wait. But Mr. Novak touches upon two areas of the federal budget too lightly: entitlement programs and defense. Each of these deserves far greater scrutiny.

Mr. Novak himself falls prey to the liberal-Left's characterization of Social Security and Medicare as "fundamental welfare programs." Although the original purpose of Social Security was to provide assurance that the elderly would avoid destitution, today the system is expected to do much more. It has become a pension fund from which virtually all "senior" citizens draw, regardless of financial need. And, for the most part, today's beneficiaries are members of the same middle class that enjoys Medicare benefits.

Social Security and Medicare are just the more salient of the many federal entitlement programs which have continued to gallop out of control. Over 50 percent of all federal spending consists of benefits to individuals. For two-thirds of those benefits, the financial need of the recipient is not a factor. In addition, one out of every three Americans receives some form of non-cash federal benefit. These various entitlement programs amount to what Peter G. Peterson has called middle-class welfare. Examples abound.

Item: Pensions for retired federal employees are irresponsibly generous. Replacement income for government employees averages 50 percent higher than in the private sector. Over 40 percent of male civil-service workers retire between the ages of fifty-five and fifty-nine, compared with only 6 percent in private industry. With civilian and military pensions costing over $35 billion in fiscal year 1983, this profligacy is reaching scandalous proportions.

Item: The Veterans Administration's $10-billion-dollar health-care delivery system is another entitlement program out of financial control, now that it provides free medical care to veterans sixty-five years of age and older, whether or not their illness is service-related. This select-beneficiary population is about to double in size, as World War II veterans swell the ranks of the "entitled." At this point, it is an even bet as to which will be financially overwhelmed first, Medicare or the VA medical system.

Item: Between 1970 and 1980, the disability caseload increased by 75 percent and its payload by 500 percent, although rates of sickness

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

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

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

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and injury did not change significantly. The cost of living merely doubled while the dollar value of disability benefits tripled. The proportion of men who are not working doubled since 1953. In the fifty-five to sixty-four age group, more than one in four men no longer work. They withdrew from the labor force in increased proportion as it became more lucrative not to work.

Federal subsidies for the middle class can also be found in the most unlikely guise. One example with which I am personally acquainted is federal aid to poor... urban areas. It seems that the eligibility criteria are such that Great Neck, New York, an affluent (and politically liberal) community on Long Island's north shore, has received, in fiscal years 1982 and 1983, federal urban aid to permit the red-bricking of sidewalks outside the village's more fashionable stores and boutiques. Local liberals rationalized that the village was entitled to the subsidy and, besides, if Great Neck did not take the money, someone else would.

The principal problem is that our political leaders are afraid to level with their middle-class constituents. Conventional wisdom says that a politician who is thought to oppose middle-class entitlements will suffer defeat at the polls.

Unfortunately, President Reagan accepted this political thinking when he declared early in his term that the nation's largest entitlement programs (i.e., those serving the middle class) would be exempt from serious cost-containment measures. One result has been that the burden of budget restraint fell mainly on welfare programs that focus on the poor or near poor, a fact that has made the administration vulnerable to the charge of callousness. Of greater import, the failure to attack all entitlement programs is assuring astronomical budget deficits.

The Left, however, seized the opportunity to appeal to the middle class through scare tactics (e.g., Reagan was going to "slash" Social Security benefits) and by establishing reduced defense spending as the alternative to limiting entitlement benefits.

Mr. Novak correctly points out that President Reagan's rearmament program will consume less of the nation's GNP than defense costs did in the early 60's. More importantly, the current increase in military spending is essential to reverse the gross deterioration of U.S. defenses which occurred in the 70's as a result of a steady decline in real-dollar funding. Underfunding adversely affected all areas of the military at a time when the Soviet Union was engaging in a breathtaking military build-up.

In today's debate, the Left successfully misrepresents the issues, claiming that increased defense spending is made possible by cuts in social-welfare programs. In fact, if the military budget were not increased by a single dime next year, the projected federal deficit would still exceed $150 billion.

Perhaps it is too much to expect that Congress will temper runaway entitlement programs by controlling expenditures. Only Ronald Reagan stands in the way of increased taxes—which he correctly understands would be a sure-fire way to replace economic recovery with economic stagnation. Nevertheless, it is one thing to veto congressional tax increases, it is quite another to make Congress appropriate the funds necessary for rearmament.

Unless President Reagan dispels the false link between defense and social-welfare spending, it may not be possible to sustain the political support essential to a long-term U.S. military build-up. That is why it is crucial that the President tackle entitlement programs head-on. There simply is no other realistic choice.

DAVID SCHIMEL
Great Neck, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I would like to reply to the article by Michael Novak defending the "fairness" of the economic policies of the Reagan administration.

The believers in the Ronald Reagan brand of government are decrying the findings of a recent Gallup poll, whereby 82 percent of the American people hold that President Reagan's domestic programs "help the rich"; 75 percent hold they "hurt the poor." To this Mr. Novak and others answer that *reality* is different from *perception*; that the perception, or misperception in their view, of the Reagan administration's domestic programs is the product of an overzealous, liberal-biased media. Thus the Reagan partisans do not so much dispute the accuracy of the poll as the correctness of the public's thinking. If the public were presented with a full dose of Reagan's truths, it would think better of his policies.

Whatever the percentages of those Americans who regard Reagan's policies and programs as hurting the poor, there can be no doubt that the poor have, in fact, been targeted for cutbacks while the wealthy have been the beneficiaries of largesse from the preferential tax and economic policies of our government. Indeed, "restructuring the national debt," reducing "costly" subsidy and social programs for the poor while "reinvigorating" the economy through changes in the tax code and "incentives" for businesses was a stated, open agenda of Reaganomics. And the Reagan budgets realized a major reduction in the welfare state, including cuts in food stamps, job training, legal services, aid to public education, financial aid for students in college, health care for the poor, and funding to families with dependent children. This assault on social programs was executed at a time when the neoconservative movement was in full swing, urging less government regulation of business and less activism on the part of the federal government in terms of civil-rights enforcement.

The picture painted by Reagan supporters in the privileged classes was that the federal government's promoting racial justice and the general welfare of the nation had created a rising tide of dependency and mediocrity and had stunted the individualistic enterprises of the "best and brightest" capitalists. "Free enterprise" and government support of business, they suggested, would remedy inflationary cycles and curb low productivity on the part of workers....

Today, President Reagan, the former labor leader, the partisan of the working man, former Democrat and modern-day Horatio Alger, personifies and is the chief representative of a clique which engages in double-talk about poverty, race, and class; which speaks patriotically about the "sacrifice" every hard-working American owes to his nation as its members reap the benefits of mammoth profits and personal wealth left virtually intact by means of tax shelters and tax-avoidance schemes made possible by Congress and the President.

While Jimmy Carter made a symbolic effort to appear like the common man, donning, on occasion,

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sweaters and trimming some of the "perks" which accompany the Presidency, Reagan has wined, dined, and lived grandiosely, mostly not at the expense of his own pocketbook but at the expense of the taxpayers. Both the poor and the taxpayers are substituting chicken for hamburger at their dinner tables while at the White House the prime ribs are being replaced by salmon with mousse of sole. This is a celebration of wealth and splendor within the same federal bureaucracy which candidate Reagan promised to control. The bureaucracy in turn successfully hides an outrageous squandering of taxpayers' monies. According to the knowledgeable columnist Jack Anderson, "no complete tabulation exists of presidential spending. Any extravagances are kept out of sight in dark bureaucratic corners. . . ."

Curious how simple and feasible it is, though, for these same federal bureaucrats to propose rules and regulations for counting the pieces of furniture and TV sets in a poor family's household against a welfare payment or other allowance provided for subsistence.

The Reagan administration's record on domestic programs is a dismal one precisely because it is flawed by cynicism and lined with hypocrisy. Assuming, as we must, that the aforementioned Gallup poll was a sampling of a cross-section of the American people concerning their opinions about the "fairness" of Reagan's policies, the results *understate* rather than skew the problem. This is because the direct targets and victims of the Reagan cuts, and the people who are traditionally underrepresented, if included at all, have not yet been heard from. These invisible persons include the unemployed, the discouraged workers, the youth, the students, the elderly, the infirm, the language minorities, the blacks, the Hispanics, and women, all of whom are now seething, and registering to vote, and acting as a coalition of concerned humanity. Also, increasingly among their ranks are to be found persons from the intelligentsia and those who, though privileged, are imbued with the egalitarian spirit.

People are again marching by the hundreds of thousands, organizing and engaging in the politics of self-preservation. They are reclaiming their social consciousness from mutually-shared pain.

This is a growing movement which the media cannot ignore. It is news. While there is still plenty of hype in the press about how Reaganomics is "working" (the President says it's working because "they don't call it 'Reaganomics' any more"), TV cameras are spanning the American landscape and rediscovering poverty, blight, and hunger. Last Thanksgiving and Christmas the soup kitchens were open and serving meals to once-secure families as well as to the homeless. People were falling smack through President Reagan's "safety net." Reaganomics was not, and is not, working to meet the urgent crisis of teenage parents, battered wives and husbands, abused children, hungry senior citizens, discouraged workers, illiterate adults, and drop-out youth. What federal commission will propose the "political" solution to this malformation of discontent?

If anything is true about this savage "discovery" by television cameras, it is that the media were a little late catching up with the analyses, warnings, and findings of reports from civil-rights and public-interest groups. The media were too identified with a national mood of giving the President's policies a chance, and this ignored the budget alternatives offered by the NAACP and the Congressional Black Caucus and others, perhaps because these budgets represented, in some news-manager's mind, strident, passé liberalism. Both houses of Congress accommodated the President's national economic recovery plan. Some in Congress chastised it as a clone of supply-side economics, but, except for the shouting from the few liberals and minorities, the Reagan legislative railroad ran free. Not even Tip O'Neill dared uncork the Humphrey-Hawkins full-employment measure from its bottle as a gesture of a gasping plea for sanity from the loyal opposition. "Realism" was the order of the day.

The "fairness" issue is now surfacing because, once again, disruptive protest and unprecedented turnouts of minority voters are taking aim at Reaganism. The election returns of 1982 are causing some politicians to reconsider their endorsement of the Reagan formula. Their constituents were sending them a message. The tide, as poll-takers see it, is turning. The ideological debate about the role of the federal government is not one-sided as before.

The supply-side partisans, however, have not given up. They point to sliding interest rates and declining unemployment statistics to rehabilitate Ronald Reagan and prop him up to run for another four-year term. But as Vice President George Bush discovered when he spoke at the NAACP convention last July to a chorus of boos, the message that economic recovery is around the corner is not being bought by blacks. As bad as unemployment has been for whites under Reagan, it was never as bad or as chronic and structural as the unemployment crisis of black Americans. And while unemployment for whites has diminished somewhat, unemployment for blacks is dangerously high, and for black youth it is skyrocketing. The racial gap persists. The rising economic tide did not lift all boats.

There is, moreover, reason to be skeptical of the slight decrease in national unemployment statistics when one considers the relationship of poverty data to the economic health of the nation. The national poverty rate rose in 1982 to 15 percent, the highest in seventeen years. That translates into some 34.4 million people officially counted as poor. Responding to the increased poverty rates, the White House notes that food stamps, public-housing subsidies, Medicaid health benefits, and Medicare are not counted as income and, therefore, the poverty rate is overstated. One might say in answer that, had these programs been funded below the current levels of cutbacks, then under an unfettered Reagan program of austerity and "New Federalism," the numbers of officially-defined poor would be ever so much larger.

It is not surprising that Reagan is annoyed by these most recent revelations of hunger in America; just as his administration's record on civil-rights enforcement is an embarrassment, so are these poverty figures. The initiatives undertaken by the administration in the name of national recovery and breaking the cycle of "welfare dependency" have not created jobs for the hard-core poor, or otherwise put "idle" hands to productive work. Reagan has no jobs program to reach the millions and millions who want to work. These people think it unfair for Reagan to point to employment ads in the newspapers advertising positions which are available only to the highly-

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skilled while their President ignores the lines of thousands which form whenever real, but scarce, openings occur in construction, hotel services, carpentry, sanitation, police, and municipal-service jobs. . . .

The situation of disproportionate poverty among blacks cannot be ignored. . . . The fact is the ghettos and the gilded suburbs exist side by side as a function and symbol of institutionalized economic racism. As psychologist Kenneth Clark has indicated:

> The child born in the ghetto is more likely to come into a world of broken homes and illegitimacy; and this family and social instability is conducive to delinquency, drug addiction, and criminal violence. Neither instability nor crime can be controlled by police vigilance or by reliance on the alleged deterring forces of legal punishment, for the individual crimes are to be understood more as *symptoms of the contagious sickness of the community itself* than as a result of inherent criminal or deliberate viciousness [emphasis added].

Plainly, ghettos take on psychological as well as physical properties, and the social-caste-like inequities between poor and rich enclaves serve to frustrate equal enjoyment of opportunity. This racial and class dimension of American society makes a mockery of the civil-rights laws which were enacted to free individuals of the burdens of racism. Present realities are that whites' fears concerning property values, and their untoward anxieties respecting competition in the workplace (which is rationalized by a myopic, self-perpetuating definition of "merit"), make it extremely difficult for individual efforts alone to restructure opportunities to decrease tensions and conflicts between the races. . . .

Conservatives like Mr. Novak are quick to note that despite huge expenditures by government, poverty seems to be growing. Actually, with the advent of the Great Society programs, rates of poverty had started to come down and poor people's sense of hope in utilizing newly available resources increased their expectations of better horizons and brighter futures. Class-action lawsuits filed by legal-service attorneys further expanded both the vision and boundaries of the fight against poverty in America. But the Reagan era dashed those hopes, and his Justice Department has actively attempted to restrict the pleadings and scope of remedies to scandalous constitutional violations. This trend on the part of the administration to pull back on civil-rights enforcement and "rethink" traditional approaches in equity law raises serious questions about the ability to secure justice in a democratic society. Every person deserves the equal protection of this nation's laws, and certainly the burgeoning ranks of the poor are owed remedies in law commensurate with the impact of the illegal conduct perpetrated against them by private actors and public agencies.

Unfortunately, the American people have been only fleetingly concerned with the causes and effects of poverty. Their spirit of generosity has not yet extended to understanding and resolving the fundamental dimensions of poverty in America. To do so they would have to think more honestly about privilege and class in America. They would have to transcend the self- and other limiting prejudices concerning, for example, class, race, and merit, and at the least alleviate the greed and inequities which have rent trust in our destiny as a nation by eroding and blocking the nation's commitment to human rights.

Pronouncements of support for equal opportunity are mere statements. The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was meant to accomplish much more than the establishment of a broad public policy. It empowered the Congress to take necessary action to attack the dual society. If Congress and the American people undertook that responsibility, they could turn promises into guarantees, and help foster the integration of the economic side of opportunity with the civil-rights perspective of fairness.

MICHAEL MEYERS
Director, Office of Research,
Policy, and Plans
National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People
Brooklyn Heights, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Michael Novak's article contains serious errors of fact. For example, contrary to what the article says:

• Medicaid does *not* cover all of the poor. Rather, it covers only persons who are aged, disabled, blind, or members of families with dependent children. Able-bodied single individuals, such as middle-aged divorced women, are ineligible for Medicaid.

• The elderly poor are *not* all receiving Social Security and are not all covered by Medicare. Benefits under both of these programs must be earned with sufficient quarters of covered work, with the result that approximately 6 percent of the current elderly population is ineligible. Some of these individuals are poor.

• Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid have *not* "virtually ended" poverty among the elderly. Recent Bureau of Census statistics on poverty in 1982 show that approximately 3,750,000 individuals aged sixty-five and over had cash incomes below the poverty line—which was $4,626 for those living alone, and $5,836 for those living with another person. While there was a marginal improvement from 1981—about 100,000 elderly persons moved above the poverty line during the year—the number of persons below is still very significant. Moreover, it is not surprising that the three listed programs did not solve the problem. The two medical programs help only the sick (the sicker you are, the more benefits you get, but this does not make you richer) and the average Social Security old-age insurance benefit for an unmarried person approximates the poverty line. This means about half the retirees receive Social Security benefits below the poverty line.

The material in the article is slanted to a point beyond that which is acceptable, even in polemical writing. Some examples:

• The list of social programs given on page 30 is not complete, and no explanation is given for the omissions. Not mentioned, for example, is the public-employment program which at its peak (1979) provided over $5.5 billion for employing the poor; it has been terminated by the current administration. What else has been omitted from the list, and have these other programs been cut? Head Start? Family planning? Perhaps other very major programs. Because of these omissions, the table is not a fair guide to the changes made by the Reagan administration.

• Mr. Novak disregards the significance of the fact that some programs are means-tested, such as food stamps or Medicaid, and others are payable regardless of in-

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come, such as Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance. The significance is that many beneficiaries of the three social-insurance programs, especially Social Security and Medicare, are not poor.

• Although the author notes that the increase in total outlay for social programs, such as unemployment insurance and food stamps, is at least partially attributable to increased unemployment, he does not make any effort to correct for that fact. This he could easily have done by discussing either the number of individual beneficiaries or the amount of money expended for each beneficiary. (As it is, his use of data reminds one of the old saw: "God must love the poor, He created so many of them.")

• The article does not say what housing programs have been greatly expanded or when the funds for these programs were obligated. By omitting these important facts, the article encourages the reader to assume that all the money involved has been newly obligated for the benefit of the poor. In fact, it may include such items as mortgage credit for the middle class or community-development funds, some of which are used to rehabilitate blighted downtown areas of big cities. Moreover, a portion of the projects may have been undertaken in prior administrations but still appear in the current budget because erecting or renovating a building takes a long time.

• The text that follows the table regarding taxes on page 28 does not fit the table. In trying to read the two together, I thought of grocery stores that list prices in exotic off-weights, so that the shopper needs a calculator to compare the price of one product to another.

The policy analysis that accompanies this flawed presentation (and the above does not purport to be an exhaustive critique) is similarly deficient.

• Mr. Novak does not acknowledge the relationship between unemployment and inflation, although most economists think that the sharp increase in the former was the principal reason for the decrease in the latter. One may think this trade-off worthwhile, but a serious discussion should at least note or attempt to disprove its existence.

• Mr. Novak seems persuaded that the changes in the tax law have persuaded the rich to invest more productively. At this stage in the process, he should be able to cite some evidence that this is factually true, or at least explain why he disagrees with the substantial doubts of many other observers who say the evidence is to the contrary.

Because of these many deficiencies (and I suspect there are others), I cannot accept this article as a guide to an analysis of the Reagan program. . . .

EDITH U. FIERST
Washington, D. C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his article Michael Novak ridicules the idea of redistribution as a means of reducing inequality and poverty in America. He claims that the notion of "taking from the rich and giving to the poor" is a "dreamy ideal [that] can never be fulfilled literally, for the simple mathematical reason that there are too few rich and that, even in the aggregate, they have too little income."

Mr. Novak then proceeds to do some deep statistical dreaming of his own. Citing Internal Revenue Service tables, he points out that in 1980 there were only 117,000 Americans with gross adjusted incomes of $200,000 a year or more. He then misleadingly states that this group's "total income came to $46 billion on which they paid $20 billion (or 43 percent) in income taxes."

Now, as a man of Mr. Novak's substantial means undoubtedly knows, a person's total income bears little relation *in reality* to his gross adjusted income, the divergence between the two growing as income increases.

Using real-world concepts of total income (including all capital gains, rents, interest, and dividends), those 117,000 had a total income of at least $66 billion (about $560,000 per family). After taking advantage of the generous loopholes provided for them by the Congress, they had a gross adjusted income of $46 billion (about $400,000 per family) on which they paid $20 billion in income taxes (about 30 percent of real total income).

Leaving aside for the moment Mr. Novak's dubious practice of defining the rich as those with incomes greater than $200,000 a year at a time when the average family of four was living on less than $25,000 per year and not even 5 percent of all American households had incomes greater than $60,000 per year, let us proceed to do some of the "simple arithmetic" for which Mr. Novak expresses such fondness.

In 1980 there were 29 million poor people in the United States. An income-transfer program designed to eliminate poverty only among those not expected to work —i.e., over sixty-five (3.7 million), children (6 million), and the mothers of those children (4.1 million)— would have cost about $13 billion. This sum could have been generated by increasing the real effective tax rate on the super-rich from 30 to 50 percent, leaving the average millionaire with a post-tax income of $280,000 a year.

But why accept Mr. Novak's definition of the rich as those households with average incomes in excess of $400,000 or $500,000 a year?

If the rich are defined as the top 5 percent of all households, then in 1980 their average personal incomes would have been over $81,000 a year, at a time when the median money income of all households was only about $18,000 a year, and the average income of poor families was less $5,000 per year.

In order to generate the extra $13 billion needed to eliminate poverty among the elderly and female-headed households in that year, it would have been necessary to increase the effective federal income-tax rate on the richest 5 percent of households from about 22 percent to about 26 percent; hardly a confiscatory level.

Let's cut the statistical doubletalk and admit to ourselves that poverty in America is the result of a maldistribution of jobs, wealth, and income, a stark reality that "dreamy idealists" like Mr. Novak deliberately refuse to face.

TIMOTHY R. CAPPELLI
West Chester, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL NOVAK writes:

I am grateful for the responses of Congressman Smith and David Schimel. The latter's emphasis on the amount of social-welfare spending now going to those who are by no means poor—for brick sidewalks outside Great Neck's boutiques, to cite his vivid example—illustrates a major conceptual problem. Imagine one giant welfare state in Europe offering benefits to every European jurisdiction, village, and individual from Sweden to Italy, Turkey to Ireland. How could it ever draw up criteria clear

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enough to meet each separate case fairly and in line with the central government's stated intention? This is the continental-sized task U.S. federal welfare must fulfill. No wonder that the Office of Management and Budget estimates that even in the programs "targeted" for the poor, forty-two cents of every dollar reaches recipients above the poverty level. Thus the problem of social welfare lies in its design rather than in the amounts actually being spent.

The letter of Michael Meyers answers itself. The poor and the unemployed are not, as he suggests in one place, "invisible," but as he insists in many other places tremendously "visible"—and have been the subject of magazine covers and unremittingly frequent television treatments not only during Reagan's first year (*before* "Reaganomics" went into effect) but for two decades now. In his budget message for 1962, President Kennedy urged larger temporary welfare expenditures to help strengthen families and to move persons from dependency to independence, thus effectuating lower social-welfare budgets in the future: "a hand, not a handout," was the slogan. Now Mr. Meyers, failing to consider where all the money spent to help the poor since 1962 has gone, wants not a hand but a "guarantee." Families have not been strengthened; dependency has not been diminished; clearly stated intentions have resulted in diametrically opposite effects.

Just after my article appeared, the Census Bureau reported that in 1982 the poor had grown to 34.4 million. The official monetary measure of poverty had climbed to $9,862 for a non-farm family of four, not counting any in-kind benefits. In addition, two separate testimonies before the Congress set the "poverty shortfall"—the difference between the income the poor already receive and the amount necessary to bring them over the poverty line—at $43-$45 billion. This "poverty shortfall" amounts to far less than is currently being spent on "targeted" poverty programs. To repeat, the design seems faulty.

One reason for this, of course, is the universal but tacit recognition that poverty is *not* a merely monetary problem, despite the Census Bureau definition. There is something about poverty which exceeds monetary calculations.

Will Mr. Meyers's hostile feelings be assuaged, then, if a Democratic administration comes to power in 1984? He does not argue that the situation of the poor was better in 1967-80. One senses his frustration. Part of it arises from not examining his own premises. Is not the NAACP as responsible as the rest of us for not holding welfare programs to their original purpose: stronger families, less dependency?

Edith U. Fierst demonstrates vividly how arcane the argument must become to support the charge that the Reagan programs are unfair. She ignores the forest, about which she tacitly concedes that I was correct, to examine individual trees. On most of the detail she raises, she confirms my argument. Using 1982 figures, for example, she says that 3.75 million individuals aged sixty-five and over have cash incomes below the poverty line, while (using the latest figures available when I wrote, for 1981), I wrote "about 3 million." She has the decency to note that between 1981 and 1982, the number of the elderly in poverty was *reduced* by 100,000.

That this number is "significant," as she insists, is surely true; these people should not be overlooked. It is for them that non-cash benefits like food stamps, housing and energy assistance, and many other programs have been established; for them, too, that Medicare is held in reserve when they are ill. There is no need to suggest that the American public is hard-hearted. In 1962, a near-majority of the poor were elderly; today, just over 10 percent. This is important progress. As Mrs. Fierst says, only 6 percent of the elderly are *not* covered by Social Security and Medicare, a percentage I did not know of when I wrote in a footnote that "all" were covered, and a correction for which I am grateful.

I also erred in saying, in the same footnote, that Medicaid covers "all of the poor without exception." In covering the aged, disabled, blind, and members of families with dependent children, it covers only "most" of the poor, not the relatively few able-bodied of working age and without dependents. But even many of those are covered as, for example, a young male victim of a knife assault. Different states cover Medicaid differently.

Mrs. Fierst asks, too, for a complete list of social programs, not simply the short list of major programs I selected, and asks for detailed differentiation, for example, between the obligated and the actually expended funds in housing programs. Mrs. Fierst seems to concede that it would be very hard to show a pattern different from the one I drew and, therefore, throws the burden back on me. It is hers. The welfare expenditures I listed total $325 billion; there is not much else. The charges of unfairness are broad and should not require fine detective work to sustain.

The difference between obligating funds for housing programs and actually expending them in a given year is important. But for a Congress trying to cut spending obligated in a less responsible era, cuts in future obligations—a large part of which go to middle-class (if not upper-class) building projects—must seem a socially useful target. I am willing to concede that "housing programs" might be omitted from my list, and that the subject is complex enough for an article impenetrable except to experts. But please note how *outlays* have gone up, not down, from 1980 to 1983. The pattern, while representative, is shocking to one who believes the broad-brush charge of "cuts."

The difference between the table on taxes and the text following it hinges on one point. The median tax return occurred at an income of approximately $12,000 per year, rather than at the levels ($10,000 and $15,000) shown in the IRS group display. I used the median in the text, but did not insert it in the IRS table, since the IRS did not. Mrs. Fierst seems to have figured it out without difficulty.

Finally, Mrs. Fierst surely does not want a disquisition from a theologian on the relation between unemployment and inflation. Still, even in 1980 common sense did suggest that the Carter administration interest rates of 22 percent were bound to bring heavy unemployment for a year or more. Further, there was little promise that Carter policies, even with high unemployment, would bring down inflation. Indeed, not even the Reagan administration believed in 1981 that inflation would come down as it has in 1982 and 1983. As for productive investment by the rich, *somebody* has been investing in the stock market since August 1982.

My argument that "the Reagan administration has neither helped

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the rich nor hurt the poor in the blatant way that has been charged by its critics" is not budged by Timothy R. Cappelli's letter, either. If he wishes to define as "rich" everyone above $60,000, let him. There are many government families making at least that much who do not think that they are rich. And there are many on the Left, perhaps including Mr. Cappelli, who when they excoriate the "rich" do not include themselves. It bears repeating that the "poverty shortfall"—the amount necessary to raise all the poor above the poverty level—was in 1982 about $45 billion. But much more than that is being spent on targeted poverty programs alone. So why hasn't our goal already been accomplished?

There are further problems with Mr. Cappelli's "real-world concepts of total income," since he seems to think that capital gains, rents, interest, and dividends are not already taxed. There are also some problems with his "simple arithmetic." But his fundamental problem is philosophical. A just society cannot possibly pay everyone the same income, since the aptitudes and efforts of individuals diverge dramatically, and since the common good is far better served, accordingly, by systematic inequalities of reward. Furthermore, no socialist society, pledged to the impossible standards of income equality, seems to have done even as good a job as ours in approximating it. It is bad theory, and doesn't work in practice even when attempted.

The U.S. properly practices a great deal of "redistribution"—indeed, far more than would seem to be required to end the "poverty shortfall." I am entirely in favor of uplifting the poor; clearly, though, something dreadfully inefficient and destructive inheres in the way we are currently going about it.

Anti-Semitism

To the Editor of Commentary:

Jacob Katz introduces his article, "Misreadings of Anti-Semitism" [July], by quoting the opening sentences of my review of his recently published *From Prejudice to Destruction,* in which I criticized him for failing to place his account of the development of European anti-Semitism in its proper context—the growth of anti-modern social and political movements. Mr. Katz apparently did not understand my criticism of his work, for he now imputes to me a position that I have never advocated, to wit, that "only the Gentile role in anti-Semitism is worthy of the historian's attention," while "Jews are merely passive victims."

Having encountered scholarly resistance to his idiosyncratic views on the history of modern anti-Semitism, Mr. Katz, in reaction, has created a ludicrous caricature of the majority view. To argue, as I did in my review of his work, that stresses and strains in the larger societies in which Jews lived were critical in fostering the growth of anti-Semitic movements is not to deny that Jewish behavior—in the economy, in society, in political life—played some role in shaping anti-Jewish sentiment. It is not a question of either/or, but a matter of degree.

In his attack on "misreadings" of anti-Semitism, Mr. Katz reiterates his own position. He believes that the failure of the Jewish community to disappear of its own volition after emancipation, as both the advocates and opponents of emancipation believed it would, created "a sense of scandal" that linked up with ancient, religiously-derived prejudices to lay the basis for modern anti-Semitism. If Mr. Katz's interpretation were correct, it would follow that in those countries where Jewish solidarity and particularism remained strongest in the post-emancipation era, anti-Semitism would have been at its deadliest. But, in fact, just the opposite was true. In the years 1870-1939, in the liberal states of the West—in Great Britain and the United States—where Jewish solidarity and visibility were not radically attenuated, anti-Semitism was weaker than it was in Germany, where assimilation had taken a far more extreme course. The only way of explaining the different paths of anti-Semitism in these countries, it seems to me, is to refer to the larger political and social context in which it developed.

To approach the history of anti-Semitism in this manner hardly warrants the charge that one is trying to "de-Judaize" anti-Semitism. By no stretch of the imagination does it invite the accusation that those who take this historiographical position are "fellow-travelers" with those who seek to universalize the Holocaust and downplay the uniqueness of the Jewish experience during the war years. Injecting this issue is a diversionary tactic that has no place in the debate over the origins of modern anti-Semitism.

Todd M. Endelman
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana

To the Editor of Commentary:

I read Jacob Katz's article with interest. I am not an academic, . . . but I am a Jew, and my curiosity about the whys and wherefores of anti-Semitism knows no bounds. . . .

Mr. Katz is arguing, if I understand him correctly, that the traditional theories of anti-Semitism are inadequate, or at least have not been proved, and are also perhaps inconsistent with historical facts. That is, the proposition that anti-Semitism is strictly a Gentile malady caused by social upheaval, or that it is directed by governments to relieve unrest, or that it is the product of a general nastiness in human nature . . ., or that it is a result of the unfolding urge of each group (race) to establish its sense of superiority—as I understand him, Mr. Katz maintains that none of these theories is sufficient to explain the presence and the persistence of anti-Jewish rancor over the ages. . . .

This leads me to wonder about Mr Katz's own theory, which was not set forth in his article. If, as he suggests, we Jews have somehow played an active role in bringing abuse on ourselves, what is it that we have done or are doing? Mr. Katz mentions a number of qualities attributed to us by those who detest us: crudeness, lack of manners, xenophobia, avarice, moral insensitivity, etc. Is he saying that to some degree these vile characteristics are valid? . . . If they are not, then exactly what . . . is it that incites all with whom we come in contact? And if we are not vile, then what has caused such perverse reactions from the surrounding populace? In any case, what can we do about it?

Arthur Bay
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . Jacob Katz deals with some theories of anti-Semitism, and though he may be quite correct in refuting them, he does not offer his own theory, at least in this article. Indeed, one gains the impression from the article that it is extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, to venture an explana-

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tion for this phenomenon. Mr. Katz seems to suggest that scarcely any explanation would be adequate since we are dealing with something so irrational that it defies human understanding. I wonder, however, whether Mr. Katz would agree with me that the original cause for the widespread hatred of Jews was religiously motivated. The Christian gospels are among the most widely distributed literature in the world. They are part of the education of every Christian child, yet they present unmistakably invidious accusations against the Jewish people. . . .

To illustrate, let me relate my own experience. When I was about seven years old and attending elementary school in Vienna, I was followed from school one day by two boys who tried to attack me while saying in German, *"Du bist ein Judas, Du hast unseren Heiland umgebracht"* (You are a Judas, you have killed our savior). Of course, at the time I did not understand what they meant, but later I realized that those boys had probably just received religious instruction in which they had been told the story of the gospels. Is it not understandable that such children would grow up with a strong bias against Jews in general? . . .

ADOLPH LUSTHAUS

Tamarac, Florida

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Jacob Katz's "Misreadings of Anti-Semitism" purports to outline a historical explanation of European anti-Semitism that would do justice to and not exceed the facts. His reasons for limiting a "proper" history to the so-called observable facts reflect the most simple-minded empiricism. The logical difficulties alone, which Mr. Katz simply ignores, are enough to undermine the writing of such a history.

Mr. Katz lays down certain conditions—to be taken as theoretical principles—that he believes all explanations of historical phenomena must meet: "To a historian, the proof of a theory lies in its serviceability, that is, in the possibility it offers of providing a basis for explaining historical processes and reconstructing the course of events," What Mr. Katz finds so objectionable in psychoanalysis is not that it does not provide some understanding of the "hidden wellsprings" of anti-Semitism, but that this system of interpretation cannot give a blow-by-blow *narration* of the manifest historical events. Mr. Katz's objection . . . amounts to little more than a misunderstanding of the nature of explanation as such. "The factual narrative," he complains of one book, "and the psychoanalytic interpretation proceed on two different levels." Of course they do; the explanation of any phenomenon is always on a level that differs from the narrated facts. An adequate theory—be it historical, linguistic, anthropological, or any explanatory theory in the human sciences—*must* carefully transcend the facts if it is to have explanatory power. In the field of history, it is precisely in shifting from a mere chronological ordering of the narrated facts to the level of a systematic interpretation of their meaning that explanation consists. A refusal to take this step is tantamount to a mere replication of the events that we were trying to explain.

When he comes around to offering his own "explanation," Mr. Katz only restates the facts. . . . He gives us repetition instead of knowledge:

> The predicament of emancipated Jewry, and ultimately the cause of its tragic end, was rooted not in one or another ideology but in the fact that Jewish emancipation had been tacitly tied to an illusory expectation—the disappearance of the Jewish community of its own volition. When this failed to happen . . . a certain uneasiness, not to say a sense of outright scandal, was experienced by Gentiles.

Assuming that this nice tale of disappointed expectations did happen, how does it constitute an explanation, the ultimate cause no less, of the manifest anti-Semitism of the period? Mr. Katz's would-be explanation merely substitutes one form of anti-Semitism—the expectation that Jews would disappear through assimilation into civil society—for another form of the same—the forcible fulfillment of that expectation in the humiliation and murder of the Jews. Mr. Katz has given us no ultimate cause here, only two aspects of the same anti-Semitism about which we are still very much in the dark.

Sensing the weakness of his "causal explanation," . . . Mr. Katz takes cover by embedding it in a thesis of historical continuity:

> Modern anti-Semitism is thus a blend, and any proper history of it must consist of a careful tracing of the processes whereby vestigial anti-Jewish beliefs, dating back to the Middle Ages, were successfully combined with a whole variety of modern ideologies. Only by following the route along which the anti-Jewish tradition was transmitted . . . can we gain historical insight into the mechanism of anti-Semitism and the riddle of its survival through the ages.

This paean to the longevity and survival of anti-Semitism, alas, explains nothing but a proper penchant for chronological ordering. The recurrence of anti-Semitism with all its combinations through the ages tells us nothing about its causes, or, to use a different explanatory logic, it tells us nothing about what anti-Semitism *essentially is*. Mr. Katz gives us a sort of Jewish version of the Eternal Return myth; he has turned a vital problem calling for enlightenment into an inexplicable "tradition."

I would like, finally, to take issue with Mr. Katz's dismissal of Max Horkheimer, who seems deserving of such treatment simply because Mr. Katz heard somewhere that he was a Marxist. Consulting the pertinent chapters on anti-Semitism in Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (which he wrote with Theodor Adorno) and his later essay, "The German Jews," I find Horkheimer much more reverent of the facts of history than is Mr. Katz. Indeed, that is why Horkheimer eschews a single all-embracing cause of modern anti-Semitism. He gives, instead, proliferating interpretations, the traditional Marxist one counting for very little of the total. . . .

SAUL E. MYERS

Mt. Kisco, New York

JACOB KATZ writes:

First I must clarify a somewhat strange misunderstanding on the part of Todd M. Endelman. Because my essay opened with a quotation from his review of my book, *From Prejudice to Destruction*, Mr. Endelman assumes that the thrust of my entire essay is a polemic aimed at his criticism. The quotation I used contained a felicitous phrase characterizing the attitude of historians with whom I intended to take issue. Otherwise, there is no overt or covert reference to Mr. Endelman's review in the entire article. Consequently, his indignation over opinions attributed to him is absolutely groundless, though

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now, of course, I am bound to reply to the objections raised in his letter.

On one central point Todd M. Endelman, Arthur Bay, and Saul E. Myers are in agreement. All three are bent on locating the explanation for anti-Semitism in any given era in data contemporaneous with that era. Mr. Bay contends that if none of the current theories explaining anti-Semitism is found acceptable, no other recourse remains but to admit that there is indeed something to the negative assessment of Jews by anti-Semites. Mr. Endelman, in his original review, defends the position of historians who attribute European anti-Semitism to the growth of anti-modern social and political movements. While he now concedes that "Jewish behavior in the economy, in society, in political life" also played a role "in shaping anti-Jewish sentiment," still, all these components were of contemporary vintage. Mr. Myers, on the other hand, favors the position of the psychohistorians for whom the riddle of anti-Semitism is solved by reference to ever-present unconscious drives.

The only one of my critics to make reference to the past is Adolph Lusthaus, who quite properly mentions the impact of the Christian gospels; for it is only by expanding our perspective far beyond the particular period that we can achieve what the historian Marc Bloch calls an "understanding of the present by the past." Bloch warns that in seeking explanations, the student of history should not limit himself to "the immediately preceding" period because what he is seeking may actually be located several centuries farther back in time. That is exactly the case with early modern anti-Semitism. Its roots and origins lay in generations of religious conflict between Judaism and Christianity. The age of emancipation believed it had overcome this conflict, and had thus eliminated the cause of anti-Semitism. But the outbreak of the anti-Semitic movement in the late 19th century revealed this to be an illusion. The anti-Jewish tradition, which had seemingly waned, actually continued to lead an underground existence, only to reappear in a new guise three generations later.

The proper task of the historian is to trace the path of this subterranean metamorphosis—which is what I tried to do in *From Prejudice to Destruction*. While I did not avoid describing the contemporary historical circumstances (the crisis of liberalism and so on) under which anti-Semitism reemerged, I did not concentrate on this aspect as other historians have, and as Mr. Endelman would like me to have done.

I pointed out in my essay the dangers of concentrating on what transpires in non-Jewish society (and the contraction of perspective this implies). Mr. Endelman now declares that of course Jewish behavior had a share in eliciting anti-Semitism, a statement which is even more questionable than his original thesis. For whatever variations the phenomenon of anti-Semitism reveals, one aspect of it is constant. Whenever anti-Semitism has become virulent, Jewish behavior, for better or worse, has had only the most marginal influence upon it. It is not what Jews did in the period under question which called down recurrent wrath upon them, but what they were—descendants of the despised and diabolized enemies of Christianity who, owing to their prolonged ghetto existence, continued to live conspicuously apart. Some traces of this heritage from the past clung to Jews everywhere; they reappeared most strongly where the expectation of their disappearance was most sharply disappointed.

Mr. Endelman argues that according to my theory, a reaction to Jewish perseverance ought to have occurred "in Great Britain and the U.S. where Jewish solidarity and visibility" were more in evidence than in "Germany where assimilation had taken a more extreme course." But in fact Jews became more "visible" the more they were expected to disappear altogether. This was most strongly the case in Germany, France, and Hungary; in Great Britain, where emancipation was not predicated on radical assimilation, Jewish "visibility" was not so offending. (This difference was pointed out several decades ago by H. A. Schmidt.) When it comes to the United States, the historian Ben Halpern has rightly ascribed the relative advantage of American Jewry over its European counterparts to the fact that American Jews were spared the struggle for political emancipation altogether.

My observations about the decisive role of the dead hand of the past in the perseverance of anti-Semitism ought to relieve Mr. Bay of his dilemma. To reject the three current theories of anti-Semitism does not mean that we must accept the rationale of the anti-Semites themselves. As to Mr. Lusthaus's personal experience of anti-Semitism, this sort of accusation, while hardly unheard of, is not so typical of modern times. The trouble is that the religious passion attached to such accusations transferred itself to their profane replacements in the course of the secularization process of modern history. Hence the irrational drive of anti-Semitism, and its sheer inaccessibility to counterargument.

Mr. Myers's frontal attack sounds very sophisticated, yet it actually reflects an utter disrespect for historical data as well as faulty reasoning. "The recurrence of anti-Semitism with all its combinations through the ages" boils down for Mr. Myers to "a sort of Jewish version of the Eternal Return myth." There is, however, nothing mythical or mystical about what the British historian James Parkes called the conflict between the Church and the Synagogue. That conflict reflects rather hard facts of history that shaped Jewish destiny and are still shaping it to a certain extent to this very day.

Mr. Myers's carelessness with facts is also evident in the way he argues against my point about the effect of continuous Jewish existence contrary to expectations of Jewish disappearance. According to Mr. Myers this is to explain one form of anti-Semitism, the drive for the physical destruction of Jews, by means of another, the expectation of their disappearance through assimilation. Yet to dub the promoters of emancipation anti-Semites is to be arbitrary in the extreme. Far from intending harm to Jews—an intention inherent in anti-Semitism by definition—they thought to render them the highest of favors by liberating them from the burden and the curse of their past history. That the result turned out altogether different from what was intended can teach us a lesson about the dialectics of human history in general and about the convoluted path taken by anti-Semitism in particular. Mr. Myers, however, is not interested in seeking down-to-earth enlightenment; he is bent on arriving at the ultimate causes of anti-Semitism and penetrating to its essence.

Now some philosophers have in-

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deed tried their hand at such abstractions, attributing the seemingly eternal estrangement between Jews and Gentiles to a primordial or metaphysical division of some sort. Yet Mr. Myers does not hint at any such idea, basing himself rather on the psychoanalytical interpretations of anti-Semitism. But even if we accept the need for some essentialist explanation, does it necessarily follow that psychoanalysis represents this essence?

Finally, I am amused by Mr. Myers's zeal to protect the good names of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno and by his assumption that my knowledge of their Marxist leanings originated in hearsay. As it happens, I studied with these two scholars in Frankfurt in the early 30's and I hold their memories in respect, despite my differing approach to problems of history and society. Mr. Myers is correct in stating that the interpretation of anti-Semitism contained in Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is not exclusively Marxian; it also contains a good portion of Freudianism which is of course a redeeming feature in his eyes. Others may think that the combination of the two schools of thought in vogue in the Weimar period (especially among Jewish intellectuals) is a hybrid creation, as evidenced in the intellectual acrobatics which have made this book justly famous, if nearly unreadable. At any rate, I am able to testify that neither Horkheimer nor Adorno would have resented being called a Marxist, at least not at the time I was acquainted with them. On that point Mr. Myers's mind may be set at rest.

Totalitarianism

To the Editor of Commentary:

I cannot but agree with Leszek Kolakowski's plea for the validity of the concept of totalitarianism, particularly at a moment when the radical intellectual establishment is trying to discredit it ["Totalitarianism & the Lie," May]. . . . I also want to underscore the relevance of Mr. Kolakowski's hypothesis concerning the common ideological basis of both totalitarian versions of socialism—fascism and bolshevism. The resurgence of the mythology of the organic community, of the *Blut und Boden* motifs, in the discourse of the contemporary Left, the appeal to archaic-primitive instincts rooted in a nebulous "collective unconscious," the . . . cult of charismatic elites and leaders, emphasize precisely this irreducible totalitarian component of radical movements.

I know it is not comfortable for representatives of the Left to admit the intellectual responsibility of Marxism . . . for the horrors of the Stalinist concentration camps and for the whole evolution of Soviet-type regimes, but the problem cannot be obscured through dialectical ratiocinations. Totalitarianism is an *objective reality*, an economic, social, and intellectual cosmos, notwithstanding Western radical-liberal dissatisfaction with the totalitarian paradigm. I would invite certain critics of this theory, those innocent souls ready to trust the demagogic promises of the neo-Stalinist dictators, to visit a country like Rumania, where Orwell's *1984* seems to have been adopted by the Communist party as its political program. The rewriting of history, the pathological exaltation of Big Brother, . . . the absolute control of personal life under the unquestionable authority of the omnipotent party, are the characteristics of an autarchic system very close to the Orwellian archetype. . . . For the Communist despots, the purification of the past depends on cutting off, on sequestering their feuds from the *other* world: their object is to destroy the very idea of *otherness*. . . . The history of a Communist party actually becomes the history of various treasons, conspiracies, and plots, fortunately unveiled in time by the prophet-detective genius of the omniscient General Secretary.

The propaganda empire—this is perhaps the everlasting feature of the system, its invariable component which remains constant despite spurious metamorphoses or faked "structural" changes. Self-criticism itself becomes a propagandistic device, both at the global and the individual-empirical level. (We should always remember the late Arthur Koestler's analysis of the tortuous mechanism of Communist propagandistic logic. . . .)

To put the matter briefly, the problem of totalitarianism is the problem of radicalism, of the intellectual ambition to possess the social and the natural word, to transcend the ontological limits of the human being in order to achieve an impossible synthesis between essence and existence, between particularity and universality. Converted into a mere political weapon, used and abused by socialist and National Socialist dictators, the radical obsession with totality became an argument and an alibi for the dialectical lie . . .

Vladimir Tismaneanu
Paoli, Pennsylvania

To the Editor of Commentary:

Leszek Kolakowski observes that "There is no single cause on which we may place the responsibility for the emergence of a system which tries to give the state total power over all areas of human life, to destroy civil society entirely, and to extend state ownership over all things and all people."

It does seem fair to say, however, that a major reason some Western intellectuals were attracted to and became apologists for Stalinist totalitarianism is that they viewed it as a political substitute for faith in God and religion.

Two decades ago the late French social philosopher Raymond Aron came out with his significant book, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*. In that work, Aron furnished an immensely plausible explanation for the support given Stalinist totalitarianism by Western intellectuals who allegedly were staunch defenders and advocates of freedom and human rights. According to Aron, the Soviet regime provided them with a religion and a hope that paradise could be recreated here on earth purely through human endeavor. . . .

The Western intellectuals who were attracted to Stalinist totalitarianism wanted to attain—to use Norman Podhoretz's trenchant phrase—"redemption through politics." They believed that with the death of God, the needs of the heart demanded a new religion, one that 20th-century man could and would accept; they viewed themselves as the preachers of a new religion which offered the hope of personal redemption and, moreover, the promise of heaven on earth.

Haven Bradford Gow
Arlington Heights, Illinois

Willy Brandt & the Jews

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . David Gress, in his four pages on Willy Brandt ["Whatever Happened to Willy Brandt?," July], devotes not a word, not a line, to Brandt's attitude to Jewish prob-

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lems. As president of the Munich Jewish community (*Israelitische Kultusgemeinde München*), I gratefully recall that Chancellor Brandt gave one million DM (about $250,000) to the rebuilding of our community old-age home when it was partly destroyed in 1970, that he rushed to the memorial service for the victims of the Olympics tragedy in 1972, and that he has repeatedly shown an intense interest in Israel and in a fair solution to Middle East problems. He joined Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria in efforts to persuade Yasir Arafat to accept a sensible compromise.

Brandt is a humanitarian with global influence, the only West German Chancellor after Konrad Adenauer with lasting charisma. All this, COMMENTARY left unmentioned.

HANS LAMM
Munich, West Germany

DAVID GRESS writes:

It is true that, as Hans Lamm notes, I did not deal with the important question of Willy Brandt's attitude to Jewish problems. However, as I indicated, Brandt is a man of sincere political convictions and there can be no question of the depth of his feelings on this matter or of the significance of his actions. Still, the subject of my piece was less Brandt's personal emotions and sympathies than the general perspective and effects of his changing views. And despite all the facts mentioned by Mr. Lamm, one may be allowed to question precisely the *effects* of Brandt's ideas, given the broad resurgence of left-wing anti-Semitism masquerading as criticism of Israel among West German intellectuals and political writers (like Rudolf Augstein of *Der Spiegel*, for example). One may also doubt the wisdom and even the "humanitarian" impulse of those who believe, as Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky seem to do, that a settlement in the Middle East acceptable to Israel can be achieved with the help of such as Yasir Arafat.

Dartmouth and Wellesley

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Allow me to correct an erroneous statement in a letter in your August issue. The error occurred in the interesting exchange inspired by Louise Blecher Rose's excellent article about quotas at Sarah Lawrence ["The Secret Life of Sarah Lawrence," May]. As is so often the case, the defenses were more damning than the original criticism.

However, one of your writers attributed to John S. Dickey a remark about quotas at Dartmouth. The writer had the right college but the wrong president. It was Dickey's predecessor—E.M. Hopkins—who made the infamous admission, which at least made him more candid than his colleagues.

What is more important is that Dickey, in fact, was one of the first Ivy League presidents to move away from the quota system. Thus in my day, Dartmouth . . . was a haven of opportunity for victims of the quota system of its more cosmopolitan rivals. It is a shame that the reformer should be blamed for the distasteful policies of . . . his predecessor.

RICHARD L. GORDON
State College, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As Wellesley College trustees and active members of the Jewish community, we were dismayed by Jerold S. Auerbach's letter in the August issue commenting on the article on Sarah Lawrence. In his letter Mr. Auerbach, who is a professor at Wellesley, accused the college of a "persistent pattern of discriminatory admissions that still keeps the proportion of Jewish students shockingly low." We were dismayed for many reasons, but principally because of the implication that Wellesley as an institution, in 1983, practices conscious discrimination.

Wellesley College has always sought and continues to seek a diversified student body. Wellesley is a vital community of serious students teaching and supporting one another and learning from one another, a place where education focuses on the personal and intellectual development of women. This deep-rooted tradition has been accompanied by a commitment to the continuous process of self-scrutiny, an openness to new ideas, and a readiness to change and grow as needs demand. In recent years, Wellesley has reached out even more aggressively to attract the ethnic and minority student and to insure an environment that broadens experience and knowledge while reinforcing each person's sense of uniqueness.

Today Jewish students at Wellesley find a rabbi on the chaplaincy staff, a kosher kitchen, an active Hillel, and opportunities to celebrate major holidays on campus. At the moment this letter is being written, a succah stands prominently alongside the student center. Today, as Mr. Auerbach well knows, Wellesley College has a president who has reached out to the Jewish students on campus and to the larger Jewish community as well. To quote a recent letter from the president to the executive director of the Anti-Defamation League in Boston: "We appreciate your help in reaching more Jewish students. We hope we can make our case for Wellesley as strong as possible."

We fail to understand the rationale behind Mr. Auerbach's letter, and would like to express our own dedication to Wellesley College, a school we know to be committed to excellence and to excellent women of all races, colors, and religions. In our view, Wellesley today, as did Wellesley in the past, offers each of its students special strengths and special rewards.

HARRIET SEGAL COHN
LUELLA GROSS GOLDBERG
ANNE COHEN HELLER
ESTELLE NEWMAN TANNER
PEGGY WESTHEIMER TISHMAN
New York City

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HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH TO DRINK IF YOU'RE DRIVING?

USING THIS CHART MAY HELP YOU KNOW YOUR LIMIT.

First, you should understand that drinking any amount of alcohol can impair your ability to drive.

The generally accepted way to measure intoxication is by your Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC). In most areas, the legal definition of intoxication is .10 percent BAC and above. However, long before you reach .10 BAC, your judgment and motor skills deteriorate rapidly. In fact, some states include the definition of impaired driving ability, which usually begins at .05 percent.

Important factors to keep in mind are how much you've drunk in a given period of time, how much you weigh and whether you've been eating. Your age, individual metabolism and experience with drinking are also factors. However, it simply is not true that beer or wine is less likely to make you drunk than so-called "hard" drinks. A 6-ounce glass of wine, a 12-ounce can of beer or 1½ ounces of 86-proof whiskey have about the same amount of alcohol and will have about the same effect on you.

How to estimate your Blood Alcohol Concentration. Although the effects of alcohol vary a great deal, the average effects are shown in the accompanying chart prepared by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Find your weight in the left-hand column and then refer to the number of drinks you have had or intend to have over a two-hour period. For example, if you weigh 160 pounds and have had four beers over the first two hours you're drinking, your Blood Alcohol Concentration would be dangerously beyond .05 percent, and your driving ability would be seriously impaired—a dangerous driving situation. Six beers in the same period would give you a BAC of over .10 percent—the level generally accepted as proof of intoxication.

It is easier to get drunk than it is to get sober. The effects of drinking do taper off as the alcohol passes through your body, but the drop is slow. In the example above, the person who had six beers would still have significant traces of alcohol in his blood six hours later.

Even if you're not drinking, other drivers may be. Your best protection is still the seat belts in your car. Accidents do happen, and wearing lap and shoulder belts doubles your chances of coming through one alive.

DRINKS (TWO-HOUR PERIOD)

Weight	1½ ozs. 86° Liquor or 12 ozs. Beer											
100	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
120	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
140	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
160	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
180	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
200	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
220	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
240	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

BE CAREFUL DRIVING BAC TO .05%

DRIVING IMPAIRED .05-.09%

DO NOT DRIVE .10% & UP

Source: NHTSA

The chart shows average responses. Younger people generally become impaired sooner, while older people have more vision problems at night. Tests show a wide range of responses even for people of the same age and weight. For some people, one drink may be too many.

Having a full stomach will postpone somewhat the effects of alcohol, but it will not keep you from becoming drunk.

Black coffee, cold showers, or walking around outdoors will do nothing to make you sober. Of course, someone who claims, "I'll be okay as soon as I get behind the wheel," may be making a fatal misjudgment.

At General Motors, we have developed a device which tests a driver's reflexes and motor responses before it allows the car to start. The Department of Transportation is now testing it in California as a deterrent to repeat offenders. Today, you, the driver, have to know your limits and when you've gone beyond them. If you have any doubts, don't drive.

This advertisement is part of our continuing effort to give customers useful information about their cars and trucks and the company that builds them.

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The State of World Jewry

Norman Podhoretz

To speak of "world Jewry" in 1983 or any other year is a little reckless. For one thing, the very term "world Jewry" conjures up uncomfortable associations with the myth enshrined in the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*, according to which the Jews secretly run the world through an international committee of their richest and most powerful leaders. Jews tend to smile wryly at the mention of this paranoid estimate of their power. *Halevai*, they say; would that it were so. Or, alternatively, knowing its potential for arousing literally murderous hostility, they rush to demonstrate that there is no such entity as world Jewry and no such body as the Elders of Zion. Alas, they say, if we were so powerful, how is it that we could not prevent Hitler from slaughtering so many millions of our people?

Still, neither mordant Jewish humor nor defensive Jewish anxiety has succeeded in putting the myth of the Elders of Zion to rest. Indeed, not even irrefutable scholarly proof that the *Protocols* were a forgery of the czarist secret police has been able to block the circulation of that extraordinary document. At this very moment, in the year 1983, millions of copies of the *Protocols* are in print and are freely distributed throughout the two main centers of anti-Semitism in our day: the Soviet world and the Arab world. Yet even in the West—and yes, even in the United States—one finds traces of the myth in the minds of many who would laugh at the literalism with which it is spelled out in the *Protocols*, and who are by no stretch of the definition anti-Semitic. Only the other day, for example, I heard of a German politician with a history of anti-Nazism, and a record of friendliness toward Israel, who regularly inquires of prominent Jewish visitors, "*Was gibt's mit dem Weltjudentum?*" ("What's world Jewry up to these days?")

Most, or perhaps all, Jews know that, for better or worse, there is no such entity as world Jewry in the sense suggested by that question. Whether they bewail as dangerous their evident inability to unite for the purposes of concerted action, or whether they glory in it as a measure of diversity and pluralism, Jews understand that it remains a fact—one of the stubbornest facts of Jewish life.

And yet, and yet, in recent years there has seemed to be an exception. Since 1948, Jews everywhere, in every country, of every degree of religious observance, of every political stripe, have more and more come together on one major issue: the state of Israel. Before 1948—before, that is, the state of Israel actually came into being—there were severe, bitter, even fratricidal disagreements as to whether a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine, or the Land of Israel, to use the name by which Jews have traditionally known it, was a good idea. These disagreements began to fade in the face of the reality of the new Jewish state, though they did not entirely disappear. There were Orthodox Jews who looked upon the Jewish state as a blasphemous anticipation or "forcing" of the messianic age; there were Reform Jews who looked upon the Jewish state as a regression to tribalism; there were socialist Jews who looked upon the Jewish state as a monument to reactionary bourgeois nationalism.

But these anti-Zionist Jews were divided among themselves and in any case added up to a relatively small minority which was then further depleted by the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Each of those two wars caused severe casualties in the ranks of the anti-Zionist Jews. And in addition to eroding the animosity of the anti-Zionists, these two wars also had a profound effect on the previously indifferent or apathetic. Confronted with the possibility that, with the memory of the Holocaust still hideously fresh, yet another major Jewish community might be wiped off the face of the earth, the vast majority of Jews everywhere in the world rose up and said No. This time, if God forbid it were to happen, it would happen against the concerted effort of all Jews everywhere to do whatever they could to prevent it.

And so we entered upon a period in which, for the first time in centuries, it became possible to speak, with a degree of plausibility and with all due respect for the limits of the phenomenon, of such an entity as world Jewry. In Israel itself, despite passionate political and religious divisions, a

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proud and happy unity prevailed on the fundamental question of national security and the measures needed to insure the survival of the state against all those in the Arab world and elsewhere who were determined to destroy it. In the United States, where the largest single Jewish community in the world was and is still located—it was and is nearly twice the size of the second largest, the Jewish community of Israel—the splits of the past faded into near invisibility where Israel was concerned. Israel, said the sociologist Nathan Glazer, had become the religion of American Jews. American Jewry, I myself added, had become entirely "Zionized" in at least the minimal sense that perhaps 99 percent of the community now actively supported the idea, and of course the reality, of a sovereign Jewish state in the Land of Israel.

Even more remarkable was the upsurge of enthusiasm for Israel in countries whose Jewish communities had not previously been notable for Zionist sentiment, not even in the minimal sense of believing that a sovereign Jewish state was a good idea. France (now with the fourth largest Jewish community in the world) was a striking example. Traditionally, French Jews tended to regard Zionism as (in the words of the sociologist Dominique Schnapper) "an unfortunate confusion between a religion and a national movement." This "well-known resistance to Zionism" did not necessarily preclude a certain sympathy for Israel as a refuge for Jews unlucky enough to have been born in countries other than France. Nevertheless, "The founding of Israel and the 1948 war had no effect on most French Jews." The Six-Day War, however, worked an even more dramatic transformation on French Jewry than on the Jews of America. Even the most highly assimilated French Jews were aroused by this reminder that the very existence of the Jewish people was being called into question once again, and the result was to eliminate the last vestiges of hostility and indifference to the fate of the Jewish state. Thus the vast majority of French Jews came to agree with the proposition that "the survival of the state of Israel is the one burning issue for all Jews in the post-Auschwitz era."

The effect of the Six-Day War on Soviet Jewry was perhaps the most striking of all. Here was a Jewish community, the third largest in the world, whose ties to Jews in other countries had been forcibly cut by a totalitarian regime. That regime, moreover, was in league with Israel's enemies, who were in those days making no attempt to conceal their active desire to wipe the Jewish state off the map and drive its inhabitants into the sea. Zionism itself was a dirty word in the Soviet lexicon; in fact, there is evidence that the idea of stigmatizing Zionism as a form of racism —an idea later endorsed by the UN General Assembly—originated not in the Arab world but in the Kremlin. Yet in spite of these circumstances, the Jews of the Soviet Union by all accounts were aroused to a sense of passionate solidarity with those criminal Zionists, the Jews of Israel. During the Vietnam war, I once remarked to a Soviet dissident that many Soviet intellectuals seemed sympathetic to the South Vietnamese and the Americans. "No," he said, "not many; *all*." So it evidently was with the sympathies of Soviet Jews first in the Six-Day War and then in the Yom Kippur War. They were all on the side of Israel.

A SIMILAR development occurred everywhere in the world where Jews still lived. One of the early Zionist thinkers, Ahad Ha'am, had predicted that if a Jewish state came into existence, it would have room only for a fraction of the Jewish people, while for the majority who would remain in the Diaspora it would serve as a "spiritual center." This prophecy certainly seemed to have been more clearly vindicated than Theodor Herzl's vision of an end to anti-Semitism and the insuring of Jewish security through the "normalization" of the Jewish people in their own sovereign state. Indeed, it was the very failure of the Jewish state to make the Jewish people—first and foremost its own inhabitants—more secure that contributed to the realization of Ahad Ha'am's prophecy. For the threat to Israel's existence—a threat made visible and credible to everyone in 1967—served to put Israel at the very center of Jewish consciousness in the Diaspora.

To be sure, this was not exactly what Ahad Ha'am had in mind in speaking of a spiritual center; his idea, a secularized version of the ancient prophecy that the Torah would go forth from Zion, was that a resurgent Jewish culture would spread from the Jewish state to the Diaspora. But what happened after 1967 was not so far removed from this vision as might appear at first glance. Thus the new experience of solidarity with Israel led in many cases to a new interest in Jewish culture and even to a degree of Jewish religious observance. Everywhere Jews, especially young Jews who had never shown any interest in these things before, began studying Hebrew and Yiddish and Jewish history and attending religious services. Assimilation became unfashionable. To quote Mme. Schnapper again: "Today, in Italy as well as France, the assimilationist view, according to which Judaism is just one religious denomination among others, is defended by no more than a minority of Jews." What Mme. Schnapper says of Italy and France is equally true of the United States and, I would guess, of most (if not indeed all) Jewish communities in the rest of the world.

With the supreme exception of Emil Fackenheim, I do not believe that the significance of this extraordinary development has as yet even begun to be appreciated. There was something awesome about it, something not easily comprehended by

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ordinary categories of contemporary understanding, something touched by the miraculous. First came the Holocaust: an experience so terrifying, so degrading, so humiliating that it might well have left the survivors—I mean not only those few who survived the death camps but all Jews everywhere who escaped this genocidal conspiracy against them—utterly demoralized and therefore ready to collapse and say Enough. Instead the opposite occurred: a reassertion of the will to live.

In making this assertion, very few Jews, whether in Israel or in the Diaspora, thought of themselves as performing a religious act. Nevertheless this is precisely the conclusion to which a serious theological reading of their behavior must lead. In the eyes of Judaism, God, for His own inscrutable reasons, chose the Jewish people as a vehicle for revealing the Law to all the world; consequently, their existence as a people is in itself a religious imperative: the Jewish people and the Torah are one, says the Talmud. It was because the Jewish will to live in defiance of Auschwitz asserted itself most concretely and most decisively through Israel that Fackenheim could ascribe such overriding religious significance to the state and its survival.

Yet no sooner had this will to live manifested itself than, once again, a genocidal conspiracy was mounted against it, this time in the form of a military threat by the Arab states. This time, therefore, the Jewish will to live could only prevail if the Jewish state proved capable of enforcing it by military means. No one, least of all Ahad Ha'am, ever foresaw that the most brilliant institution of a reestablished Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel would turn out to be not its universities or its *yeshivot* but its army. But this is what the will to live dictated, and this is what the Jews of Israel, against all expectation and against the pacific habits and instincts of the past two thousand years, set about to create. Gershom Scholem, who as an Israeli and the greatest Jewish scholar of our age was in himself alone a one-man fulfillment of Ahad Ha'am's dream of a resurgent Jewish culture in Israel, nevertheless once said in conversation: "The Jews are a talented people and talent goes where it is needed; in our day in Israel it was needed in the military and so it went there."

It was not, however, until the Six-Day War that the world learned how successfully the Jews of Israel had poured their talent into the military. In the weeks leading up to the actual outbreak of hostilities, with Nasser and other Arab leaders promising to destroy the state and drive its Jewish inhabitants into the sea, there was no good reason to anticipate the eventual outcome. And so Jews everywhere trembled. But they did more than tremble. They rose up to declare that they would do everything in their power to insure the survival of the state of Israel. As statement after statement made clear, moreover, they were expressing this determination not in a philanthropic spirit or even in a spirit of fraternal concern, but rather out of the conviction that their *own* survival as Jews was linked to the survival of Israel. Everywhere in the world, spontaneously, without mutual consultation, and all at once, Jews affirmed their acceptance of what Fackenheim called the commandment of Auschwitz, the 614th commandment, the commandment that negatively forbade the giving of posthumous victories to Hitler, and that positively declared: "There shall be Jews." Like their forefathers at Sinai, these Jews of the 20th century responded to the voice of Auschwitz by answering: "We will do and we will hear."

IT HAS often been said that the elation experienced by so many Jews at the brilliant Israeli victory in the Six-Day War unleashed a spirit of arrogant triumphalism both in Israel and in the Diaspora. I have always believed this to be a philistine calumny based on willful blindness to the true meaning of Jewish elation in the immediate aftermath of the Six-Day War. To the extent that it *was* triumphalist, it echoed the grateful emotions expressed in the Song of Moses, or, to bring it historically closer to home, a sentiment familiar even to assimilated or unlettered Jews from yearly recitation at the Passover seder, one of the few traditional religious practices that is still more honored in the observance than in the breach. "In every generation," we read in the Passover Haggadah, "they rise up to destroy us." This was the lesson learned, or rediscovered, in 1967, especially by American Jews for whom the preceding twenty years had been a veritable Golden Age of Security, a period of safety and prosperity unparalleled in the entire history of the Diaspora.

The verse I have just quoted from the Haggadah ends, just as the Song of Moses begins, with thanks to God who, says the Haggadah, delivers us from the hands of those who rise up in every generation to destroy us. Did the Jews of the generation of 1967 learn or rediscover that part of the verse as well? Some members of that secularistic generation certainly did: there was a dramatic rise in the number of "returnees" to religious observance. In France, Mme. Schnapper writes that ". . . the emotions aroused by the Six-Day War caused many Jews . . . to find their way 'back to Judaism.' " The same thing happened in Israel, in the United States, and in other countries too. Of course, these returnees were only a small minority. Yet I believe that even many who did not openly and consciously credit God with the victory of 1967 experienced intimations of the miraculous in the deliverance. If there was triumphalism in that experience, it was closer to awe than to arrogance.

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Besides, there was an undercurrent of anxiety coursing through and dampening the elation. For in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, it began to become clearer and clearer that Israel was losing the sympathy and support of leftists and even liberals everywhere in the world. Jews were accustomed to hostility from the Right, but hostility from the Left came as a bewildering shock from which many Jews have still not recovered and to which they have been unable to adjust.

In any case, such triumphalism as there was in 1967 enjoyed only a very brief run. A mere six years later, the Egyptians and the Syrians launched a surprise attack, which demonstrated that the victory of 1967 had not rendered the lesson of 1967 obsolete. They were still rising up to destroy us. The Jewish resolve to hear and obey the commandment of Auschwitz thus had to be reaffirmed at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War; and it was. Indeed, the Yom Kippur War elicited an even greater outpouring of Jewish support for Israel than had been the case in 1967.

THE period in which, for the first time in centuries, one could speak of a united world Jewry, was, then, born out of one war and strengthened and matured in another. The question that confronts us today, fifteen years after this new age of world Jewry was inaugurated, is whether it was brought to an end by yet another war: the war in Lebanon of 1982.

During the war itself, the answer to that question was loudly proclaimed to be Yes. In the United States, scarcely a day passed without a story in the newspapers and a feature on television informing us that there was now a split in the Jewish community. Statement after statement streamed out of the mouths of prominent Jews who criticized the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as everything from an unwise resort to force to an act of imperialist aggression. Intense as this American Jewish criticism of the war was or seemed to be, the critics were or seemed to be even more vociferous and passionate in England. Evidently, so hard was it to find an articulate Jewish defender of the Israelis in England itself that a television network there had to import an American—me—to provide a bit of balance when it staged a discussion of the war by Anglo-Jewish intellectuals. But the most dramatic reports of a split came from within Israel itself. For the first time, so the world was told, significant numbers of Israelis were dissenting from their government on an issue of national security, even to the totally unprecedented point in some cases of refusing to fight.

Given all this, it would have been reasonable for an innocent observer to conclude that at least half the Jewish world had suddenly turned against Israel—certainly on the issue of the war in Lebanon and perhaps even on the issue of the Israeli position in general. After all, here were the Israelis being daily stigmatized even in respectable circles of opinion as no better than the Nazis, and the Jews seemed more intent on proclaiming their "anguish" over what the Israelis were presumably doing in Lebanon than on leaping to the defense of Israel against these disgusting libels.

This impression could only have been strengthened by the Jewish reaction to the massacre by Arab Christians of Arab Muslims in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. On any sane scale of moral judgment, the Israelis would have ranked at the bottom of the list of those responsible for this act of vengeance in a long chain of internecine blood feuds between one group of Arabs and another. Yet when everyone in the world began talking as though Israelis, rather than Arabs, had been the guilty party, what did we see and hear from the *Jews*? We saw mass demonstrations against the government within Israel, and we heard of statements by one Jewish leader after another in the Diaspora which sounded suspiciously like confessions of Jewish guilt.

Such, at any rate, was the message conveyed by the media. The media were intent on finding evidence for the view that a previously united Jewish community was now split. One can only speculate on why they were so eager to make this into so big a story. My own guess is that a combination of motives was at work here. As longtime believers in the theory that Israel is the main obstacle to peace in the Middle East, they had a clear political interest in persuading Washington that there was now an opportunity to put various kinds of pressures on Israel: if the Jewish community was split, the political costs of turning on Israel were obviously much reduced. In addition to this political interest, they also had a moral interest in finding Jewish cover for their own attacks on Israel: if Jewish leaders and, still better, Israelis were denouncing Israel as a fascist country and the war in Lebanon as an act of criminal aggression, this made it easier for others to say such things, and worse, without exposing themselves to charges of anti-Zionism and even anti-Semitism.

BUT what about the Jews who allowed themselves to be used as vehicles for the message of a split being conveyed by the media? The first point to make about these Jews is that they constituted a small minority. Judging from the polls and other indicators like the increased level of contributions to the United Jewish Appeal, the vast majority of Jews remained firm in their support of Israel.

No doubt the size of the majority varied from country to country. In the United States, nearly 90 percent of a national sample of Jews in a 1983 study described themselves as "pro" or "very-pro" Israel. I have seen no comparable studies of the West European Jewish communities, but I would

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guess that the pro-Israel majority in France was somewhat smaller than the American and that in England it was smaller still. Nevertheless a reasonable estimate would be that the support of perhaps 85 percent of the Jewish people throughout the world for Israel was unshaken by Lebanon. By this I mean that whether they liked Menachem Begin or not, whether they were for or against his policies on the West Bank, and even whether they had doubts about the wisdom of going into Lebanon or not, the great majority of Jews refused to be morally bullied into "joining the jackals," to borrow the image used by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan in characterizing the anti-Israel pack at the UN and elsewhere who have been trying for so long to delegitimize Israel by branding it a criminal state. Against enormous pressure from the surrounding environment to add their voices to the cacophonous chorus of attacks on Israel, the majority of Jews summoned the moral courage to hold firm.

Ironically, however, it was not *these* Jews who were celebrated for courage. It was rather the Jewish critics of Israel who, when they were not congratulating themselves on their own courage (or comparing themselves to the ancient Hebrew prophets), were being congratulated by the columnists and editorialists and TV commentators for daring to speak out. Now, as it happens, a good many of these critics lived in university towns or worked in professions like journalism in which criticizing Israel was a species of *conformity to prevailing opinion*. No courage was required to attack Israel in Berkeley or Cambridge or Ann Arbor, or in the offices of the New York *Times* and *Newsweek* and NBC; in such places it took courage, a great deal of it, to *defend* Israel. I will grant that someone like the executive director of a Jewish community center in the Midwest did need courage to attack Israel. But that only confirms the main point I am trying to make: which is that the great majority of Jews remained staunch in their support of Israel during this enormously difficult period—a period when as Jews they were made to feel more isolated and morally beleaguered than at any time in living memory.

IN SHORT, there was no split in the sense or of the dimension suggested by media coverage of world Jewry's response to the war in Lebanon. But in saying this, I do not mean to suggest that Lebanon had no effect on the Jews. Lebanon did have an effect. The effect was wildly exaggerated and misinterpreted by the media. Nevertheless, it was real and may yet turn out to be consequential.

I would summarize it by saying that Lebanon brought about a resurrection—or, if one prefers language more natural to the contemporary ear—a return of the repressed. The corpse that was resurrected, the repressed that returned, was Jewish anti-Zionism.

I said earlier that the three main forms of Jewish anti-Zionism—Orthodox, Reform, and socialist—suffered a near-fatal blow when the state of Israel was founded. They were, one might say, rudely thrown into the dustbin of history by its verdict in favor of Zionism. But like a number of other inhabitants of that fabled bin, they managed to remain surprisingly vital in one form or another for the next twenty years. Although most Orthodox Jews made their peace with Israel, splinter groups like the Neturei Karta continued to regard the state as a blasphemous abomination. Most Reform Jews also made their peace with Israel, but traces of the old anti-Zionist tradition could still be detected here and there in a certain sourness toward Israel, in the grudging quality of support for the state, in the tendency to blame Israel for anything that might go wrong in its relations with the United States and even with the Arab states.

All this came out clearly in 1956, when a substantial number of Jews joined the Eisenhower administration in condemning the Israelis for their part in the Anglo-French Suez campaign and applauded Eisenhower when he forced them to give up the territorial gains they had made in the Sinai. One could see the same sourness toward Israel in the harping on Israeli responsibility for the Palestinian problem, even in the days before the creation of the PLO when the Palestinians were still regarded by themselves and everyone else as refugees, not as freedom fighters, and when Jordan still held the West Bank and Egypt still held the Gaza strip.

A similar set of traces could be found among Jewish socialists and the many intellectuals who, though no longer socialists, had remained in some sense on the Left. Of course, for the first thirty years of its existence, Israel had a socialist government, and this in itself did much to blunt and coopt opposition from the Left. Yet the old uneasiness with Jewish nationalism, the old feeling that statehood was the wrong solution to the "Jewish problem," never quite disappeared—not even, I think, in Israel itself. Lenin (or was it Plekhanov?) once said that the Bundists—the anti-Zionist Jewish socialists of Eastern Europe who differed from other Jewish socialists in believing that secular Jewish culture was worth preserving—were really Zionists at heart, Zionists who were afraid of seasickness. Yet it would be just as accurate to say that the socialist Zionists were really socialists at heart, socialists who were *not* afraid of seasickness. In other words, their commitment to Jewish statehood was predicated on the belief that the Jewish state would justify itself in the eyes of socialist values. By becoming a model of socialist virtue, it would demonstrate that socialism and Zionism were beautifully com-

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patible. There was thus an element of ideological conditionality in the Zionism of the socialist Zionists. The inescapable logical implication of their position was that a Jewish state (unlike all others) had to justify its existence by developing a certain kind of society and behaving in a certain specified manner.

Within Israel itself, the day-to-day realities of life in a living polity vastly outweighed the theoretical conditionality in the Zionism of the socialist Zionists. Moreover, the responsibilities of governing and conducting foreign policy in a murderously hostile environment, and being forced to fight one war after another simply in order to remain alive, had the enormously healthy effect of clearing their minds of any lingering traces of the notion that a Jewish state had a special obligation to earn its right to exist. In the Diaspora, however, where these influences were absent, support for Israel among Jews on the Left *did* remain conditional to one degree or another. So long as Israel behaved itself in ways that they could easily approve, they would be on its side; let Israel make one false step, however—false, that is, from their point of view—and they would begin to reconsider.

MY CONTENTION is that the war in Lebanon became the occasion for just such a reconsideration. More precisely, it became the occasion for going public with a reconsideration that had been brewing since the accession of Menachem Begin to power in 1977. As a disciple of Jabotinsky and a product of the Revisionist wing of the Zionist movement, not only was Begin not a socialist; he was not a man of the Left at all. To the political and intellectual establishment in Israel, which was made up almost entirely of men of the Left, Begin was a hated figure. Indeed, the feelings of the Israeli establishment toward him bore a striking resemblance to the feelings of the liberal establishment in America about Richard Nixon. Liberal hatred of Richard Nixon had deep roots, going all the way back to his role in the Hiss case; similarly with the hatred of Begin in Israel, which went back all the way to the ideological and political wars of the pre-state period between the Labor Zionists and the Haganah on the one side and the Revisionists and the Irgun on the other. In America this hatred of Nixon as the ancestral enemy was widened and deepened by the chagrin of the liberals over his success in mobilizing the so-called "silent majority" to usurp the power that they were convinced rightfully belonged to them; so too in Israel, the socialist Zionists were in a heightened rage over Begin's success in riding the Sephardi and the Orthodox vote to power over them.

In my opinion, it is impossible to understand the unprecedented protests and the street demonstrations provoked in Israel by Lebanon without taking into account the role played by this ancestral hatred of Begin. In America, an effort was made to use Vietnam as a weapon against Nixon; in Israel, an effort was made to use Lebanon as a weapon against Begin. In America, Nixon was finally toppled not in an election but by an investigation; in Israel an effort was made to topple Begin in the same way after the massacres in Sabra and Shatila.

Within Israel, then, Lebanon became a weapon in a partisan political struggle. Yet so deep were the roots of this struggle, and so wide were its implications, that the opposition sometimes found itself talking as though its own commitment to Jewish statehood had once again become conditional. I say *as though* because I do not believe that anyone in Israel, except perhaps for a few isolated individuals, was ever actually driven by hatred of Begin or by opposition to the war in Lebanon into a change of mind about the value and validity of Jewish statehood. Yet when fear began being expressed by Israelis for the future of democracy in Israel, when epithets like "fascist" began being hurled at Begin, and especially when a line like "In our matzah is the blood of Palestinian children," could appear in an Israeli poem, encouragement and credence were given to those Jews in the Diaspora who *had* seen in Lebanon a confirmation of their growing doubts about Zionism—that is to say, about the value and validity of Jewish statehood.

Some of these people had become grudging supporters of Israel in 1948; others had come around as recently as 1967 or 1973. Moreover, unlike the opposition in Israel, most of them *had* implicitly attached conditions to their support for Israel. So long as Israel's survival was imminently threatened, they would rally to its side; and so long as Israel followed policies they could wholeheartedly approve, they would defend it against the ideological assaults of its enemies. As Lebanon showed, however, if Israel resorted to arms when its total destruction was not the immediate alternative to war, their support could not be counted on. Nor were they prepared to stand fast against the relentless efforts of the jackals to define Israel as a criminal state, to rob it of legitimacy and therefore of the right to exist. For these conditional supporters of Israel, what the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 had done, the war in Lebanon of 1982 had undone.

For a handful, Lebanon undid everything: these few actually joined the jackals themselves and openly repudiated the entire Zionist project. In such cases, the repressed that returned was the old socialist idea that Zionism represented an outburst of reactionary bourgeois nationalism. But in most cases, the repressed that returned was not quite so wholesale or so radical. It took the more limited form of certain ideas and attitudes that

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had been elements of one or another traditionally anti-Zionist position.

While the war in Lebanon was still going on, for example, two Jews, one English and one French, independently said to me that they had been so disaffected by Lebanon that they no longer had the stomach to defend Israel. Nor did they agree with me that the destruction of Israel would in all probability mean the final disappearance of the Jewish people from history. There had been Jews before Israel came into being, and there would be Jews if, God forbid—and each of them took care to say "God forbid"—Israel were destroyed. For their part, they meant to devote themselves to the needs of Jewish life in the Diaspora.

These two ex-Zionists were, whether they realized it or not, rediscovering an element of the Bundist heritage. In similar fashion, those Jews who saw in Lebanon proof of Israel's failure to become a "light unto the nations" were knowingly or not echoing one of the major themes of the anti-Zionism that once upon a time dominated the Reform movement whose opposition to Jewish statehood derived theologically from its emphasis on the universalist mission of the Jews.

Given this revival of Jewish anti-Zionism, can we today, as 1983 draws to a close, still speak, as we could during the previous fifteen years, of a united world Jewry? In politics, a majority on the order of 85 percent for all practical purposes spells unanimity. This is why the persistent reports of a split in the American Jewish community failed in the end to undermine congressional support for Israel. Whatever the media might say, the politicians knew from their own soundings that Jewish voters would still reward them at the polls, and through financial contributions, for supporting Israel, and would still oppose them if they turned against Israel. But that, I fear, does not dispose of the matter, even in the political sphere.

Within Israel, the opposition has an unquestioned right to attack the government and to criticize it vehemently both on specific policies with which it disagrees and on its general conduct of affairs. Israel is a democratic country, and those Israelis who call their government fascist do not seem to realize that their freedom to do so is itself the most vivid demonstration of the ludicrousness and the intellectual irresponsibility of the charge. But there is something else they do not realize. They do not realize that abandoning all restraint in attacking the government is more than a democratic right: it is also a luxury. Even a country as powerful as the United States can hardly afford the unrestrained exercise of this right in the face of an aggressively expansionist Soviet empire. Thus the spread of a point of view which, as Mayor Edward Koch of New York recently put it in speaking of his fellow Democrats, "sees the United States as the major cause of the world's ills," seriously hampers American efforts to resist Soviet expansionism and therefore ultimately endangers our own security. And if this is so where a superpower like the United States is concerned, it is all the more so of a small and infinitely more vulnerable country like Israel. I do not suggest that the answer is a legislated restriction on free speech either here or in Israel. What I am suggesting is that Israeli oppositionists ask themselves whether their country, living as it does on so narrow a margin of security, can afford the luxury of an opposition that knows no self-restraint. If the idea that (to quote Mayor Koch again) "America is what's wrong with the world" is both false and dangerous, the idea that Israel is what's wrong with the Middle East is no less false and even more dangerous.

In addition to speaking thus bluntly to those of his fellow Democrats who have been attacking the United States, Mayor Koch on a different recent occasion had some harsh words to say about those of his fellow Jews who have been attacking Israel. For this he was in turn attacked as a McCarthyite by a prominent journalist who had not previously been notable either for his love of Israel or for speaking as a Jew. Indeed, it is a measure of the hostility to Israel in the souls of a number of public figures who in the past, to put it mildly, never called attention to their Jewish origins that they have been willing to make the ultimate sacrifice of identifying themselves in public as Jews in order to lend greater credibility to their attacks on Israel. It was one of these newly emerged inhabitants of the Jewish closet who cried McCarthyism in response to Koch's criticism.

The same cry of McCarthyism has been heard from other Jewish critics who plaintively ask for the right to speak their minds about Israel in general or Begin in particular, as though anyone had been silencing them. The reality, of course, is that the views of these critics have been trumpeted on the front pages and the op-ed pages of all the major newspapers and broadcast to all the world on all the major networks. Not only have they been given a hearing far out of proportion to their representative weight and influence within the Jewish community; they have also been scrupulously accorded equal time in discussions within the Jewish community itself. Nevertheless they have the *chutzpah*—in that respect, at least, they are very good Jews—to complain about being muzzled.

To make matters even more bizarre, these great believers in the value of frank and open criticism of Israel cry McCarthyism whenever anyone engages in frank and open criticism of *them*. Yet if they are driven by conscience to attack Israel, I am driven by conscience to attack them, and I ask them to ask themselves whether they are willing

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to accept responsibility for spreading the notion that Israel is "what's wrong" with the Middle East and thereby encouraging unilateral pressures that can bring no other peace to Israel but the peace of the grave.

In sum: from a strictly political point of view, the resurgence of Jewish anti-Zionism is at the same time relatively unimportant because it influences only a small minority of Jews, and potentially dangerous because it lends a highly visible measure of added plausibility to the campaign against the legitimacy of Israel.

From the point of view of world Jewry, however, the resurgence of anti-Zionism is a much more serious development. In the pre-Auschwitz age, the arguments advanced by various kinds of Jewish anti-Zionists against the idea of Jewish statehood were not only powerful; they were in many instances stronger on paper than those of the Zionists. Surely, for example, the opponents of Zionism among the Orthodox had a better case than Orthodox supporters of Zionism when they said that according to the Torah a Jewish state in the Land of Israel could only lawfully come into being with the coming of the Messiah. Thus when, in Chaim Grade's great novella, *The Rebbetzin*, which is set in an East European *shtetl* in the early 1930's, a rabbi sympathetic to the Zionists is angrily likened both to the Sadducees and to King Jeroboam, the charge is sustained by the most learned of the rabbi's colleagues.

But of course Grade is pointing here with the dramatic irony provided by hindsight to what might be called an instance of prophetic projection. For if anyone today can be compared with the Sadducees and with King Jeroboam, it is Orthodox anti-Zionist zealots like the Neturei Karta. Consider: the Sadducees were pious Jews—many indeed served as High Priests in the Temple—who did not agree with the Pharisees that the Oral Law in its entirety had been revealed to Moses at Sinai along with the written Torah. To my mind, this was a more plausible position than the one taken by the Pharisees, but history decided otherwise. History decided that Jewish survival depended upon total acceptance of the religious authority of the Talmud, just as history had earlier decided in favor of the equally implausible idea that only in Jerusalem could sacrifices be performed. Because it disagreed with this idea—so the Bible tells us—the northern kingdom of Israel under Jeroboam split with the kingdom of Judah and eventually disappeared from Jewish history; and because they disagreed with the idea that the debates of the rabbis of the Talmud were no less divinely inspired than the words of the Torah, the Sadducees in their turn disappeared from Jewish history. So too the pious anti-Zionist Jews of today who declare (in the words of the Neturei Karta) that "the Zionist state has no legitimate right to exist," and who denounce it as "blasphemous and heretic" [*sic*], are cutting themselves off from the mainstream of Jewish history and will very likely either go the way of the ten lost tribes and the Sadducees or will survive as a separate sect like the Samaritans or the Karaites, once part of the Jewish people but no longer so.

If Jews whose observance of the 613 commandments is likely to be outweighed in the scale of Jewish history by their repudiation of the 614th, what shall we say of Jews whose Jewishness involves a lesser degree of religious observance or none at all? Take, for example, those Jews who were drawn back or even introduced for the first time to Judaism and Jewish culture by their concern over Israel in 1967. Will the smattering of Hebrew they have learned, or the Friday-night *kiddush* they have begun to recite, or the synagogue services they sporadically attend survive the slashing of the lifeline to Israel? Unlike the anti-Zionist Orthodox zealots, the post-1967 returnees to Jewishness who have now turned against Israel probably will not end up as a separate sect cut off from the living body of the Jewish people. Instead, they will in all probability lapse back into an assimilationist mode and disappear in that way from Jewish history.

Because the Jewish people, already tiny in size even before it was decimated by Hitler, can ill afford such fallings-off, the resurgence of anti-Zionist ideas and attitudes is an ominous development. If these ideas and attitudes should spread within the Jewish communities of the world, they would pose the double threat of simultaneously strengthening the enemies of Israel from without and weakening Jewry from within. The central issue, then, is whether they can be expected to spread.

I for one believe that they have for the time being done their utmost and that they are unlikely to go any further. After all, Lebanon provided Jewish anti-Zionism with its first real opportunity since 1948 to stage a comeback. But not only was it the first; it was probably the best that could be hoped for. Here was a war started by Israel in a situation in which survival was not the immediate stake—Israel's first "war of choice," as it came to be called. Here was Israel being portrayed everywhere as an aggressor, a murderer of helpless civilians. And here, therefore, was a vivid vindication of the old anti-Zionist warnings against the evils of nationalism that would flow from Jewish statehood. All this was happening, moreover, in a cultural climate heavily biased against the use of military power by any Western nation or any ally of any Western nation—a bias fully shared by Jews, most of whom remained sympathetic to the left-of-center political forces which had been grow-

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ing more and more pacifist in outlook since the Vietnam war. Yet even with so golden an opportunity to exploit, the new anti-Zionism made amazingly limited inroads.

What this tells us about world Jewry in 1983 is that it has passed the first serious test of its resolve to obey the commandment of Auschwitz. Before Lebanon, obedience was easy. Israel was surrounded by an alliance of Arab states openly dedicated to its destruction. There was no ambiguity about the danger and no disagreement about the means required to deal with it. Then the Arabs changed their tactics. To their own peoples they still proclaimed that their intention was to wipe the state of Israel off the map, but now they let it be known through hints and whispers into the ears of Western statesmen that if only Israel agreed to a Palestinian state on the West Bank ruled by the PLO, they would agree to live in peace with Israel. With this shrewdly calculated shift—and with a little help from oil—the Arabs introduced an element of uncertainty into the minds of Israel's friends, including of course the Jews. To make what had formerly been clear even fuzzier, there was the fear among Jews everywhere that Israel would be unable to remain either Jewish or democratic if it held onto the West Bank and either had to absorb or rule over a million unwilling Arabs.

It was into these doubts and fears and ambiguities that the war in Lebanon erupted. Yet in spite of everything, hardly any Jews anywhere lost their nerve. They understood that Lebanon was not an isolated episode, but yet another front of the unrelenting war against Israel which the Arabs have been conducting since 1948. They understood that Israel had a perfect right to secure its northern borders against military assaults by the PLO. They understood that Israel had no less perfect a right to go on the military offensive. They refused to believe that the Israelis were indiscriminately bombing and shelling civilian targets. They were horrified by the comparisons made between the Nazis and the Israelis, and they were appalled by the almost complete absence of protest against these and other anti-Semitic canards.

All this signified that the great majority of Jews everywhere in the world found the moral courage to hold firm against overwhelming external pressures and insidious inner doubts. Thanks to Israel, world Jewry is still a reality in 1983. Like Israel itself, it has emerged from the ordeal of Lebanon in a somewhat bruised condition, but it *has* come through. And it has served notice that it will not be bullied or cajoled into forgetting that in our generation Jews are above all else forbidden to give posthumous victories to Hitler, and that in our generation this means above all else that Jews are forbidden to do anything that might strengthen the hand of those who have risen up to destroy the state of Israel.

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European "Sophistication" vs. American "Naiveté"

Owen Harries

The Europeans have a better understanding of the complexities of the present world difficulties than the United States.

—James Callaghan, London *Times*, February 19, 1982

One dreams also of a real American foreign policy which takes realities into account. . . .

—Couve de Murville, London *Times*, February 18, 1982

"It is recordable fact that the Reaganites hold alarming simplistic beliefs that divide the world into goodies and baddies," a conservative British editor said the other day. It seems hard to be a sophisticated European and also an admirer of Ronald Reagan.

—Robert G. Kaiser, *International Herald Tribune*, July 6, 1983

THE great transatlantic debate over deploying the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe has once again raised the question of how America's European allies see themselves, the United States, and international politics generally. Since the acute difference over Poland and the gas pipeline last year, the attention given to this question has diminished. Insofar as it has been addressed at all, it has been the attitudes of the Greens, the organized "peace movement," and the committed anti-Americans which have been most discussed. But those groups are not the most important elements in the situation. They are the outsiders of European politics. Their activities may make effective television, but—*pace* the Vietnam experience—the politics of the street in which they engage is the politics of the weak, of those without access to institutional power and decision-making. They will only have influence in circumstances in which those who have such access are themselves indecisive, doubt-ridden, or dangerously complacent.

What, then, are the prevailing assumptions and perceptions concerning themselves and the United States of those who influence and make decisions in Europe? UNESCO is not the first place that comes to mind as a source of insight into this question, but one must find one's epiphanies where one can. The occasion I have in mind was the last day of the UNESCO conference on Education for International Understanding, Cooperation, and Peace in April of this year, a gathering which displayed all the characteristics one would expect of a conjunction of that sponsor and that topic.* In its closing stages the United States delegation (headed by Reagan-appointed Ambassador Jean Gerard and including a number of conservative advisers) had fought hard to resist a "compromise" under which the U.S. would have to surrender the one resolution that robustly asserted liberal, democratic (and supposedly UNESCO) values in return for the dropping of two of the many resolutions submitted by Communist countries. Finally, under intense pressure to "save the conference," berated by its European friends for its stubbornness, and having received instructions from the State Department to accept the compromise, the U.S. delegation unhappily gave way. But having done so, it used the final plenary session to vent its feelings and complained bitterly about UNESCO's betrayal of the values it claimed to uphold and about the failings of the conference generally.

Immediately afterward—and this is the point of the episode—a number of West European delegates gathered in the lobby to discuss what had happened. After a while, one of them summed up the general feeling with an exasperated question: "Isn't it a pity that the United States can't learn to lose gracefully?"

It is a remark that stays in the mind. The more one considers it, the clearer it becomes that losing gracefully is by now the essence of West European foreign policy. The willingness to do so is the main component of the superior "sophistication" and "realism" which are so insistently claimed,

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* For a discussion of this meeting, see "How to Lose the War of Ideas," by Chester E. Finn, Jr. in the August issue of COMMENTARY.

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sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, for the Europeans. The claimed superiority is, of course, to the United States. In my experience, acceptance of a model of the Western alliance as being composed of wise, worldly Europeans who understand, and can play, the game of international politics in all its complexity, and a naive, ham-fisted America which does not and cannot, is a basic part of the mental make-up of a disturbing proportion of the people who shape, implement, and interpret European foreign policies. This is at least as true of conservatives as it is of social democrats and liberals. Belief in the model was strongly reinforced by the election of Ronald Reagan. The stereotypes of the B-grade Hollywood actor, the cowboy, the unreconstructed cold warrior were made to measure to confirm and justify the European sense of superiority. But that sense did not originate with his election and it will not end when he goes.

When one is exposed to this claim of superior realism and sophistication, one's first inclination is to ask where exactly is the evidence for it. If one considers some of the salient episodes in the history of Europe in this century—the events leading up to 1914, the Versailles peace conference, Munich, the extent of the effort Europe has been prepared to make to secure its own defense since 1948, and the current attitude toward the defense of its vital interests in the Persian gulf—one is not irresistibly led to concede European superiority. One might also be inclined to ask who, precisely, among Europeans has been more "sophisticated" than, say, Truman, Acheson, Nixon, and Kissinger, four men who among them ran American foreign policy for a good slice of the last forty years? These are legitimate, and in some circumstances necessary, questions. But insofar as the object is not to win an argument but to help the alliance function a little better, perhaps it is more profitable to try to understand the content of the claim than to contest it.

Let it be conceded at once that there are Europeans who are superbly equipped to comprehend the complexity of international politics and who are well grounded in the realist tradition which focuses attention on interests and power. At their best they are very good indeed. That having been said, however, two things must be added: first, increasingly they are not *at* their best; and second, most of the people who have to do with the making of foreign policy in Europe have only a casual and superficial acquaintance with the position and tradition they claim to represent.

As for the good people not performing at their best—which is the more interesting aspect—this, I believe, is largely explicable in terms of recent European history and the current state of the sociopolitical milieu in which they function. The recent history of Europe is essentially a history of losing: losing control over the division of Europe after World War II; losing the military dominance Europeans had previously enjoyed; losing political control over the key strategic issues in their own continent and over their own security; and losing virtually all of the vast imperial possessions (and the trade networks that went with them) which had previously made them the managers of a very significant portion of the world's affairs. At the same time, domestically, governments and other key institutions have suffered a serious erosion of legitimacy and authority.

Moreover, while some of these losses were the unavoidable consequences of historical events, increasingly they have flowed from an inability to mobilize the will and the power necessary (and objectively available) to protect interests in a more effective and assertive way, and from declining commitment to the values professed by West Europeans. All this has been a very recent and very compressed experience, and its effect on the confidence of decision-makers, on their assumptions as to what is possible, their determination to shape events, has been profound.

What happens to realists in such circumstances? One of the things that happens is that the deterministic—even fatalistic—strain that is inherent in realism comes to predominate. An episode in the long career of the English historian E.H. Carr makes the point. At the end of the 1930's—another decade of loss and of a crisis of faith for West European democracies—Carr wrote his classic realist analysis of international politics, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*. In its first chapter he observed of realism:

> In the field of thought, it places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences. It tends to depreciate the role of purpose and to maintain, explicitly or implicitly, that the function of thinking is to study a sequence of events which it is powerless to influence or alter. In the field of action realism tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to, these forces and these tendencies.

Carr then went on to illustrate his point by writing what another English historian, A.J.P. Taylor, was later to describe as "a brilliant argument in favor of appeasement."

Lest it should be thought that Carr was in any way eccentric and untypical, it should be pointed out that in the 1930's the link between appeasement and realism was widely recognized. When Harold Nicolson, a prominent anti-appeaser at the time, was attacked in the House of Commons by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's supporters, his response was: "I know that in these

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days of realism, principles are considered as rather eccentric and ideas are identified with hysteria." And a standard work on the subject, *The Appeasers*, by Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, observes:

> For the appeasers it was the height of "realism" to criticize the Versailles Treaty, and to show that all Germany's grievances in the 1930's sprang from the injustices of this Treaty. It was "practical politics" to advocate Treaty revision in Germany's favor.

Some went beyond this and exhibited a still more unattractive side of realism when it is associated with weakness—the positive appeal which power has for it. When the historian A.L. Rowse suggested that the London *Times* would do better to pay less attention to Italy and more to the stronger Germany, the pro-appeasement editor of that paper, Geoffrey Dawson, replied: "To take your argument on its own evaluation—mind you, I'm not saying that I agree with it—but if the Germans are as powerful as you say, oughtn't we to go in with them?"

IT IS difficult to resist the conclusion that thinking analogous to that illustrated by these examples is widespread in Europe today. The impulse to accommodate, and to adjust to, "the facts" is strong. So is the inclination to rule out one's own will and resolve as, potentially, one of the most significant of these "facts"—or to take the unbending of the springs of action in oneself as something one is as helpless to change as one is to move the stars from their courses.

All this is apparent in the plaintive appeals for an understanding of the allegedly unique difficulties which make effective action impossible or even prevent the keeping of promises made. The head of one German think tank once put it to me, with the air of one advancing an unanswerable argument, that it was completely unreasonable to expect the Federal Republic to give up a substantial proportion of the 5 percent of its trade that was conducted with the Soviet Union just to make a political point; another justified the failure to meet the promised 3-percent increase in defense spending on the grounds that for a country in the Federal Republic's circumstances, social security was more important than military security.

The same tendency is apparent, too, in the evident belief that attempting to improve one's position in significant ways—usually caricatured as a commitment to "winning" regardless of risk—is not only dangerous but simplistic and intellectually vulgar, clear evidence that one does not appreciate the "complexity" of things.

At the root of much of the European impatience and exasperation with the United States lies a resentment of the refusal by Americans to share this fatalistic attitude toward the facts of power and to surrender control over their own destiny—to substitute, as someone has put it, the passive question, "What will become of us?" for the political question, "What is to be done?" Sometimes the words "impatience" and "exasperation" are utterly inadequate to describe the response. Feeling breaks all bounds and causes cultivated and normally fair men to say absurd and unforgivable things. Thus Michael Howard, the Oxford historian, writing in *Harper's* (February 1983), says that "in many American minds [he is speaking not of the kooks but of those he describes as friends] the flames of war seem already to have taken a very firm hold," and he goes on to speak of "the brutal paranoia of the Committee on the Present Danger." The persistent stress on complexity (as distinct from accepting it as obvious) is itself a clear indication of the European predicament. The world is always unmanageably complex to those who lack a coherent position and whose resolve is faltering.

IF FATALISM is one side of the coin, complacency is the other. It is the combination of fatalism and complacency which is particularly characteristic of contemporary Europe. The claim that Soviet power is irresistible, or at least too dangerous to resist, goes along with the confident assertion that Europeans "understand" the Soviet Union in a special way and that, given the chance (i.e., freedom from American pressure), they can "handle" relations with the Soviets successfully. Particularly in West Germany, stress on Soviet power is accompanied by stress on the "confused," "insecure," and "bumbling" nature of the Soviet leadership. It is only a short step—readily taken—from this to the assertion that it is in the Western interest to help the Soviets solve their problems and manage their crises. To fail to do so is said to be provocative and dangerous.

Along with this goes the belief, again particularly evident in the Federal Republic of Germany, that in any long-term interaction between themselves and the Soviet Union, they will be the gainers. In terms of Lenin's question "who, whom?" many Europeans are complacently confident that the outcome of such an interaction will be a process of osmosis which will gradually normalize the Soviet Union.

This complacent adherence to a best-case view of things sits strangely with the profound underlying fatalism, and the combination can certainly make for some confused polemics. But if the two are logically in conflict, psychologically they are compatible and complementary—a balancing and disguising of strategic pessimism by tactical optimism. A retreat to a fatalistic surrender of control over one's own destiny (particularly when such a surrender is not required by objective circumstance) is only likely to be bearable if one can convince oneself that the consequences of the sur-

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render will not be too bad, that fate is appeasable. It becomes functionally necessary to believe that the Soviet Union is not too formidable and ruthless an enemy, that American demands and assertiveness are crude and mistaken, and that European sophistication and experience can somehow do the trick and outwit the logic of power. The application of this sophistication is, after all, the only remaining available game, and one's self-respect, as well as one's credibility in the eyes of others, requires that one have *some* game.

The preferred term for the policy that results from this combination of attitudes is "damage-limitation." It is a reassuring term, having a vaguely technical ring about it and free from both the disastrous historical associations of "appeasement" and the frivolity of "losing gracefully," though it amounts to much the same thing. Damage-limitation is now the operative principle in a great deal of European diplomacy, with respect both to the Soviet Union and to the Third World.

There are, of course, circumstances in which preventing one's position from deteriorating too quickly or drastically is about all that one can reasonably expect to do. But when the adoption of such an approach becomes generalized, when the instinctive reflex across the board is to think in these terms, the result must be enfeebling. It means that the initiative will always be yielded to others, that they will set the agenda. It means that one's own policies will always be reactive and that one's own interests and values will never be asserted at their strongest, but in the form of modification on the claims of others. I have sat through weeks of discussion among Western diplomats in which there was no Western paper before the participants and the whole time was spent trying to decide how to respond to documents fundamentally hostile to Western positions.

This is an approach which contains a built-in danger of "buying the same horse twice": first in formulating one's initial negotiating position in a way which—with "sophistication" and "realism"—takes account of the interests of the other side, and secondly in actually negotiating on the basis of that already compromised position. A strategy of damage-limitation is one which regularly leads its practitioners to proclaim a 20-percent modification of a thoroughly objectionable proposal as a resounding victory—not only publicly but in cables to their own governments.

In multilateral forums, where the one-country-one-vote system and bloc-voting prevail, this damage-limitation approach is rationalized on the grounds that, as the vote is certain to go against the West in any case, the only sensible thing to do is to try to improve resolutions—however basically hostile to Western values and interests they may be—before they are voted on. But this practicality ignores the importance of the symbolic and ideological dimensions of the activities of such forums, which are perhaps their only important ones—or, if it does not ignore them, it belittles them with such phrases as "mere rhetoric" or "hot air," a strange response from people who have had recent and bitter experiences of the role of symbols and ideology in politics. It also ignores the demoralizing long-term consequences for the West itself of tolerating and even conniving in systematic attacks on its own values, institutions, and interests.

Any suggestion of a stronger course—the curtailment of funds on a selective basis, for example, or even withdrawal from a particular organization (say, from UNESCO, the most anti-Western and inefficient of the UN special agencies)—is likely to be dismissed as extreme and crude, with the familiar argument that the West must stay in there to try to "manage" things and prevent them from getting even worse. But this is a weak argument in two respects. It ignores the fact that the West has proved itself singularly incapable of such management. More fundamentally, it fails to see that the presence of the West (even more than its money) is a necessary condition for the continuation of the games played in multilateral forums. Without the Western presence, these games would lose point and flavor.

The root error now, as in the 1930's, is a failure to recognize imperialism where it exists. Hans J. Morgenthau once defined appeasement as a policy of compromise, perfectly sensible when dealing with an adversary fundamentally committed to the status quo, but misapplied in a situation in which one is confronted with an imperialist power. That is, appeasement and imperialism are logically connected: it is the latter that transforms compromise into appeasement.

It may well be that a certain kind of practical realism, concentrating as it does on power and interests narrowly defined and being dismissive of more intangible factors, is naturally prone to this kind of error. In particular, this brand of realism tends to minimize the importance of ideology, the driving force of modern imperialism, seeing it as little more than "window dressing" or "rhetoric"; and it has a durable conviction that there are always deals to be struck if one can only show enough patience and ingenuity to find the right formula.

Such attitudes as these are, I believe, widely prevalent in Western Europe, and prevalent in influential circles. Clearly, even among those who hold them there are differences in the strength, consistency, and explicitness with which they are held and expressed. And some do not hold them at all. Margaret Thatcher, to take an obvious example, is not known as a good

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loser. But even she is influenced by people whose instincts and convictions push in that direction, and sometimes their influence prevails: witness the decision taken to support Robert Mugabe's accession to power in Zimbabwe in 1979, which, whatever one might think of its merits, certainly represented a retreat, accepted reluctantly under extreme pressure from her advisers and colleagues, on Mrs. Thatcher's part; witness, too, her reaction to American policy over the gas pipeline, when a major question of East-West policy was reduced to a matter of contracts; and witness most of all her extremely hostile reaction to the American military intervention in Grenada.

The decision of the West Europeans to proceed with the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles may appear to contradict the above argument, but I do not think that it does. Acceptance of deployment is not for the most part based on the conviction that the case for doing so is sound and strong, but has been reluctantly arrived at on the grounds that, having gone so far, West Europeans are stuck with it, and that American resentment would be too difficult to handle if they were to retreat. To the extent that this is the case, it is another manifestation of fatalism, of acquiescence in a decision imposed on Europe by the will of others rather than freely arrived at.

A last and obvious point. If the European view I have described is not universally held in Europe, it is equally true that it is not restricted to Europe. In the sense described, there are many "Europeans" in the United States, in and out of government—people who take as axiomatic the fact of America's naiveté, the superior sophistication of its allies, the wisdom of surrendering to complexity, and the efficacy of damage-limitation. The difference is that in the United States they are surrounded by a people which is still not quite reconciled to losing gracefully.

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The Greatest Living American Philosopher

Josiah Lee Auspitz

CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, the only American one can confidently place among the world's great philosophers, had a view of logic as a form of heroism. As he saw it, logical thinking is virtually useless in life, where the most important matters must be settled by faith and instinct. Logicality is heroic precisely because it is unarrested by practical interests, unhindered by the everyday need to leap to judgment. It is reasoning as if for eternity and for humanity as a whole. It is not dispassionate, since a commitment to the life of the mind is itself a sublime passion, but rather disinterested and selfless. It is, in his view, founded upon an altruistic principle.

When Peirce expounded this idea in a series of articles on the philosophy of science for *Popular Science Monthly* in 1877-78 he could not know that he was fated not merely to praise the heroism of intellect but to become corban to it. He was in those days as comfortably positioned and highly regarded as a forty-year-old logician could hope to be in 19th-century America. He was widely recognized as brilliant, and more importantly, appreciated in a select international scientific circle for his accomplishments in geodesy, astronomy, mathematics, symbolic logic, and philosophy. He had the patronage of the most influential men of science of the older generation and the enthusiastic support of the leading editors of both the very learned and the semi-popular journals. He was able to write on the most esoteric subjects but also to make non-didactic philosophy interesting to the readers of the *Nation*, *Popular Science Monthly*, and the *North American Review*. Besides, he had a remunerative post at the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the major government employer of research scientists. To this he was about to add a lectureship at the newly founded Johns Hopkins University, where he had every prospect of training a generation of graduate students to carry on his devotion to pure inquiry.

Even on the basis of what he had written before his fortieth year, one might have said that there had not been since Pascal a writer so thoroughly grounded in science and mathematics who worked to retrieve rather than to overturn the scholastic heritage of the Middle Ages. And how much bolder an enterprise from a child of Unitarian Harvard.

No one could have then imagined that Peirce would die a shivering pauper, sustained on alms raised for him by William James, that at his death in 1914 his major works would lie uncollected and unpublished, his contact with students nil, his final and most brilliant contributions buried in letters and notebooks that would begin to receive due notice only two generations after his death. No one could have predicted that even dutiful works of scholarship devoted to him would have the effect of delaying a general appreciation of his merit.

I

BUT we run ahead of the story. One result of the fate that befell Charles Sanders Peirce is that we cannot assume that the educated English-speaking reader even recognizes his name. Among specialists, of course, his reputation grows—I count seven issues of major international journals devoted to Peirce in the past few years, covering such topics as semiotics, pragmatism, linguistics, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and history of mathematics. One of these, the April 1982 issue of *The Monist*, contains a bibliography listing more than 600 entries during the previous five years.* And the attention Peirce receives is not merely archival. As one philosophy professor wrote recently: "I look on him not as a thinker of bygone days, but as a colleague and a co-worker on issues of abiding interest."

If a philosopher can be considered among the living so long as his ideas continue to spark interest and controversy at the frontiers of inquiry, there is little doubt that Peirce will remain for some time the greatest living American philosopher. There is afoot a kind of back-door Peirceanism in which his positions are rediscovered, often without attribution, or worse still, are alleged

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* An updated version of this bibliography, by Christian J. W. Kloesel, has recently been published in *The Relevance of Charles Peirce*, edited by Eugene Freeman, Hegeler Institute (La Salle, Illinois), 410 pp., $29.95.

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to have been superseded in the work of critics (in different generations, Arthur O. Lovejoy, Willard Van O. Quine, and Jürgen Habermas come to mind) who fall well short of comprehending their full range.

In disparate specialties, academic fashions have moved closer to aspects of Peirce's work that previously seemed outlandish: his diagrammatic habits of thought, his use of the continuum of infinitesimals, his post-Darwinian concept of evolution, his view of science as relying on a community of inquirers, his stress on the imaginative element in scientific discovery, his penchant for combinatorial analysis, his sophisticated use of the concept of modality, his insistence on a "logic of vagueness," his admiration for Hegel and Duns Scotus, his critiques of what are now called positivism, empiricism, skepticism, and intuitionism, his meticulous lexicographic work in philosophical terminology, and, above all, his founding of the now ubiquitous discipline of semiotics. At the same time, among those who admire philosophy for its own sake, a patient scholarship has begun not only to trace the development and antecedents of the many topics he addresses but to see a common core of animating ideas that gives Peirce's work its unusual power, self-sufficiency, and coherence.

But none of this ferment has yet reached a cultivated American public. Even among professors of philosophy Peirce has been neglected both by the scientifically inclined, who have looked to Britain and Vienna for philosophical direction, and by the historically, morally, and portentously minded, who have shopped German, French, and Eastern. For example, at Peirce's alma mater, Harvard, his name has appeared in the catalogue of philosophy courses only once in the past five years, during which period no fewer than two course listings a year have advertised close readings of Wittgenstein.

At last, however, both the professoriat and a broader public will have a chance to know Charles Peirce as only a few devoted scholars have known him. Indiana University Press has now issued the first two of a projected twenty-volume collection of Peirce's writings, chronologically arranged.* Though the edition bears the authoritative stamp of the Center for Scholarly Editions of the Modern Language Association, it is something more significant than the final embalming fluid for a classic author. Just as the 19th-century editions by Erdmann and Gerhardt established Leibniz as a writer who still exercises influence, so Peirce, it seems safe to say, will emerge from this collection as an active participant in current philosophical debates.

About half of the projected Indiana material has never been in print before. Peirce's known corpus would fill more than a hundred 500-page volumes, of which about one-fourth were published during his lifetime, and no book of his collected papers appeared until after his death. The Indiana volumes are thus more than the elegant reprinting of previously available work. They draw upon decades of scholarship in assembling, deciphering, and dating Peirce's manuscripts.†

Moreover, by placing Peirce's work in chronological rather than topical order—as was the scheme followed by the Harvard University Press edition of the 1930's—the new edition will enable a wide readership to follow his philosophical progress on a variety of interconnected problems. This is as Peirce himself would have wished. He saw philosophy not as issuing in systems or settled doctrines but as the working out of a logical point of view.

The chronological selection also focuses attention on piquant historical and biographical issues. Peirce's life was closely bound up with the founding of the modern American research university, and with the beginnings of federal and foundation patronage for scientific inquiry. Yet after his dismissal in 1884 from Johns Hopkins, some dark scandal was rumored to justify his ostracism from academic life, and the very purity of his devotion to logic was repeatedly used to deny him institutional funds as an independent scholar. He had to fall back on odd jobs, support from friends, and the patronage of a few New England families still prominent in higher learning. Does his exclusion tell us anything about institutional as opposed to individual support for philosophy in the land of pragmatism?

II

We meet "Charley" Peirce in Volume I as the ultimate Harvard brat. He came from one of those Yankee families which, whatever their professed church—and the Peirce-Nichols family's drift from Calvinism to Unitarianism to Episcopalianism is typical—have made of Harvard their cathedral.

Charles Sanders Peirce was the grandson of the librarian of Harvard College and the son of America's preeminent professor of mathematics. At his father's hands, he received a "laboratory" education that, from a scientific point of view, made John Stuart Mill's seem like a genteel kinder-

* *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition.* Volume I 1857-1866. Preface by Edward C. Moore, Introduction by Max H. Fisch. Indiana University Press, 698 pp., $32.50. Volume II 1867-1871. Preface by Edward C. Moore. Introduction by Max H. Fisch, C. F. Delaney, and Daniel D. Merrill. Forthcoming, January 1984.

† The Peirce Edition Project at the joint campus of Indiana and Purdue Universities in Indianapolis houses the files and library of Max H. Fisch, who has devoted the past forty years to scholarship on Peirce. It serves as an ongoing scholarly center. In addition, the Project has benefited from two preparatory collections: three volumes of *Texas Tech Graduate Studies* (1975, 1978, 1979) devoted to Peirce's contributions to the *Nation*, compiled and annotated at the Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism, Lubbock, Texas, by K. L. Ketner and J. E. Cook; and a multivolume, 2,500-page collection of Peirce's mathematical papers, *The New Elements of Mathematics*, edited and introduced by Carolyn Eisele (Humanities Press, 1976).

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garten. He was drilled in mathematical games and careful observation of the unreliability of his own senses. At eleven he wrote his own "History of Chemistry" after reading a translation by his father's sister and brother of the first German chemistry text to be used in American colleges. At fourteen he fell in love with *Whateley's Elements of Logic.* At fifteen he inherited his uncle's library of medical and chemical books. At sixteen his father supervised him in what were to be three years of regular readings in German of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* so that he committed whole chunks of it to memory.

Charley entered Harvard at sixteen. He did not do well in the areas central to computing class rank—compulsory chapel, good behavior, regular recitations, and compositions on set topics (e.g., "What is your favorite virtue?"). His performance declined as he grew older and more disposed to libertine bouts in Boston. His senior year he ranked seventy-ninth in a class of ninety-one. He did, however, spend some time with his Aunt Lizzie, the German translator, on an original rendering of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories from Kant's *Critique,* took loving notes on his father's lectures in advanced mathematics and physics, and plunged himself into Schiller's *Aesthetic Letters.*

He was graduated without honors in the class of 1859, and then spent several months on field trips in Maine and Louisiana with Alexander Dallas Bache, an old family friend who was superintendent of the United States Coast Survey. Then it was on to tutelage under another family friend, Louis Agassiz, for six months of private instruction in biological classification. He entered Harvard's Lawrence Scientific School in 1861 for formal training in chemistry and in 1863 received a B.S. degree in chemistry *summa cum laude.* In 1861, as the Civil War began, Bache appointed him to a (draft-exempt) post in the Coast Survey, as an aide to his father, who held the rank of assistant, directly below superintendent.

During the 1860's Charley remained at Harvard as a proctor, tutor, instructor, lecturer, and staff member of the Harvard Observatory. Like all other Harvard students in those days, he studied mathematics exclusively from texts written by his father, with the exception of an analytic geometry section by James Mills Peirce, his older brother.

His marriage, too, was an intramural affair. His wife, Melusina ("Zina") Fay, was the daughter of his father's Harvard classmate, an Episcopalian clergyman. Charley had to leave Unitarianism for the union, but his philosophical work had already progressed to a fascination with triadic categories that reconciled the unitarian-trinitarian dispute on a metaphysical level. Though an enthusiastic convert in his first years, he thereafter described himself as a Christian by sentiment rather than creed.

Zina, in any case, was not conventionally pious. Her real religion was separate-but-equal feminism, and her theological interests extended mainly to the person of the Holy Ghost, which she saw as the feminine aspect of the Trinity. She wrote a series of lead articles for the *Atlantic* advocating cooperative housekeeping to free women for careers, and a female parliament in which women would have their own political voice without having to compete with men. In Cambridge, she organized a school (which only her nephews attended), a Cooperative Housekeeping Society (with her father-in-law chairing its meetings), and a Committee on the Intellectual Education of Women, "by which girls might go through a course of study in some degree equivalent to that of Harvard College." In politics she advocated a form of proportional representation devised by her husband. She thus helped lay the ground for the founding of Radcliffe College and for the complex system of proportional voting which the city of Cambridge has retained to this day. Zina left Charley in Paris in 1875, and they were legally divorced in 1883. But during their Harvard period they seemed the quintessentially busy and productive Cambridge couple.

We should pause here to note that the three great scientific teachers of Peirce's youth—his father Benjamin Peirce, Jr., Alexander Dallas Bache, and Louis Agassiz—were more than fast friends. They were the core of the "Lazzaroni," or beggars for science, lobbyists who used every opportunity to build a national scientific research establishment. They formed a socially prominent yet uncompromisingly meritocratic cabal who sought to remove any obstacles that might deter humble, talented boys from a university career. The up-and-coming American astronomer, Simon Newcomb, an immigrant from Canada, exemplified their ideal. We shall encounter him later.

The Lazzaroni openly despised "practical" studies and "leveling" trends in education, yet were expert at dealing with crass legislatures and private donors in the cause of pure research. Many of their institutions survive to this day. In 1848 they founded the American Academy for the Advancement of Science; in 1863, channeling war fever into funding for science, they helped to write the bill which chartered the National Academy of Science. Their stamping ground was the U.S. Coast Survey, later renamed the Coast and Geodetic Survey. Benjamin Peirce succeeded Bache as its superintendent and inherited from him the dutiful Julius Erasmus Hilgard, an immigrant from Germany, to run the Washington office. Hilgard, too, figures in Charley's future.

None of the Lazzaroni was a more tireless promoter of science than Benjamin Peirce. He developed elaborate plans for the Lazzaroni dream of "a truly national university," which he tried at various times to sell to the federal government, the State of New York, and the City of New York. He and Agassiz worked more successfully at moving

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Harvard in that direction. The two of them were able to influence the choice of two successive Lazzaroni as presidents of Harvard in the 1860's. And to this day the governing structure of Harvard University, with its various boards and visiting committees loosely coordinated by an overarching board of overseers, owes much to Benjamin Peirce's *Working Plan for the Foundation of a University* circulated in 1856.

The first Lazzaroni president of Harvard, a classicist, died after two years, the second resigned unexpectedly after six. While Peirce and Agassiz were preoccupied with blocking an older Unitarian clergyman, they got (as they wished) a scientist and a layman but (as they did not) a young chemist whose elevation to a tenured chair they had previously blocked on the novel grounds that his social connections and administrative gifts were no substitute for scientific ability. This was Charles William Eliot, thirty-five, a professor of chemistry at the newly founded Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the son of a former mayor of Boston and treasurer of the Harvard Corporation.

Since Eliot had proctored the Harvard class of 1859 and had taught chemistry at the Lawrence Scientific School until 1863, he had ample opportunity to form what was to remain an unshakably low opinion of the character of Charley Peirce. But he also appreciated the need to placate the Peirce-Agassiz faction. Within weeks of Eliot's appointment, he topped an offer that had been made to Peirce's elder son James from the University of California. He followed with a plum for Charley, who was invited to give eleven university-wide lectures on British logicians in Eliot's first year as president and a further series his second. The year was then 1871, Charles Peirce was thirty-two, nine years married, and we are at the end of the period in which he wrote the papers collected in Volumes I and II.

Though he had been to the wilds with Alexander Bache, and made a Coast Survey trip to Europe with his brother and father to observe a solar eclipse in Sicily in 1870, he had never had to venture outside the ambit of his father's influence in Cambridge, Massachusetts. A vignette by Aunt Lizzie in family correspondence of 1867 describes a lively and lovable Charley "seated in his comfortable and handsome study" in front of the new glass-fronted bookcases of which he was inordinately proud (and which already contained a collection in medieval logic more than double that of the Harvard library). He seemed then as bright-eyed as a squirrel. He would, his aunt thought, never grow old.

III

In his own family correspondence of 1909 Peirce wrote that he did not "gain control" of his philosophical direction until 1867, when he was twenty-eight. The Indiana volumes appear to be edited with this in mind. Volume I takes an immature Charley to 1866, while Volume II covers the momentous years 1867-71, during which the young Peirce, in effect, pioneered a distinctively American and yet post-Enlightenment approach to philosophy. He announced his intention to do so obliquely but unmistakably in the seventh of a series of evening lectures on "The Logic of Science" at the Lowell Institute in Boston in 1866.

At that time, as indeed now, the purveying of philosophy in America was like the dry-goods business in an underdeveloped country, in which trading houses of various European nations supply the more refined native needs. The main imported brands in mid-19th-century America were German transcendental philosophy, Scottish common-sense philosophy, English association philosophy, and French positive philosophy. There was, in addition, a native so-called philosophy, which had not, however, crossed the crucial threshold between moralizing and theorizing. Peirce, therefore, while paying courteous notice to the homespun names of Edwards, Channing, Parker, and Emerson, among others, did not consider their work to be philosophy in the classical sense.

Yet New England, he thought, had three prerequisites for great philosophy: "the love of research and especially of history," "the capacity for being elevated by an idea," and, above all, the proverbial Yankee ingenuity rooted in "the same mixture of enthusiasm and patience which are required to originate a philosophic theory." "But though the Yankee is thus fitted to do so much good service in philosophy, let us by no means forget that he has not done it hitherto."

Hitherto. Between 1867 and 1871 Charles Sanders Peirce would publish ten papers, on a range of seemingly disparate topics—five papers on logic and mathematics for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, three metaphysical essays for the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, a further essay in symbolic notation applying the algebra of Boole to an entirely new field, and a long semi-popular review of a new edition of the works of Bishop Berkeley. These pieces, all reprinted in Volume II, do not comprise a system so much as a related set of beginnings. They lay down the main lines of inquiry to which Peirce would devote his life. But more than this: the best of them, taken together, constitute at once the declaration of independence of American philosophy and the movement of that philosophy into a central position in the mainstream of Western thought.

By the end of Volume II, indeed, it is clear that Peirce has launched a philosophical enterprise remarkable in three enduring respects. First, he shifts the ground of Western philosophy to a concern with the medium about which philosophy is itself a message—language, or more generally, signs. Second, he refounds modern science in terms seen as continuous with the logic of Aristotle and the Middle Ages rather than as based on a sharp

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break with them. Third, he prepares the way for mapping in formal terms territories of thought that still elude textbook logic.

These undertakings are all closely related. Philosophically, the first and third of them remain the most radical and fruitful in new lines of inquiry. But it is the second—the logical reconceptualization of modern science—that provides the most accessible approach to Peirce's work during this period. Unlike the purer logical undertakings—and pure logicality, the reader will recall, is heroically incomprehensible to those of us preoccupied with daily chores—it is susceptible of historical and polemical presentation. Peirce himself delivered semi-popular polemics on the failings of the fathers of modern science from which one can, with a few philosophical short cuts and a few forward glances, extract an underlying argument.

As I have suggested, Peirce's sensibilities about science recall Pascal's, but in a very different idiom. Pascal, living through the instauration of modern science, had an acute sense of the insufficiency of scientific categories in moral conduct: he had described in belles lettres the differences between the rigorous demonstrations of "the geometrical spirit" and the refined discriminations of everyday life. Yet as a result of his religious conversion, he asserted an ultimate unity of reason and faith.

On these same questions Peirce took a more austerely logical tack. What Pascal had experienced as a personal religious crisis, Peirce was already well advanced in treating as a problem for the method and logic of science. What he sought was a unified theoretical criterion adequate to science and moral practice alike. If certain logical categories were incompatible with moral conduct, they must also be incompatible with the activity of being a scientist. Scientific inquiry, after all, was itself a form of conduct, a practice with its own shared standards and mores. Like medieval religion it rested on real, catholic assent. The difference lay in the manner of fixing belief: the medieval church invoked canonical authority, buttressed from time to time by the bonfire and rack, while science relied more on reasoned agreement. The task for Peirce, then, was not to vindicate revealed religion, but rather to make explicit the postulates of scientific inquiry, and with them to reform the philosophical habits of the scientific community.

These philosophical habits had, as Peirce saw it, been perverse from the start. For historically contingent reasons the scientific movement had adopted a jerry-built metaphysics incompatible with science itself. The so-called "new philosophy" of science had been founded on an unexamined rejection of positions associated with religious orthodoxy. Because the Church revered Aristotle, science became anti-Aristotelian; because the Church glorified faith, science embraced systematic doubt; because orthodox scholastics accepted the reality of universals, the "new philosophers" followed the unorthodox Ockham in attending to empirically verifiable particulars; because the Roman priesthood invoked the world to come, science stressed utility in the here and now.

In adopting what were, in effect, forensic positions, modern science had gotten off on the wrong philosophical foot. It was therefore stuck with logical dogmas that would ultimately block the road to inquiry. The remedy was to find for it a true logic not vitiated by what Peirce would later call "a barbaric reaction against the Middle Ages." This logic was implicit in the actual practice of science—in, as Peirce would later argue, Galileo's stress on the "natural light" of reason or Kepler's continuing struggle to readapt his initial cosmology to new empirical evidence. But the logic-in-use, the *logica utens* of modern science, had never been explicated and systematically pursued as a textbook logic, a *logica docens*.

WHAT was then taught as the so-called philosophy of science was a bifurcated method thought to consist of induction and deduction. Each strand could be traced to one of the "church fathers" of modern science. The deductive strand was personified in Descartes, the inductive one in Bacon. The inadequacies of the one were thought to be complemented and corrected by the other. And each had associated with it a metaphysic that provided a line of philosophical retreat for the other. Deduction drew upon the supposed priority of intuition and the ultimate validity of introspective knowledge. Induction drew upon empiricism, the doctrine of the primacy of external fact. Together they gave science the semblance of a working metaphysic. How did we know which experimental facts were significant? By intuition. How did we establish that our intuitions were valid? By experiment.

For Peirce, by contrast, neither deduction nor induction nor some mysterious oscillation between them could account for the methods of science. For the two left out the crucial, creative element in scientific inquiry—successful hypothesis. In the vulgar mythology of science the bifurcated method gave rise to a misleading folklore of experimental observation. There was, for example, the tale about Galileo coming to his laws of motion by observing a lamp swinging in the cathedral of Pisa. This sort of legend lent support to the views of John Stuart Mill, who had lately proclaimed that even the axioms of geometry were founded in induction.

Now Galileo's most important experiments, as Peirce (correctly) understood them, were "thought experiments" only. They were not founded either in induction or in deduction but in the crucial *tertium quid* of scientific method: hypothesis. Peirce presented successful hypothesis as a method in its own right, and he would extend his view of it beyond science and see it as an instance of what, for the sake of parallelism with induction and deduction, he would call "abduction" or sometimes "retroduction." The term retroduction suggests a

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method of reasoning backward from presumptions to supporting evidence. It aims at demystifying the "intuitive leaps" that scientists rely upon.

Peirce's view of its centrality to science was not a point about method alone. It was a rejection of a deeper error that both Descartes and Bacon shared: a failure to deal with the artificiality and fallibility of the scientific construction of reality. Philosophically, the lurching from intuitionism to empiricism did not correct the metaphysical errors of the "new philosophy" but compounded them. For the two were simply two versions of the same underlying error—the attempt to establish some fixed point, unmediated by language, as an ultimate and certain foundation for knowledge. As Peirce saw it, any such certainty was meretricious.

Contra the Cartesians, he argued that there was no truth that could be established intuitively because there was no such thing as purely introspective knowledge. Even the apparently introspective methods of the mathematician were nothing of the sort. The seeming certainty of mathematics derived not from introspection or intuitive access to the absolute but from (as he would later put it) the simple fact that mathematicians reason about ideal constructs—diagrams, really—wholly within their control.

But this did not mean that the brute facts are the final authority. For Peirce also argued, against the dogmatically skeptical empiricists, that facts can have no logical priority to concepts. Every fact of which we are able to form a proposition at once involves us in a world of conceptions from which there is no exit and no extra-conceptual authority. However loudly we may assert that an extra-conceptual world patterns our thinking, our very assertion is intelligible only within a world of ideas.

In short, science is not exempted from the human predicament of abstraction. For abstraction, to put it simply, is the price of attending to one aspect of reality to the neglect of another. Since one cannot attend to everything at once, there is no escape from it. One does not get beyond abstraction by ignoring it but by having an articulated grasp of its power and limitations. For science this required, Peirce saw, a new metaphysic; for logic, a rededication to it as "the science of the conditions which enable symbols in general to refer to objects." And both the metaphysical and logical projects required a new view of the old medieval debate on the degree of reality to be accorded to universal conceptions.

IV

One of the anti-scholastic prejudices that modern science had embraced was a deep skepticism toward universals, toward general ideas. Science had adopted what was commonly called Ockham's razor (which Peirce traced to Ockham's nominalist contemporary Durand de St. Pourçain): that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily. The class of entities that the late medieval nominalists had wished to cut out were universals. They denied that universal terms could have any reality apart from the individual things to which they referred. Universals were mere names—whence the label "nominalism." And since this view, though piously and cautiously expressed, contained suggestions subversive to a universal and catholic order, it naturally had great appeal when that order was breaking up into individual, quasi-national units. Moreover, its cash value for science was to argue for economy, for the elimination of what Hobbes called the "insignificant speech" and "empty words" of the learned doctors.

In England, especially, nominalism reigned supreme, often without any awareness of its late-scholastic origins. There it seemed, simply, part of the national character. As Peirce observed in his 1871 essay on Berkeley:

> From very early times, it has been the chief intellectual characteristic of the English to wish to effect everything by the plainest and directest means, without unnecessary contrivance. . . . In philosophy this national tendency appears as a strong preference for the simplest theories, and a resistance to any complication of the theory as long as there is the least possibility that the facts can be explained in a simpler way. And accordingly, British philosophers have always shown strong nominalistic tendencies since the time of Edward I, or even earlier.

Since Britain had, on Peirce's view, been the exclusive or shared home of every major scientific advance of the previous three centuries, its national habits of thought had penetrated the common sense of science. Men of science took for granted the nominalist doctrine that every general idea was a generalization from particulars or "cases," and could have no meaning beyond the individual things it covered. Reality was a preexisting standard that science uncovered by small incremental inductions. Such advances as hypothesis could yield were intuitive leaps beyond the existing (inductive) evidence that were later vindicated by it.

But Peirce, trained to his fingertips as a "man of science" (Whewell's neologism "scientist" was one of the few he detested), found this notion backward-looking and restrictive. Hypothesis to him was a leap not beyond reality but into it. If one wished to use a mysterious word like intuition, it had to be understood as the completion of ideas already achieved and presupposed in scientific inquiry. It depended on an element that was conceptual yet not introspective, real yet never wholly verifiable as present fact.

The hallmark of nominalism was a backward-looking view of reality. It accepted as fact only that whose existence was established. Hypothesis, by contrast, meant pursuing as real that which would be agreed upon as real by some future community of inquirers. It presupposed what Peirce would later call the doctrine of the "unsettled universal." That is, it granted a degree of reality to

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general ideas whose limits remained to be determined.

Hypothesis, in sum, posited a reality that would be accepted by the scientific community after inquiry had run its full course. Every (hypothetical) concept was to be judged not merely as a recapitulation of previous instances but as a forward-looking anticipation of its working-out. Its meaning consisted in all the imaginable uses to which it might be put. It stressed not what was but what would be. In so doing, hypothetical reasoning had a power well beyond random guessing. One could not account for its success without conceding some degree of reality to forward-looking general ideas. As Peirce would later put it, "no agglomeration of actual happenings can ever fill up the meaning of a 'would be.' "

But ever since Hume's critique of causation, the philosophical presumption was against a "would be" as wishful thinking. So the question still remained: could any supposedly universal conceptions, whether one took them forward or backward, be more than collections of particular aspects of individual things? Could one speak seriously of real universals? Even if one granted some basis in reality to the scientist's need for hypothesis, how far could this be extended into one's view of experience as a whole?

In addressing such questions—and we can, of course, only provide signposts toward them here—Peirce had two advantages over later logicians. Though many of them have, like him, been trained in classics, science, and mathematics, Peirce added to this a grounding in both German metaphysics and scholastic logic. Following the Germans, he put the problem of universals in terms of "the categories," those elementary conceptions that since Aristotle were held to underlie all discourse. Following the scholastics, he also cast the problem as one of "speculative grammar" (to use the title of a 13th-century treatise), an inquiry into the degree of reality to be accorded the formalities of discourse. Combining these two approaches with a scientific sensibility yielded powerful results, so powerful, in fact, that we shall have to become a bit more familiar with them to understand the logical categories reinforced both by the *logica utens* of modern science and by the American experience.

V

I HAVE suggested that Peirce's writings during the period 1867-71 mark a coming of age not only for him but for American philosophy. I have even said that they amount to "the declaration of independence of American philosophy," words that may seem hyperbolic and loose. As it happens, I mean them quite literally.

Much as the colonies broke with their mother country by proclaiming certain English liberties to be founded in universally "self-evident truths," so Peirce broke with English nominalism over the status of universals themselves. These two declarations of independence share more than a family resemblance. They are both premised on a post-nominalist view of public discourse, in which universals are taken as living realities. In practical American politics this view reaches its apotheosis in Lincoln. Ultimately, it is at odds with the deeper logical categories of John Locke, who is both overplayed as the progenitor of all that is American and underrated for his coherence as a philosopher.

I say ultimately, because one can read Locke's political treatises very far without noticing the implacable and shrewdly couched hostility of his logical writings to anything that smacks of universalism. His nominalism coupled with his horror of "enthusiasm" repels the universalistic strain in the American regime. Scholars who have noticed this have accordingly looked elsewhere for literary influences: to Montesquieu and other writers of the French Enlightenment, to the Scottish common-sense philosophers, to Cicero, to Aquinas, to Shakespeare, Calvin, Aristotle, the Bible. As a historical matter, these are interesting leads to explore.

But if what is sought is an articulated and enduring philosophical basis for American universalism, it comes in the difficult, apolitical, post-Civil War work of Charles Peirce. And if the best American statecraft has tamed an almost Gallic universalism with a very British sense of particular and contingent practices and interests, Peirce has given us a comparable achievement in logic: a presumption in favor of universals checked and balanced with devices for making them corrigible and concrete.

Peirce's first lasting contribution to the literature of universals was a deceptively modest paper entitled "On a New List of Categories" presented to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1867. It is cast as a technical improvement upon Kant's transcendental deduction. Kant, in revising Aristotle's list of the categories, had limited himself to those for which he could find an a-priori, transcendental basis. His revised tables reaffirmed logical categories that were by then traditional—quantity, quality, modality, and relation. Later German writers who tried to supersede him (Hegel, Fichte, Schiller) invoked some mode of experience (history, morals, art) that went beyond mere textbook logic.

One move remained inadequately explored: an approach to the categories through the notion of representation itself. It could be called, following Locke, a semiotic approach (from the Greek *sema*, a sign, as in semaphore). It had been broached by Kant in the footnote that concludes his summary of the three critiques, and more explicitly by the early Kantian Karl Leonhard Reinhold, with whose work Peirce was acquainted.

The semiotic approach (or "semeiotic," as Peirce punctiliously spelled it) preserved the approaches of the German idealists while remaining neutral

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among them. Since all ideas, even those declared to be a-priori, absolute, or "things-in-themselves," could be seen as signs, it was fair to ask: what categories were postulated in semiosis, the activity of signification? In casting the question in this way, Peirce reoriented philosophy from a concern with the theory of knowledge (sometimes called "epistemology," another word he disliked) to the conditions of representation.

This reorientation had the ironic advantage of using Ockham's razor to cut down the Ockhamists themselves. The nominalist presumption against general ideas was, as Peirce saw it, a mystical doctrine masquerading as a skeptical one. For if ideas in general are not the criterion by which we judge other ideas, then we must posit some incognizable reality as that criterion. But a reality beyond cognition is a metaphysical, not to say mystical, superfluity. If one values parsimony, there is, as Peirce put it in 1868, no need to posit "a reality more recondite than that represented in a true representation."

Of course, a true representation is not a simple thing. And Peirce's subtle paper of 1867 sets forth the category of representation as presupposing other categories which are, however, accessible to us only through representation itself. To put it another way, each sign is abstracted from a welter of qualities and relations which are themselves accessible to us only as signs. As a bare simplification one can speak of two orders of such ulterior relations—that between the sign and its object, and that between the sign and some interpreting mind. Absent signs, there is no relation between one mind and another or between mind and the world of external objects. All experience, in short, is mediated, and mediated experience is the sole basis of our knowledge.

Yet our mediations—which Peirce calls signs and representations—carry with them evidence of their own fallibility. Whence the central predicament of all discursive theorizing: the theorist is always trying to capture in representations a precise account of experience which from the very nature of representation he knows will remain beyond his grasp. His predicament is not different in kind from that of the artist or businessman or politician, who deal with their own worlds of representation. But since his world requires that everything be articulated, he, unlike them, must have a reasoned account of the signs he uses and the inferences he makes with them and from them. For Peirce this led, as his insights invariably did, to a three-pronged project in the study of signs ("semiotic"): first, to a ramified typology of signs and their elemental constituents ("stecheotic"); second, to an investigation of the methods by which signs earn the patent of truth among the scientific community ("methodeutic"); third, to a view of philosophy as an inquiry into the "postulates" of logical experience ("critic").

What still distinguishes Peirce's contributions in these fields is his awareness of their medieval roots. And the second distinctive component of his discussion of universals is that he sees it as a continuation of the scholastic debate between the followers of Duns Scotus and those of William of Ockham—a debate between the "realists" and the "nominalists."

His views on this debate were presented most forcefully in the 1871 review of the works of Bishop Berkeley, often considered an "idealist" voice at odds with the dominant, "empirical" spirit of British philosophy. Peirce, by contrast, saw Berkeley as a link between Hobbes and Locke, on the one hand, and Hume, on the other. And he saw all of them as playing out the nominalist themes introduced by William of Ockham. He thus used the Berkeley review to expose the dogmatic nominalism of modern English philosophy and to declare his independence from it.

Over the course of his life Peirce would systematically replace the keystones of nominalist logic with an alternative set of leading principles. Instead of the nominalist habit of assuming ideas to be discrete and to be related by the principle of association, he would employ the principle of continuity, which assumed fuzzy boundaries. Instead of taking doubt as the norm of inquiry, he would stress belief: "To make believe that one does not believe anything is an idle and self-deceptive pretense." In place of a merely parsimonious prejudice against multiplying concepts, he would propound a *general* rule for simplifying all relations of more than three terms into triadic form.

He would even provide an alternative to the algebraic notation which Boole and he had pioneered as the basis of symbolic logic. Algebraic form, after all, subtly encourages the old nominalist prejudice that logical thought, like mathematical calculation, consists in the concatenation of precisely defined elements. Toward the end of his life Peirce would devise two systems of logical graphs to give diagrammatic form to his own sense that the most powerful thinking begins with indeterminacy and moves from the vague to the precise. Within precise algebraic notation, meanwhile, he would replace the central technical device of nominalism (Ockham's "syncategorematic") with the "quantifier," a term he coined to describe the device that encourages individuation while building in a bias against isolated individuals.

On the fruitfully vague level of metaphysics, he would readapt his own notion of the "unsettled universal," which looked to the future for vindication, to cover also the ground of Hegel's "concrete universal," which was better attuned to the past. And he would rework the central concepts of Plato's *Timaeus* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* so that they applied not to the nature of the universe directly but only mediately through the human interpretation of signs.

The result is a body of work that does not fall neatly on one or the other side of what are often

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portrayed as irrevocable watersheds of modern philosophy—realism versus idealism, empiricism versus transcendental speculation, mathematical precision versus anti-formalist vagueness, an epistemological versus a metaphysical approach to first philosophy. It marks Peirce as the most scientific of the German idealists, the most profound of the Scottish common-sense school, the most powerful of the neoscholastics, the most far-ranging of the modern realists, the first American.

VI

The unfolding of this astonishing development is a story for the years beyond 1867-71, and thus falls outside the volumes considered here. Still, "by their fruits shall ye know them." The best-known fruit of Peirce's youthful anti-nominalism is "pragmatism," another term he is credited with introducing. The idea is already evident in Volume II. It will make its full appearance in Volume III, as a maxim for clear thinking. Here is the way Peirce presented it in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," the second of his *Popular Science Monthly* articles of 1877-78:

> Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.

Read in its chronological place, the pragmatic maxim is, I think, indisputably not a theory of truth but of meaning, not a fancy word for anti-intellectualism but an attempt to extend our intellectual purview. It is one of a wide array of devices by which Peirce developed his post-nominalist logic of science.

Specifically, the pragmatic maxim is Peirce's counter and corollary to Ockham's (that is, Durand's) razor. For if we accept that "entities are not to be multiplied unnecessarily," the question remains: how do we know what constitutes an unnecessary entity?

The nominalist answer, as we have seen, is to rule out universals, to admit only the (universal?) principle of resemblance and association among particular cases. The pragmatic maxim, by contrast, provides a more open-minded reading of the razor. It proposes that we weed out unnecessary ideas by a principle of clarity. Presented with any idea, the pragmatic maxim leads us to ask: what practical difference could it conceivably make? If there is no conceivable difference, the idea is superfluous.

Peirce's pragmatic maxim does not build in a dogmatic presumption in favor of universals; it merely permits them to earn their own way. On pragmatic grounds, then, how do universals earn their way? What practical difference does it make whether we view universals as real possibilities or as mere associations of particulars? What difference whether we proceed with realistic or nominalistic presumptions?

For science, as we have seen, the difference is to be found in whether hypothesis is treated as a mystical exercise of "intuition" or as a method in its own right, to be studied and improved. Outside science, the practical consequences of the debate on universals are no less far-reaching. Here is the description of them with which Peirce concludes the Berkeley review:

> . . . though the question of realism and nominalism has its roots in the technicalities of logic, its branches reach about our life. The question whether the *genus homo* has any existence except as individuals is the question whether there is anything of any more dignity, worth, and importance than individual happiness, individual aspirations, and individual life. Whether men really have anything in common, so that the *community* is to be considered as an end in itself, and if so, what the relative value of the two factors is, is the most fundamental practical question in regard to every public institution the constitution of which we have it in our power to influence.

Q.E.D. Peirce's philosophical declaration of independence from nominalism provides a belated logical ground for the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America. For if, as the nominalists have it, reality only inheres in discrete individuals, it cannot be "self-evident" that, in Jefferson's words, "all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." Such self-evidence presupposes the reality of universals or the reality of human community, or both. The American Declaration of Independence, then, insofar as it is more than a merely opportunistic assertion of power, requires a non-nominalist logical ground. It asserts that the legitimate authority of government rests upon universal truths, accessible to common reason.

Writing after that assertion had been put to its bloodiest test in a great civil war, Peirce provided a moderate basis for it—one that permits but does not require or encourage any further commitment to innate ideas, natural law, general will, collective conscience, or revealed religion. Unlike Locke, Peirce was not a man of politics, and it would be wrong to read him as consciously justifying an abolitionism, Civil War, or Reconstruction for which, among his close circle, only his wife Zina had any enthusiasm. But he was certainly aware that the way in which the particular, the individual, and the universal are related in logic is totemic of the relation between the individual and the community. The generalizing power of science encourages one to grant a degree of reality to universals; the American regime has required it as an article of faith. Peirce's "unsettled universal" reconciles these demands.

It is thus not surprising that Peirce's forward-looking view of the reality of universals was taken up in cruder form by other Americans. It is, for

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example, the central idea behind Josiah Royce's notion of progressive revelation in religion, in which the truth of Christianity is made manifest in a Community of Interpretation. It is equally pronounced in John Dewey's Great Community, in which science and democracy are seen as twin progressive forces uncovering universal principles by self-correcting procedures of public discourse.

There is about it, too, more than a faint echo of theological doctrine. A real universal is what is predestined to be accepted as such, in the way, for example, that in rabbinic tradition the whole development of the Oral Law is held to have been revealed along with the Written Law at Sinai, or in the way that in the Gospel According to St. John a preexistent Christ is held to have been present with God in the form of the Word, or (to get closer to home) in the way in which among Peirce's Puritan forebears the elect were held predestined to work themselves into that condition. And in the popular religion of Peirce's day, the notion of a universal truth both objectively real and continuously unfolding was embodied in the refrain of the "Battle Hymn of the Republic": "His truth goes marching on."

VII

None of which, to be sure, constitutes a philosophical case. Quite to the contrary: merely to suggest a theological analogue, a cultural resonance, or an institutional need for a philosophical argument is often taken, *prima facie*, as proof against it. To play fair, we should not judge a philosophical position by its agreement with some extraneous interest but, at the first threshold, by its integrity on its own terms. For Peirce the relevant terms always refer to the future.

As we have seen, around 1867 the young Peirce began to view reality as a "would-be"—as what would be agreed upon if all the evidence were known and all the possible viewpoints on it critically evaluated. For him what is called "truth" consists not in any settled doctrine but in the fated forward movement of inquiry itself. That usually irrelevant question—what is the relevance of this philosophy for us?—thus seems in Peirce's case reasonable and apt. To what extent has the progress of the past century vindicated him?

Within academic philosophy, Peirce's youthful anti-nominalism takes on, if anything, a sharper edge today. It reads as an attack on unnamed eminences—Wittgenstein and Strawson on one side of the Atlantic, Willard Quine and Nelson Goodman, the polestars of Harvard's postwar preeminence, on the other—writers who have helped to make orthodox that peculiar vacillation between worlds of fact and intuition that Peirce calls nominalism.

Right after World War II, which many thought to have been fought in part over universal ideals, Professors Quine and Goodman declared universals unreal. They were perhaps reacting against C.I. Lewis, an admirer of Peirce who had been America's reigning logician in the interwar period. They issued (in the *Journal of Symbolic Logic*) a manifesto entitled "Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism," which reads like a parodist's version of the attitudes Peirce criticized. The authors declaim against "abstract objects" in terms that reintroduce the confusion between the "abstract" and the "general" that Peirce had taken some pains to dispel in 1867. And they candidly confess the grounds of their skepticism: "Fundamentally our refusal [to accept 'abstract objects' even in mathematics] . . . is based on a philosophical intuition that cannot be justified by appeal to anything more ultimate." The extremism of this statement necessitated many adjustments over the years, often with ideas that show a greater continuity with C.I. Lewis and thence with Peirce than the initial break would lead one to suppose. Here, then, the reader of Peirce has a head start in understanding the backing and filling of postwar academic philosophy.

Peirce's thought *circa* 1871 also puts in some perspective the work of Saul A. Kripke, often described as the leading younger logician of the analytic school. His most recent book, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Harvard, 1982), would appear at first glance a careful and respectful reinterpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which abandons an extreme for a more supple nominalism. In point of fact, it sets up the terms for a radical break with Wittgenstein on issues adumbrated in Peirce's Berkeley review. Walking unawares along Peirce's path, Kripke finds a common structure in the central arguments of Wittgenstein, Berkeley, and Hume. He describes this as due to "skepticism" rather than "nominalism," and he notices points of comparison with Quine, Goodman, and other latter-day nominalists ("skeptics"). He takes care to note that his interpretation of Wittgenstein came to him in the early 1960's, so that, if he does in fact make the open, Peircean break—if he sees "community" not as an independent concept but as a derivative one entailed in the character of signs themselves—it will seem roughly fair to say that in the century following the original publication of the materials in Volume II, American philosophy of logic has moved from the early Peirce to the early Peirce.

As latter-day nominalism runs its course, the caveat conveyed in Peirce's work on medieval texts is especially pertinent: crudely put, don't throw out the baby with the bathwater. Just as the achievements of scholastic logic were ignored in the first three centuries of the scientific movement, so there are now portents of a compensatory barbarism. Increasingly, academic philosophers are expected to earn their keep by pronouncing on morally meaningful topics. This has led in some quarters to a nostalgia for pre-scientific times and to a general berating of "modernity," by which is sometimes meant something much broader than the *via moderna* of the early Ockhamists: an at-

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tack also upon the humane skepticism and cultivated individuality often associated with the nominalist school. Peirce, in his willingness to entertain universals and in his insistence on methods for making them open-ended, workable, and precise, suggests a more civilized and arduous procedure for those wishing to do philosophy on nonscientific topics: instead of rejecting out of hand the entire body of modern philosophy, to understand its limitations on its own terms. Indeed, Max H. Fisch, the dean of Peirce scholarship, has suggested that Peirce's greatest future influence may lie in his bearing upon the "philosophy of institutions" other than those of modern science.

Outside the departments of philosophy there are also fruits to be plucked from the young Peirce. He puts forth a model for disciplined thought still in advance of the prevailing canons. Instead of beginning with what is precise and verifiable, one begins with what is ill-defined. Inquiry then appears not like a mosaic in which one works with tesserae already cut to size, but like the molding of an unshapen piece of clay. The discipline consists not in avoiding what is vague or grandiose but in the self-control to entertain indeterminate ideas until one can give them precise definition. Since definition itself results from a back-and-forth procedure of testing, relation, and negation, it is this procedure, not the canonical forms called induction and deduction, that is at the heart of creative work.

But unlike clay modeling, Peirce's method of thought does not stop with a settled form. Its concepts never rest in equilibrium. They are never baked into a hardened mold. Peirce's early thought lays the ground not only for an alternative to nominalism as a school of thought but to the noun as a crutch for thought. As his later correspondence has it, Peirce sought a "mode of thinking that never results in a concept that is equivalent to a noun substantive." He elsewhere notes that Gaelic lacks a subject noun, that Egyptian hieroglyphs are subversive of the Indo-European subject-predicate form, and that in biblical Hebrew and other Semitic languages nouns have obvious verbal roots and force.

In effect, Peirce is advocating a suspension of the Law of the Excluded Middle, which stipulates that anything must be either A or not A. He is proposing also a doctrine of the "continuous predicate," in which no logical relation is static. I, for one, doubt whether the equilibrium theories of modern economists, or the notion of discrete stages, periods, and social classes that are so convenient in the writing of history are compatible with thinking in Peirce's terms.

There is, finally, a way in which the young Peirce speaks to what is often called common sense—that sphere in which outworn philosophies supply counters for everyday thought. Current political discourse, for example, is structured around quasi-philosophical antinomies—"idealism" versus "realism," a "pragmatic" versus an "ideological" approach—that cannot survive a reading of Volume II. To distinguish the real from the fictitious or the external from the internal is tenable enough. But as the young Peirce shows, to distinguish the real from the ideal is a very different matter. The real, as he sees it *circa* 1871, is an idea that would be agreed upon independently of what you or I now happen to believe. In this sense the real has an inescapable ideal character, and it is a profoundly corrupting discourse that sets "realism" and "idealism" at antipodes, as if philistinism were the ultimate realism.

An ideal or conceptual basis is also at the heart of what can properly be called pragmatism. Whether used as a term of praise or derision, "pragmatism" now connotes a hearty anti-intellectualism, a robust willingness to be buffeted by the winds of fortune, to accommodate, to compromise, to succeed under the pressures of the moment. In this vulgar pragmatism, whatever succeeds is true, and if it ceases to succeed, something else must be true, until such time as it, too, can be associated with some documentable debacle, such as a lowering by two percentage points of the gross national product.

It seems almost a fresh revelation to be reminded that pragmatism, as originally set forth, is a maxim for appraising concepts rather than an excuse for playing fast and loose with them. Insofar as it bears on politics, pragmatism consists simply in understanding the meaning of a doctrine in terms of its practical effects. Thus if, for instance, a given view of the state carries with it the need for wholesale liquidation of populations, suppression of freedoms, and regimentation of everyday life, these are not, pragmatically considered, "means" to an "end"; rather, they are the "meaning" of the doctrine itself.

VIII

In part, Peirce's precocity on a wide range of issues is a tribute to the philosophers he worked hardest to understand—the "nominalists" Kant and Ockham, the "realist" Duns Scotus. But the ranging relevance of his early thought also has an institutional cause. Boston in those days aspired to be an American Athens. Peirce had to go no farther than his father's house to meet the country's leading poets, jurists, scientists, preachers, and statesmen. And as we have already seen, his father, aunt, uncles, and other teachers were at the very center of the Lazzaroni clique. They were all imbued with an ideal of a scientific research university fed by elite secondary schools. They sought a combination of intellectual rigor and democratic recruitment that would improve upon rather than ape the available European models. Peirce wrote for that kind of a research establishment, but without the compromises by which the contemporary version of it has been achieved. If his work, even when

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wrong, enters easily into the conversations of contemporary specialists, it is because he had them specifically in mind. If it goes beyond them, it is because he was not limited by their institutional blinders.

When Peirce wrote the materials in Volume II there was no such thing as a graduate department of philosophy in America. The system of our own day, in which a philosopher is employed as a scholar in some subfield of a balkanized faculty, has advantages that Peirce, with his faith in the cultivation of the specialized sciences, appreciated. In philosophy, however, the departmental system has also resulted in the sundering of elements that he united in his person. Few American philosophy departments, let alone individuals, combine his historical sense of philosophy with a dedication to precise, mathematical notation with broad speculative and scientific abilities. As a result, readings of Peirce by scholars in this or that philosophical subdivision have often missed a larger sense of what he is doing.

He was, after all, consciously recasting the logical basis of modern science, consciously developing the first systematic American philosophy, consciously justifying the vision of an ideal university as a community of ongoing inquiry, and doing so in a way that both ratified and moderated the religiously grounded universality that had triumphed in the American Civil War. All this gives his theoretical work a breadth and depth not equaled by any other American philosopher. He emerges as a post-Enlightenment writer untinged by romanticism, aestheticism, or nostalgia. Independently of the techniques pioneered, arguments made, and doctrines expounded—and the ritual admission that one "cannot do justice to them here" is especially appropriate for a writer as meticulous and difficult as Peirce—the truly exciting thing about the two volumes at hand is that they document the founding of American philosophy. They exhibit the maturation and then the first bold strokes of an epochal mind.

IX

They also set the stage for a tragedy. The bright-eyed young scholar of 1867 will become, in his own words of 1898, "an old hermit, white and wild," and in the words of William James five years later, "a seedy, almost sordid old man." His collection of medieval texts will have long since been sold to the Johns Hopkins library to raise money. He will have become involved in the 1890's in frenetic, failed, Gilded Age moneymaking schemes to float new inventions, build great canals, sell oil paintings, write bestselling texts. In the end he will be reduced to offering himself to declaim the part of King Lear before a hall in Boston for $200. His old friend William James will rescue him first by laundering private funds through the Harvard Corporation to provide him a dignified forum for a lecture series in 1903, then by direct charity.

The whole spectacle will point comfortable lessons for his tenured contemporaries: genius without character is vain; brilliance cannot be sustained without colleagues; the most important book is a balanced checkbook; slow and steady wins the race.

And not for his contemporaries alone. There is an undercurrent in much writing on Peirce that suggests he got what he deserved, that it was his own flaws that brought him down. Overprotected by his father, he was too self-centered to get on with others, too erratic to work in harness, too lacking in self-control to manage his finances. His star rose only while his father lived. After that his academic career collapsed and his work became hopelessly eccentric. His separation from university life has seemed to point a special moral about the impossibility of a life of the mind outside academe, and to this day in the institutions that blackballed him there arise exculpatory rumors of other sins made darker by being unnamed.

This account, at least insofar as it concerns his intellectual output, seems to have been rejected by the Indiana editors: of their twenty volumes, sixteen will be devoted to Peirce's post-academic period. But I also think the "tragic-flaw" account faulty in giving insufficient credit to the indifference and malevolence of others. And since this academic year marks the centenary of Peirce's firing from Johns Hopkins, in a prejudicial way that ended his university career, it is perhaps fitting to conclude by pursuing to 1884 our brief chronicle of Peirce's relation to academic life.

Documents which have not yet received public notice suggest that, whatever his personal weaknesses, Peirce was the victim at Johns Hopkins of a star-chamber proceeding set in motion by a scientific rival, Simon Newcomb, and abetted by a bureaucratic one, Julius Hilgard.

The prime mover of the piece was Simon Newcomb, described by Peirce in later years as America's leading man of science of the 19th century. Newcomb had been a protégé of Benjamin Peirce and his brother-in-law Charles Henry Davis. He had made his early career entirely within the Lazzaroni circle. Like Peirce's father, he led a publicly irreproachable life and had an institutional influence equal to his scientific achievement. He and Charles Peirce were among the extraordinary group of younger scholars and scientists assembled by Daniel Coit Gilman, the founding president of Johns Hopkins.

Hopkins in those days was the university of Lazzaroni dreams. Gilman announced that the $4-million Hopkins bequest would be devoted to pure graduate research. This bold stroke spurred other college presidents, notably Eliot at Harvard, to invest in advanced research. Peirce was hired by Gilman in 1879 as a part-time lecturer in logic, with the remainder of his time devoted to work at the Coast and Geodetic Survey. The quality

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and general tenor of his graduate teaching may be surmised from what was to have been the first of a series edited by him of collected papers of his students, *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University* (1883).* Though he was, as a personal matter, what would now be called highly neurotic, his main personal disability was a great resource to a research university. He was cursed with a systematic mind chained to an impulsive nature. Unable to find a form for all his ideas, he was forever generating insights that were immensely stimulating to others. He was for five years hired on a year's renewable contract. At the beginning of his fifth year, in September 1883, he was encouraged by Gilman to take a two-year lease on a house in Baltimore.

Before coming to Hopkins, Peirce had alerted Gilman to possible embarrassment resulting from his permanent separation from his wife. Peirce's formal divorce went through in 1883 and was followed with an immediate marriage to a French widow, who claimed to be of a partly noble background. Juliette, the new Mrs. Peirce, made a favorable initial impression on Mrs. Gilman. There was nothing in the remarriage that changed Peirce's status at Hopkins, until Newcomb took it upon himself to bring certain rumors about Peirce to the attention of a straitlaced member of the board of trustees.

The source of the rumors was Julius Erasmus Hilgard, whom we have encountered as assistant under Bache and Benjamin Peirce. Twice blocked by the elder Peirce for promotion to superintendent of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, Hilgard finally succeeded to the job, but as a bitter, broken, and sick man. He was morally outraged at young Peirce's remarriage: he knew Charley and Juliette to have been in flagrant consort prior to the divorce. Newcomb retailed this and perhaps other rumors to the Baltimore burgher in a railroad-car conversation. The trustee, horrified, reported the rumors as fact to Gilman. Newcomb then followed with a written note to Gilman confirming that the source of the rumors felt it a moral duty to supply whatever further testimony was needed.

Though there is no record of any further inquiry having been made, Peirce soon found himself severed from Hopkins without any idea of the cause. The university simply declared itself to be discontinuing instruction in logic and terminated all three faculty in the subject. It then hired two of them back under other rubrics. Unaware of Newcomb's role and never informed of the charges against him, Peirce accused Gilman of "treachery." Juliette made a special appeal in a stormy private meeting that made matters worse. Neither Gilman nor the trustees ever gave any statement of cause for their action, though they did, in the end, make restitution for the second year of rental on Peirce's house. A reputation for moral turpitude followed the Peirces during their subsequent thirty years of quiet rural life, and there are written records to attest that a bad moral character was used to deny Peirce consideration for further university posts.

Newcomb's role can be substantiated mainly from his gossip-laden correspondence with his wife, who spent 1883-85 in Europe supervising the Swiss education of the three Newcomb daughters. Those letters also reveal that Mary Hassler Newcomb, a granddaughter of the founding superintendent of the Survey, did some Peirce research of her own. She reported to her husband allegations of financial improprieties in Peirce's commissioning of the European manufacture of pendulums for the Survey. Newcomb passed these reports on to Hilgard, who tried to use them to compel Peirce's resignation. But the European source of the allegations could not (to Newcomb's annoyance) be induced to commit them to writing, and Peirce was able to demonstrate an out-of-pocket payment that Mrs. Newcomb's informant had neglected. Hilgard and Newcomb thus did not find sufficient grounds to complete the destruction of Peirce's livelihood. As a public agency, the Survey could not chop Peirce quite so neatly as Johns Hopkins, and he was still drawing his assistant's salary when Hilgard's alcoholism forced his own premature retirement. Newcomb, foreseeing Hilgard's demise, corresponded with his wife about giving up his tenured chair at Hopkins to become Hilgard's successor. But he did not need the superintendency to confirm his victory in the one-sided war for the Lazzaroni succession.

Peirce and Juliette had some inherited income, which along with his Survey job gave them a very comfortable $10,000 a year with which to retire to a newly bought house in Milford, Pennsylvania. It was his hope to live as a country gentleman/philosopher. As long as his money lasted, his wife was continually making additions to the chateau. In the early 1890's, however, Peirce lost everything in a stock-market crash, was terminated for neglecting his duties at the Survey, went through a sheriff's seizure of his house, and had to support himself by writing reviews for the *Nation* and definitions for the *Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia*. Newcomb, when the first edition of the dictionary appeared, published a needlessly captious letter criticizing some of Peirce's definitions.

By the turn of the century, when Peirce was nearly destitute, his friends encouraged him to apply to the newly formed Carnegie Institution, set up to support outstanding intellectual work in "every department of study." His application may well be the most impressive foundation-grant proposal ever submitted, both in intellectual scope and in the accompanying testimonies of support. Some two dozen letters of recommendation were filed from the leading philosophers and statesmen of the day. The president of that newly founded

* Recently reissued as Volume I of the Foundations of Semiotics series, Achim Eschbach, general editor (John Benjamins Publishers, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 1983).

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institution, however, was Daniel Coit Gilman, who had the secretary of the executive committee solicit an independent professional opinion from Simon Newcomb. Peirce's application was refused, on the old Johns Hopkins grounds that work in logic fell outside the defined sphere of the Carnegie Institution, which would limit itself to work in the special sciences. Under this rubric, Newcomb himself received a grant at a later date, as did one of his close associates.

X

PEIRCE was without rancor. He remained unflagging in his high estimation of Newcomb's contribution to science and of Gilman's institution-building role. Their failure to support him does not erase these achievements. But I am not the first to see it as raising serious questions about institutional support of what is called genius. For it is in the nature of groundbreaking work that few can identify it. Of these, fewer still command the resources to support it. And in highly theoretical fields the very activity of inquiry often carries with it incapacities in practical affairs that limit effective control to still fewer hands. If those hands are unsteadied by some extraneous passion, even a brilliant light may be extinguished. In Peirce's day, the modest resources he required were concentrated in two places—Harvard and Johns Hopkins—and both failed him.

As a result, his later life was subjected to torments beyond those already built into his work. Any critical examination of the deepest logical categories risks severing the bonds that unite the philosopher with his fellow men. Any attempt to develop an alternative to orthodox habits of thought requires a dedication and regularity that put severe strains on any but the most phlegmatic temperament. For the prickly and emotional Peirce, there was enough agony simply in pursuing his aim in life. To this were added financial uncertainty, social ostracism, and poignant contradictions: Peirce, the philospher *par excellence* of the communal basis of inquiry, forced to work in utter isolation; the warrior against the noun substantive having to make his livelihood writing dictionary definitions; the pampered child of the Lazzaroni exiled from the university of their dreams to a cruel world of piecework and business ventures; the believer in heroic dedication to an indefinite future begging for tomorrow's bread. That he managed nevertheless to complete a body of work which, for all its many imperfections and unfulfilled projects, will provide, as it is issued over the coming years, more to raise the general standard of theoretical study than that of any living American philosopher, is one of the more inspiring stories to have taken place on this continent.

It would be comforting to think that in our own day a vast, bureaucratized, and pluralistic research establishment and the system of "peer review" prevent a repetition of Peirce's tribulations. But there are never peers to review unique work, and the very bureaucratization of intellectual labor entrenches the conventional. Moreover, the mere maintenance of overhead costs seems to require making and therefore enforcing a case for inquiry in terms of some irrelevant utility, as in books by university presidents with such titles as *Beyond the Ivory Tower* (Harvard) or *The University and the Public Interest* (Yale) or *The Uses of the University* (California). There is, however, no utilitarian formula for the propagation of genius, or even of simple intelligence, no institutional procedure more efficacious than the exercise of spacious judgment, and no rule more reliable than this: to pursue our intimations of what is important for its own sake, and when we find it in others, to support it as best we are able.

It will perhaps be clear why among friends of learning these Peirce volumes will be welcomed as more than a publishing event. They provide an occasion to retrieve a sense of clarity about fundamental concerns. Attractively produced, impeccably introduced and annotated, they pay tribute to a remarkable mind. In so doing they advance by a giant step the life of the mind to which Charles Sanders Peirce was heroically devoted:

> Sometimes we can personally attain to heroism. The soldier who runs to scale a wall knows that he will probably be shot, but that is not all he cares for. He also knows that if all the regiment, with whom in feeling he identifies himself, rush forward at once, the fort will be taken. In other cases we can only imitate the virtue.

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Train to the West

A Story

Leon Steinmetz

"LISTEN, old man," said Andy Perlov, entering my room, "would you like to get married?"

"Married?" I said. "No. I'd rather wait."

"You didn't get me. Not really married. Just to register with some chick from the West and make a dash for the free world."

"Could you arrange that?"

"Old man, for money I can arrange anything. For money, as my departed grandpa used to say, I could teach a horse to play the fiddle," Andy said, stretching his wide froggish mouth in a grin.

Altogether, Andy resembled a squat, solid frog. His eyes were big and bulging. He even walked a little like a frog, slightly swaying and hopping on his way. He was a jack of all trades, or, I should say, of all goods. He could get anything.

When I was still going to the art academy and living with my mother—he lived on the next block—he had always gotten me everything I needed. "Listen, kid," he would say, plopping down on my bed a huge, orange English suitcase with a lot of little straps, zippers, and pouches. "Got everything you ordered." And clicking the snaps and locks, he would throw the suitcase open.

What wasn't in there!

The records of Louis Armstrong and Elvis Presley mingled with flacons of Coty perfume; Gucci shoes as soft as gloves jumbled together with the banned poems of Pasternak or a set of Dostoevsky novels printed in Russian in Paris. Andy himself never read these books. For him they were simply scarce items, like Dutch underwear or Austrian leather neckties. If "clients" were willing to pay enormous sums for them, then they were worth getting.

"Now, what was it you asked for," he would say, "Ingres paper and a sable brush?"

"Yes."

"By the way, I got this new French shaving cream for the armpits. Want some?"

He wasn't much older than I, no more than a year or two. When I first met him, he was about nineteen, but already a hard-boiled businessman with a vast clientele.

After finishing the art academy, I had stopped using his services, but he would still drop by occasionally, offering me sometimes a Picasso album, sometimes a pair of Norwegian knit gloves. Now he was offering me a marriage.

"Listen, Andy," I said, "is there a new law now that if you register with a foreigner they let you go?"

"Uh-huh. I know some guys who skipped out that way, and then got divorced over there at once."

"You aren't chiseling me, I suppose?"

"Old man, you've known me for almost ten years, have I ever chiseled you?"

OUR conversation took place at a time when Russia's borders were sealed tight, and you couldn't even dream of leaving the country. I should say, however, that leaving for the West had been my oldest and strongest dream.

Putting my ear very close to my grandfather's old Philips radio, I would try to catch Russian-language broadcasts of the BBC or the Voice of America. And I knew that in this I was not alone. In my imagination I saw our whole gigantic country sitting bent over, its ear pressed against thousands of radios, trying, through the thundering and wailing of the jammers, to pick out separate words, snatches of sentences, to fit them together into news of what was really happening in the world, happening for that matter in our Russia itself.

Why, why was it my destiny to be born here, where my whole existence so completely depends on the slightest finger twitch of that sneak who is called our Leader? Why is it my destiny never to see the Sistine Chapel, or to walk through the Parthenon? Why is it that the only chance for me to see Paris or Rome is through the gun-port of a tank, if he suddenly decides to move our troops there? These and similar thoughts overwhelmed me, and I could not subdue them.

"Mama, just imagine, if we could somehow go to the West," I would say, "if a miracle happened, I would probably die of happiness after crossing the border."

On miracles, however, you could not rely.

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When I was sixteen, I even thought about crossing the border illegally. I spread out maps of the country on the floor and studied them for hours, pondering where to cross. "The western border is out of the question," I thought, "what's the sense of crossing into Poland or Czechoslovakia? Through the northern border you could only get to the polar bears; the eastern leads to China. So, the only choice then is to go south—across the mountains." I contemplated this idea thoroughly, until one day a friend of my mother's visited us with her acquaintance. This acquaintance was a gray-haired man of about sixty, stooped and with a broken nose. His name was Mark.

As it turned out, this Mark was not sixty, but a little over thirty, and he had just come back from the camps. He got into them, it turned out, for doing precisely what I intended to do—crossing the border illegally.

One spring, he took a stick and a sack and went across the mountains into Turkey, hoping to slip through without being spotted. But he hadn't walked even a mile within our border zone before he was spotted, arrested, tried within three days, and sentenced to twelve years of hard labor. He served the entire twelve years and left the camps a gray-haired, crippled old man.

After meeting this Mark, I must admit, I revised my plan of illegally crossing the border.

The BBC English broadcasts weren't jammed as fiercely as the Russian ones. In order to understand them, I decided to learn English.

The teacher, whom I found through an advertisement, was a mellow, corpulent man with a double chin and a quiet voice. In his small apartment there was always the sweet smell of baking dough. He loved to bake and he had three cats. Before the lesson, he would have me try his latest creation. I would eat, and the cats would stand around, looking at me lustfully.

"Don't pay any attention to them," he would say, chuckling, "they've already had two apiece. They're just terrible gluttons."

He was a rather pleasant man. His English pronunciation was flawless. He had been born in England and lived there till the age of fourteen, studying at the famous Oxford Dragon School.

"You can be taught perfect English pronunciation," he told me. "You have a splendid mouth."

Once—it was during the fifth week or so of our lessons—he was explaining to me the difference in pronunciation between the words "weather" and "whether."

"Weather," he said. "The first sound is 'w,' not 'v'; but in 'whether,' there is just a slight exhalation at the beginning." He exhaled, and put his hand on my thigh. " 'Weather' and 'whether,' you see?" he repeated, squeezing my thigh slightly.

With that my English lessons ended.

In downtown Moscow, at the Revolution Hotel, there was a bar called the "Pen Pub" where foreign correspondents stationed in Moscow used to hang out. Natives were kept out of that place. To enforce the rule a bouncer was always on duty.

One time—I was still at the academy then—I managed to slip in. I sat in the corner and looked at all these foreigners. They were laughing, drinking, talking loudly.

They're people just like me, I thought. But every one of them can buy a plane ticket and within two hours be across the border. In the creases of their jackets and shirts there are probably still some bits of air from the other side of the border. The air of freedom. Do they understand it? Or for those who have never found themselves (having committed no crime, for nothing) physically locked up in a cage, is this too hard to understand?

The bouncer came up to me.

"I figure you're a local," he said.

"Pardon me, sir," I said, trying to imitate an Etonian accent.

"Don't take me for a fool," he interrupted. "Get your ass out of this place, and don't let me see your face in here again!"

With the passing years, after I finished the academy, the desire to leave never abandoned me. On the contrary, it grew stronger and stronger. And now here was Andy, saying he could arrange it.

Could it really be true? I was afraid to hope. I too much wanted it to be true.

Scarcely two weeks had gone by before Andy showed up at my place again. He was beaming.

"Kick up your heels, boy, it's in the bag!" he said. "Consider yourself married." He himself was decked out like a bridegroom in a new green orlon suit, white turtleneck, and orange cowboy boots. "Got a chick for you!"

"Who is she?"

"Shh, take it easy. Don't get excited. A French girl. I just spoke to her. She's agreed to register with you. So you can fly the coop."

My heart started beating rapidly.

"Andy," I said going up to him, "Andy, you idiot, you don't even realize what you've done for me."

"Well, we're friends, boy, and you know me, for my friends—the shirt off my back."

"Still, just remember, I'll never forget this," and I hugged Andy and kissed him on both of his froggish cheeks.

"All right, all right, enough smooching, we aren't fairies." He plopped down on the sofa, resting his high-heeled boots on one of the arms. "Back to business. The whole thing is going to cost you, you know."

"I'll sell this apartment. Will that do?"

"Well, your place isn't exactly the Ritz," he said, sizing up my room, "but I guess it'll be enough. You see, I'll take next to nothing, since we're friends, but she's asking a lot. She needs the

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money now. She's an exchange student. Collecting the songs of these moronic Nanays, who live in Siberia. She's uh . . . whatchamacallit . . . a philologist or a mythologist. . . ."

"Anthropologist?"

"Yeah, yeah, exactly, anthropologist. Maybe she's cuckoo too, I don't know. You'll wet your pants at how she talks. Half French, half Russian, half in that Nanay talk. She asked me if I knew what the word *"shelkavdyr"* means in Nanay. Of course, I knew it. Studied it all my life," he chortled, showing his protruding front teeth.

"Okay. . . . Andy, what do I have to do now?"

"Go to the marriage registry right away and get yourself an application."

"Do I have to see her before that?"

"No, you don't have to see her. Besides, she's leaving tomorrow. Just fill it out, sign, and give it to me. I'll bring it to her, so she can sign it before she leaves."

"Is she going back to Paris?"

"No. To Siberia. To those Nanays for their songs. I wouldn't go there for all the tea in China. They say they've got mosquitoes there as big as crows. Well, that's her choice. Anyway, she'll be back here in about four weeks, exactly when I think your registration will be scheduled. By that time you must sell your apartment and have the money ready. You'll give it to me right after the registration. That's the deal. All right?"

"Yes, of course, of course. Andy, what's her name?"

"Catherine d'Artagnan. A good French name."

WHEN Andy first offered me the chance to get married so I could leave the country, I hadn't told my mother about it. Why worry her? Maybe he was just blabbing. But now, when it became a reality, I decided to talk to her.

"I'm asking you, please, not to rush into it. Think first," she said. "You're selling the only thing you have, your apartment, giving him all your money. What if he swindles you?"

"I won't give him any money now. Only after they register me with her."

"What if they register you, but won't let you go?"

"Andy said there's a new law, and they will let me go."

"Andy said, Andy said, I wouldn't trust this Andy at all. He's such a sneak. Maybe he's pushing you into some kind of trap. . . ."

"Come on now, what kind of trap? I've known him for ten years. It's just a friendly service."

"You don't know who else he performs his friendly services for. Look, he doesn't work anywhere, he makes fishy deals, he gets tons of money, and no one touches him. Anybody else would have been in jail for a fraction of that. . . ."

"All right, all right, perhaps he does get foreign goodies for the cops' wives and because of that the husbands don't bother him. But what does that have to do with me?"

"I don't know. I'm only begging you to be cautious."

"Be cautious" was my mother's favorite refrain. "For God's sake, be cautious, turn the radio down. Why should the whole block know you're trying to catch the BBC?" she would say to me when we were still living together.

"That's okay. They don't do anything for listening now. They just jam the stations."

"Still, you don't need to have it on your record that you were trying to listen."

"Aw, come on, everybody's trying to listen."

"So, then it's on everybody's record."

In the middle of these conversations, she would suddenly throw a pillow over the telephone and rush it out of the room, its long cord trailing behind her. She was absolutely convinced that the phone was used as a permanent bugging device.

So there I was now, sitting in her apartment. In the same apartment where I had once lived with her. The high-backed Voltaire chair was standing in the same place by the window. Far below the trolleys were ringing to each other, and the colored circus lights were twinkling.

She heaped food on my plate. Whenever I came, the first thing she would do is start feeding me. It had been almost three years since I moved out, but she still couldn't get used to it. It seemed to her that I was constantly dying of hunger. So I ate, and she sat across from me, her hand under her cheek, and looked at me. And I realized suddenly how much she had aged. The gray hairs, which until recently could be easily counted, were now countless. And the veins in her hand were swollen, like those of old people.

"Please listen to me," she said. "I'm more experienced than you are. I've seen more. You don't realize what a terrible risk this is. You don't even know who she is or who her family is."

"What's the difference who she is or who her family is?"

"There is a difference. You can find yourself married to God knows who. . . ."

"It doesn't matter. I'll cross the border and divorce her in a jiffy."

"But what if she won't give you a divorce?"

"Why shouldn't she?"

"You don't know what she might do if she's a swindler."

"But she's not a swindler. She's an anthropologist."

"How do you know that?"

"Andy said. . . ."

"So again, 'Andy said. . . .' "

"All right, so what do you suggest, that I turn it down? When it may be the only chance for me to leave? If I don't grab it now, I may never in my life have another one. . . ."

"Well," she sighed, "what can I say?"

THE next day Andy and I brought my application form, filled out and signed, to the marriage registry. The name Catherine

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d'Artagnan, written in an even, round hand, in green ink, stood at the bottom of the application next to mine.

As Andy had predicted, the ceremony was scheduled to take place in four weeks. The registration day fell on December 22.

"Hey, that's great, boy, getting married right before Christmas. That's a great omen!" Andy said. "Just don't drag your feet now. By registration day all your stuff should be wrapped up. So get going."

I got a move on and, rather quickly, sold my apartment, the few pieces of furniture which I had, and all the rest of my simple household.

I moved in with my mother and started living in the same room I had been living in before. My mother was happy to have me back with her, but tried not to show it. I knew, however, that deep in her soul, more than anything else, she wanted my marriage to fall through, and for me to remain with her.

And I was in a strange state—trance and excitement at the same time. Mixed feelings overwhelmed me. At times I felt that nothing would come of my plans—that Catherine d'Artagnan would change her mind, or that she would be forced to leave Moscow before the registration date, or that at the last minute they would refuse to register her with me—in short, that everything would fail and they would never let me go. At other times I felt absolutely certain that they would let me go, and I would leave, and then, in my mind, I bade farewell to this apartment, to this building, to this neighborhood, and to all of my former life.

In one of those moments, I went out for a walk, something I hadn't done since I first moved out of my old neighborhood. My own place was far away, on the other side of the city, and when I went to visit my mother, I was usually in such a hurry I had no time even to look around. Nothing seemed to have changed. Just as before the trolleys were jingling loudly, and just as before, the ice-cream man was hawking his wares on the corner.

But no, not everything was the same. The small public garden in front of the circus where bums had slept or played cards on the benches, where ragged old ladies in moth-eaten hats from the last century basked in the sun, where, bracelets and necklaces ajangle, skirts trailing along the ground, Gypsy women rambled about, offering to read your fortune—that little garden was no more. In its place there was now an asphalt square at the center of which stood a granite monument to some scientist with a test-tube in his hands.

I went further, up to the circus.

The multicolored lights over the entrance winked at me.

"Two hundred sixty," I murmured, and then realized that along the way, in my mind, I had been counting the steps, just as I used to do in my childhood, long ago. Only then there were always three hundred and ninety-two.

THEN, at last, it came. That day, December 22. The day of my marriage.

The three of us—me, my mother, and Andy—stood on the street near a tall, flat office building, waiting for Catherine d'Artagnan. My mother smoked one cigarette after another. I looked at my watch every thirty seconds, only Andy was calm.

"Listen, where is she? It's already five to," I said. "Maybe she hasn't come back from Siberia yet?"

"She has. I spoke to her yesterday."

"Maybe she changed her mind and won't come," said my mother and I detected hope in her voice.

"No, she'll come. Don't worry." Andy said.

At that moment a taxi pulled up at the curb. The door opened and a small figure in a red-fox coat and a large, fluffy, yellow beret hopped out. After her, out of the cab, scrambled two stocky characters in long burnooses embroidered with bits of colored glass and tall, pointed hats. From under the hats two identical, high-cheekboned faces looked timidly out at the world. One of the characters was holding something resembling a long suitcase made of bark.

The figure in the beret handed the money through the window to the driver, then straightened up and started looking around.

"It's her! Catherine!" Andy shouted.

"Ah, *do svidania*!" Catherine d'Artagnan exclaimed, "or no, what I am saying, I guess that's good-bye in Russian. . . ."

"You want to say *zdraste*," Andy chuckled.

"Oh, yes, yes, of course *zdraste*, I confuse them all the time, these *zdraste* and *do svidania*," she laughed. "I glad see you finally," she said, pressing my hand with her small warm palm. "I am such sorry that we is late. They almost got lost today. Went from me literally few steps, and . . . well, all right. . . . Now, I want present you. This is Kadyk Iglaev, and this is his son, Pupok Iglaev. They are Nanays, from Siberia."

She turned and said something to them. The Nanays placed their right hands on their foreheads and bowed to us. Their parchment faces wrinkled in cordial smiles.

"Listen, let's go. Now we're really late," Andy said.

"Yes, yes, let's go," Catherine said hurriedly. "Would you mind if they are with us? I am afraid to let them out of my side."

We all went into the main entrance of the building, and waited for the elevator. The Nanays stood beside us, holding hands.

"You cannot imagine what a beautiful *rygaly* they are," Catherine said, brushing the snow from her fluffy beret.

"*Rygaly*?" Andy said.

"Yes, that's what it is called in Nanay. What is it in Russian? My God, I all forget, although, once, I knew Russian rather good. It is like singers and shamans."

"I see," Andy said.

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"Do you know how long it will take here?" she turned to me.

"No, I don't know."

"No more than twenty minutes," said Andy.

"Oh, that's very well. Then we have enough time. I arranged coming with them to one journal at twelve. Maybe they will write about them. I such want do something for them. If you only see how *terriblement* the Nanays live in Siberia. . . ." She spoke rapidly, swallowing her r's, making mistakes, mixing Russian words with French ones.

My mother looked at her without a word.

We got out of the elevator on the sixth floor, where the marriage registry was located. Several official-looking women bustled about its entrance. One of them rushed over to us.

"Are you scheduled for eleven?"

"Yes, we are," Andy nodded.

"Then where the heck have you been? The TV people are here already. Everybody's waiting for you!"

"TV people?" I said.

"It's not for us," Andy said.

"What do you mean not for you? Are you the French bride/Russian groom?"

"That's right."

"Then they're waiting for you, and for goodness sake, don't confuse me! Take them into the main reception hall, hurry!" she said to a thin, pimply girl who stood beside her.

The fancy spacious hall with high ceilings was full of people. Between two of the windows stood a long table covered with a red cloth. A gray-haired man with a small weasel face, wearing a suit hung with medals, rose from the table.

"Welcome, our dear fiancés!" he declared. As soon as he said that, lights flashed on, and cameras, their lenses pointing at us, started whirring. "You and your witnesses, please, approach the table!" And when we did that, the man produced a piece of paper from his breast pocket and began reading from it: "Honorable comrade journalists! Permit me on behalf of the City of Moscow. . . ."

"My God," Andy gasped, "you know who that is?"

"Who?"

"The mayor!"

"You're kidding!"

"Cross my heart. Don't you recognize him?"

Yes, it was, indeed, he. The mayor of Moscow himself.

". . . and I personally," the mayor continued, "warmly congratulate the new international family. What better proof can there be of the friendship between our two peoples, than when a young citizen of the French republic marries a young Soviet man? On behalf of the entire citizenry of our great capital we wish them many children who will consider Russia their father and France their mother!"

"What does all this mean?" my mother asked me quietly.

"I've no idea."

". . . And may this nuptial celebration, like the forthcoming visit of our dear guest"—here he brought the paper closer to his eyes—"Mister, uh . . . Henri de Gusac . . . be a symbol of love between the peoples of Russia and France."

"Damn, I got it! That's big stuff!" Andy whispered. "Did you get it? Tomorrow that guy's coming, the French foreign minister, and they're making political hay out of your marriage. Oh, boy, that's big stuff!" he repeated.

"Wait a sec, maybe it'll be bad for me?"

"Are you crazy? Hell, that's fantastic luck! I told you it's a great omen to get married right before Christmas!"

"Now, I would like our young couple to, please, put their signatures here." The mayor moved the marriage certificate, printed on luxurious, heavy paper, toward us and held out a pen.

Catherine put on her glasses, which gave her face a serious, businesslike look, and signed her name next to mine. My mother and Andy signed as witnesses. The mayor produced a large seal, breathed on it, and pressed it onto the certificate.

"On behalf of the Moscow City Hall," he declared solemnly, "I pronounce you man and wife!"

Then he had his picture taken with Catherine and me, his arms around our shoulders. He stood between us, smiling broadly and flashing his metal front teeth, and I thought: "So, I'm married. The last thing I expected was for it to happen so easily. Andy's right. I've been unbelievably lucky. . . ."

The mayor's voice interrupted my thoughts. "And now, comrade journalists, the newlyweds will be happy to answer your questions."

"Gosh! Not that!" I had barely thought, as questions started pounding at us from all sides:

"Do you speak Russian or French with each other?"

"What wedding gifts did you give each other?"

"In which part of Moscow do you plan to reside?"

"How do you visualize the liaison between France and Russia in a hundred years?"

"How many offspring do you plan to have?"

"How many what?"

"Children. . . ."

Up to this moment, I was the one who had been trying to answer the questions, and Catherine had been mostly silent. Now, suddenly, she stepped forward.

"I want say one question," she said nervously. "It is very, very importance. I just return from Siberia. They are Nanayian *rygalys*. Iglaev, *père et fils*." She took the Nanays by their hands and brought them next to her. "They are beautiful *rygalys*. You must listen them and about them write. It is very *pressant*. . . ."

She said something to the Nanays.

Iglaev-*père* opened his bark case, which he had been holding all the time during the ceremony, and took from it a big bone decorated with black carvings, along which a single string was stretched.

With his small swarthy fingers he pinched the string.

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"Iiiing," it twanged tinnily. And, as if catching up this twang, Iglaev the elder exclaimed suddenly in a high voice:

"*Agerdy kerdyyy. . . .*"

"*Kerdyyy,*" his son joined in.

And to the piercing twang of the single string, accompanying themselves with finger-snapping, in two voices they sang some terribly doleful Nanay song.

I glanced at Catherine.

She was listening to them spellbound. Her eyes brimmed with tears.

The next day in the main newspaper, under the headline LOVE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND FRANCE, appeared our wedding picture.

I was standing by Catherine d'Artagnan. Next to us, squinting under the bright lights, stood the Nanays. I looked rather confused.

CATHERINE was to leave Russia in a week. I had the choice of either attempting to go with her, or trying to go later, on my own.

"I wouldn't even think of getting out separately," said Andy. "You should definitely go with her. Who knows what could happen tomorrow. Now you're a famous big shot, so they'll give you permisson for sure. Just tell them it's your honeymoon, blah-blah-blah, you know. As my departed grandpa used to say, strike while the iron is hot."

As it turned out, Andy was right. My new fame glided in front of me and opened all doors.

"Ah, hello, how nice to see you . . . yes, yes, I understand . . . to visit your in-laws for the honeymoon, sure, of course, no problem, we'll do it for you. Just come back in a couple of days and everything will be taken care of," the official of the Department of Foreign Travel told me.

And, amazingly, it was not a lie.

"It's all done. Here's your permission," he said to me, when, two days later, I was back in his office. "Have a nice trip and a pleasant return."

When I left his office, my head was spinning as though I were drunk. Permission to leave Russia was in my pocket. I could not really believe it. Every few steps I would stop, take it out, and look at it. Passers-by turned to stare at me. I must have looked like a lunatic.

"So, YOU'RE leaving, after all," my mother said, seeing the permission, and started to cry. The first time in all these weeks. "Leaving for God knows where, with God knows who. . . ."

"Please," I said. "Please. . . . I know where, and what does it matter with whom? I'll divorce her right away, and then I'll settle in a bit and send for you. Just imagine how wonderful it'll be. . . ."

I didn't have much to do to prepare for my journey. The apartment and all my things had been sold, and the money I got from them I had given to Andy immediately after the registration. All my possessions now consisted of two suitcases.

I started bustling about getting tickets for Catherine and me. She was grateful, for she was terribly busy the whole time before our departure, trying to do something for the Iglaevs. I saw her only once, very briefly, when in order to reserve the tickets I needed her signature. She told me that she had to fly not to Paris but to Finland, so I bought tickets for a December 28 flight to Helsinki.

But the day before our departure, Moscow was hit by a blizzard. In one day, the city was covered with a foot of snow, and it continued and continued falling with no end in sight. The airport was closed, and all flights cancelled. The trains, however, kept on running. So I returned our plane tickets and got tickets for the Moscow-Helsinki train, which was scheduled to leave on December 29, at 11:45 P.M. from the Moscow West Station.

TO MY surprise a lot of people came to the station to see me off. There were people I hadn't seen in years. They were all excited, bustling around and making a lot of noise. You might have thought it was they who were leaving and not I. I shook someone's hand, embraced someone else, somebody I didn't remember at all rushed up to kiss me.

My mother stood off to the side, apart from the others. She wasn't crying. She only grew pale when, wrestling free from some stranger's embrace, I went over to her.

"Well . . . so long. . . ." I said.

"So long," she answered.

"I'll call you tomorrow from Helsinki."

She nodded.

I realized how hard it was for her to be so calm. Ever since my childhood, as far back as I can remember, she'd always had this pride about not showing her feelings in front of strangers. When she and my father divorced (I never saw him again after that, he moved to another city and not once, since then, visited me) she was always tender with me and remarkably calm, even-tempered with others. Just once, by accident, did I catch her crying. It was only much later, thinking back, that I realized what this outward serenity had cost her.

"Well, old buddy, adieu," said Andy, walking up to me and slapping me on the back. "Write. Don't forget. I'll be curious to know how you make out there. Here, this is for you," he said, handing me a little box. "Although, in the free world, they've got it for sure, still, take it, it's a little souvenir from me."

"What is it?"

"An electric toothbrush. Newest model. Japanese. In the mornings you'll brush your teeth and think of me."

"All passengers please board the train! The train will depart in one minute!" From the doorway of the car, putting the wrong accent on every word, the young towheaded Finnish conductor announced.

I tossed our luggage onto the steps of the car. Catherine had even fewer things than I—two light bags.

And then a short whistle, and the train pulled

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out slowly. Behind the window, on the platform they were waving to us. Andy, jumping up and down, was shouting something, but I couldn't make out the words. I tried to lift the window, but it wouldn't budge.

The train picked up speed. Outside the window, fur hats, waving hands, scarfs, ruddy faces, flashed by. My mother stood motionless, clutching her handbag.

And then, the end of the snow-covered platform appeared for a moment, the last lamppost, the snow swirling madly in its neon glare—and that was it. Total darkness outside. And the train swept through this darkness, cutting it suddenly with sharp and abrupt whistles.

IN THE small double compartment the couches were upholstered in purple velvet. On the table, covered with a snow-white cloth, a small lamp, under a cozy shade, rocked slightly back and forth. Two miniature night lamps above the headboards of the couches were reflected in the black window.

Catherine threw off her red-fox coat, unpinned her fluffy beret.

"So, few more hour and you are free forever. You glad?" she asked, sitting across from me.

"Yes, but I can't quite realize it, somehow."

"I such happy to do this to you," she looked at me in a friendly way. "When I in Russia, I second time here, I feel so desperate. I want everybody to save, everybody to help. It is like stand on a river bank and see a boat with people drowning, and you not know whom to stretch your hand, you want save everyone," she said. And I looked at her and suddenly saw that she had remarkably beautiful eyes—large, light amber, golden, like the fox coat that lay next to her on the couch. "You understand me?" she asked.

"With my mind, yes. It's quite hard for me to feel it, though, being, so to speak, in that boat myself," I said.

"Yes, yes, of course. It is such painful—so great country, so fine people, and so terrible, terrible slavery, like in some Assyrian empire. That is what impossible to *tolérer*," she said.

The more she spoke, the more I felt how pleasant it was for me to hear her husky voice, her stirring speech, with its charming mistakes.

"I'll probably realize what's happened to me only after I cross the border," I said.

"How I would like be a millionaire, having much of money and giving it to everyone. I so upset that I couldn't leave anything to these Iglaevs. But it was so *infortune*, I didn't have one extra centime in Moscow. I had economize even on cigarettes. . . ."

"I see. . . . Of course it's a small amount, but on cigarettes . . . somehow . . . the money I gave you for the apartment. . . ." I said.

"What apartment?" She was surprised.

"My apartment that I sold. The money that Andy gave you for our registration."

"Money? For our registration? Oh, no. I could never take money for that," she said.

I felt no anger toward Andy. I didn't even feel bitterness. He, and Moscow, and all of my former life were now very far from me, and with each passing second, with each clickety-clack of the train wheels, they were fading, drifting farther and farther away. I looked at my fake wife, sitting across from me, citizen of the French republic, Catherine d'Artagnan, and understood only that I liked her terribly.

Strange feelings seized me, as if she were my closest relative, or as if I had somehow known her for an incredibly long time. Earlier even than my earliest childhood.

"How could he do that, take himself all your money!" she said.

"Well, it doesn't matter, after all. They wouldn't let me take the money out anyway. They only allow you to take one hundred dollars out."

"It is no difference. It is so mean such cheating!" She hit the couch bolster with her small fist. "When people should only help each another, because . . . because even from the point of view of anthropology. . . . I not know how to say in Russian. . . . We all are like such a thin stratum of life between these millions who are no longer here, and these billions who are not yet here, and from both we are so terribly, terribly far, that we must literally join hands and love and help one another, we all, who are alive, living on the earth at the same times."

The car tilted, and the train began to turn sharply.

"Heading into the loop," I said, not knowing what else to say.

"What?" She didn't understand.

"The Birdwhistle loop. It's from before the Revolution, when Finland was part of Russia. The prime minister was Count Birdwhistle, and he decided to build a railroad from Moscow up to Helsinki. He took a ruler and without thinking twice drew a straight line from Moscow to Helsinki and ordered them to build the road that way. No one dared to disobey him and that's the way it was built. The reason for the loop is that in one place his pencil, accidentally, outlined the edge of his thumb, and that's where we're turning now," I concluded, not really knowing why I had told her about this Count Birdwhistle, when, more than anything, I wanted to tell her how much I enjoyed looking at her.

There was a knock on the door. The Finnish conductor entered our compartment with a stack of crisp, blindingly white sheets and began making up the beds.

"What hour is it?" Catherine asked.

"Almost one," I answered.

"I such tired. I would like go to sleep. Could you please stepping out into the corridor until I get in the bed?" she asked.

I went out into the corridor, sat on a flap-seat near the window and lit a cigarette.

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The blue night light glowed in the corridor. The wheels of the train thumped evenly.

I sat, smoked, and thought.

What is this? Love at first sight? Then it's really "at first sight," since only now have I really seen her for the first time. At our two previous encounters, I didn't even exchange five sentences with her. I looked at her, but I didn't see her. And she is marvelous, exceptional. She is the woman I have always dreamed of. Tomorrow morning I'll tell her this and ask her not to divorce me. We'll settle in London. She'll continue with her anthropology, transfer from the Sorbonne to the University of London, and I'll teach somewhere, and write. And we'll send for my mother and we'll all live together. And on vacation we'll go to Italy and Athens. And I'll see the Sistine Chapel and the Parthenon.

And so I sat, smoking one cigarette after another and dreaming.

A light tinkling brought me out of my reverie. The conductor was walking down the corridor, pushing a cart with metal teapots and glasses in metal holders.

"Up so early? Helsingfors is still two hours away," he said to me, again misplacing all the accents in the words and calling Helsinki by its Finnish name.

I glanced out the window.

The sky over the horizon was getting gray. The snowy fields were quiet. There was no storm.

It seemed I had been in the corridor the whole night.

I got up and went into the compartment.

Catherine was sleeping, snuffling quietly, like a child, with both hands under her cheek.

When we get to Helsinki, I'll tell her everything, I decided.

THE train was gradually slowing down. The spires of Protestant churches jutted out over the horizon.

We were approaching Helsinki.

Several lanky Finns were already standing in the corridor, blocking it with their suitcases, talking loudly in Finnish.

Catherine and I stood in our compartment, all ready, in our coats, with our belongings in our hands.

One more minute, and I'll tell her, I thought, preparing the phrases in my head.

"Helsingfors! Arriving Helsingfors!" the conductor shouted, running down the corridor. The platform appeared through the window. The train began pulling in.

Someone's hand in a knitted glove knocked on the outside of our window.

I leaned toward it and saw a woolen ski-cap, a ruddy face, large white teeth. A strapping young man in a ski-cap and a dark-blue sports jacket was running after our car, waving to us.

"Fritjof!" Catherine exclaimed and rushed to the exit of the car.

"Everything all right? I sent you the telegram not thought it will reaching you," she said, embracing him.

The three of us stood on the platform.

"Everything is fine. I was very worried for some reason about how it would turn out for the two of you," he said.

"Turned out very splendid. We even became *célébrité*," she laughed, holding his hand. "I will say it to you later. . . . Oh, let me present you. This is Fritjof Karlson, my fiancé," she said, turning to me.

"And not a fake, but a real one," Fritjof said, smiling broadly.

My fingers weakened, and the suitcases plopped down into the snow.

"Glad to see you," he said with a firm handshake. "I believe every decent man from the West should bring at least one person out of Russia. I myself just brought one woman out that way."

He spoke Russian very clearly, almost without an accent.

"How do you know Russian so well?" was all I could mutter.

"My uncle, my aunt's husband, is Russian. Ever since my childhood, for some reason, he singled me out from his other nephews, and decided to acquaint me with Russian culture. But I'm not complaining. . . ." Fritjof smiled and dimples appeared in his sturdy cheeks. With his large, ruddy face, his blond hair sticking out from under his cap, and his short blond beard he looked like some kind of polar explorer.

"Do you live in Helsinki?" I asked.

"No, in Stockholm. I'm an anthropologist, like Catherine."

"You want spent in Helsinki a few time?" Catherine asked me.

"No, I'll go," I said.

"Then, I want you, please, always remembering, if you need something, please, don't hesitate and writing me immediately," she said.

"Yes, by all means, write," Fritjof said.

"And I, meanwhile, sending you all paper for our divorce," she said. "Well, then, goodbye. I wish you much, much happy."

She stretched up and kissed me.

Fritjof grabbed her bags, and the two of them turned and went off.

I stood following them with my eyes.

"Stop!" I wanted to shout. "What's going on? She's my wife! Please, come back! I don't want the divorce!"

But I was silent.

A light snow began to fall.

Far away, on the roof of the train station, red neon letters shone against the gray sky, HELSINGFORS RAUTATIEASENA: Helsinki Station.

My life in the West had begun.

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Thinking About Crime Again

Ernest van den Haag

JAMES Q. WILSON has been regarded as a leader of American criminology—we have more criminologists (and more crime) than most countries—at least since he collected his work in *Thinking About Crime* eight years ago. Deservedly so: his essays continue to throw a bright beam of light on the current tangle of obscure and sometimes obscurantist theories and statistics. The publication of a revised and greatly enriched edition of *Thinking About Crime*,* coinciding, as it does, with the appearance of *Crime and Public Policy*,† a compendious volume he edited, confirms Wilson's status, and is cause for both celebration and critical evaluation of some of his policy proposals. For Wilson is policy-oriented above all.

Thus, he strenuously argues that it is possible to influence events without knowing their causes. This is a point that should be obvious: one can extinguish a fire without knowing what caused it. Indeed, we often learn about causes from cures: if ingesting a chemical cures a disease, we may learn that the disease was caused by a lack of that chemical.

Even if likely to be correct, theories of crime causation do not help much at present. We know that a disproportionate number of crimes is committed by young males. But even if we wanted to, we could do little to reduce the proportion of young males in the population. Our knowledge helps us understand some fluctuations of the crime rate and to explain (in part) why the black crime rate is higher than the white crime rate: there is a higher proportion of young males in the black than in the white population. There is not much to be done about that either.

In one of the essays included by Wilson in *Crime and Public Policy*, Travis Hirschi brilliantly links crime to the control, or rather lack of control, of families and other groups over their members, particularly the young. Perhaps we will find ways of changing harmful family behavior or of replacing family emotional bonds in the future. For the time being nobody knows how to do it: the policy consequences even of correct causal theories are quite limited. Therefore, knowing about crime control is more important, at present, than knowing about crime causation.

Unfortunately, many hitherto influential criminologists have been less interested in controlling crime than in justifying social reforms by way of theories, usually unsubstantiated, about crime causation. They insist that social injustice is to blame for crime, not criminals. Crime is merely the punishment for our sins: poverty, inequality, "labeling" deviants, racism. Criminologists who think this way often have opposed building prisons; indeed they have opposed all crime-reducing measures other than the social reforms—in extreme cases the revolution—which their ideology (usually some variant of egalitarianism) demands. Everything else they regard as, well, irrelevant. It is, of course, to them, though not necessarily to crime reduction.

Wilson gives short shrift to theories blaming crime on the injustices of society. As a fine essay by Richard B. Freeman in *Crime and Public Policy* shows, the relationship between crime and unemployment is quite weak. Lack of money (as distinguished, I would say, from the presence of the wish for it) has little to do with crime: released convicts who are subsidized do not commit fewer crimes than released convicts who are not subsidized.

Nor do rehabilitation programs work. Summarizing research done by many hands, Wilson persuasively concludes that such programs—we have an infinite variety of them—rarely make any difference to the behavior of convicts upon release. Whatever the cost of the program, the rate of recidivism is unaffected. Wilson also finds that the behavior of convicts after being released from prison is no worse than the behavior of offenders who had been diverted to supervision (work release, probation) without imprisonment. So much for the "prisons are schools of crime" theory, which has helped many reformers—not to speak of the convicts themselves—to blame prisons for the crimes they punish.

Fortunately, however (another point Wilson strenuously argues that should be obvious), most criminals are quite deterrable. They respond to incentives and disincentives as people usually do, the cost of crime (mainly punishment multiplied by the likelihood of suffering it) being the disincentive, the advantage expected from crime being the incentive.**

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* Basic Books, 293 pp., $19.95.

† Institute for Contemporary Studies, 334 pp., $21.95.

** Perhaps an experiment might help. Let us significantly reduce the salary of any criminologist whenever he publishes an article against deterrence. If, thereupon, fewer such articles appear, deterrence works: criminologists can be deterred. And, since the unwritten articles would have been wrong, we would lose nothing by their nonappearance. If the number of articles against deterrence does not diminish, they would be correct. But, once more, we would lose nothing, since we would have the articles. However, in this case, I would concede that some criminologists are undeterrable. (The criminologists whose salaries were reduced were compensated by their psychic enjoyment of their writing or of their financial suffering—else they would not have opted for it.)

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To be sure, some offenders—not the most successful ones—may be so far gone that they are not discouraged by anything. But I would be content to deter the offenders who commit crimes because they expect a net advantage. The net advantage differs from person to person, according to character and opportunity. Punishments cannot ever be made harsh enough to discourage all prospective criminals. Yet even actual offenders seem to be quite responsive to punishment (and therefore to credible threats), as shown by their sedulous attempts to avoid it.

What weakens deterrence is that criminals succeed in avoiding punishment most of the time. Crime pays: for most offenders committing crimes is a rational response to the expected net advantage. According to Wilson, only three out of a hundred felonies ever lead to imprisonment. In New York such offenses as car theft, minor muggings, and minor burglaries have been *de facto* decriminalized. That is, they are hardly ever punished, as is evident when the number of these offenses is compared with the number of persons imprisoned for them (fewer than ten per year for car theft in the last few years).

WHAT then is to be done? In view of the cost, Wilson is properly skeptical about increasing rates of arrest. And arrest rates certainly matter. So, however, do our scandalously low conviction and punishment rates, which Wilson does not mention. Even when caught, criminals are rarely punished. And the threat of punishment, however severe, becomes ineffective when it becomes incredible, whether because of low apprehension or because of low punishment rates.

But what about increasing the severity of punishment? Wilson seems illogical when he contends that added severity of punishment would not increase deterrence, whereas a higher probability of suffering it would. If one commits a high number of crimes every year, it cannot make much difference whether in a three-year period one is caught and punished twice, serving one year each time, or once, serving two years. Only for the amateur who commits a few crimes a year is there a difference: he might escape punishment altogether, if the probability of apprehension were low. But Wilson throughout focuses on career criminals.

I stress the importance of the severity of punishment for a more general reason as well. People who buy tickets to a lottery, as many of us do, are persuaded by the size of the prize; they discount the low probability of winning it. Might not disincentives work as incentives do?

If so, for persons tempted to commit crimes, the size of the threatened punishment could be dissuasive, despite the low probability of suffering it. They would discount the low probability of punishment, just as lottery-ticket buyers discount the low probability of winning the prize. I could be wrong: but only if fear and hope lead to different discounts—if the improbability of winning in a lottery is discounted more and the improbability of losing, of being punished for a crime, is discounted less.

Be that as it may, there must be an optimal (most deterrent) combination of punishment size and the probability of suffering it.* Neither, therefore, can be neglected. Surely, trivial punishment, even if inflicted with high probability, will not deter. Thus the popular clamor for severity does not seem unreasonable to me.

In another instance as well Wilson clings too closely to statistics. While favoring foot patrols by policemen because they reduce petty nuisances by prostitutes, vagrants, drug dealers, drunks, groups of rowdy youths, etc., and thereby enhance a sense of order and civility, Wilson points out that increasing such patrols does not reduce crime. He bases this conclusion on experimental comparisons between similar areas, some with frequent foot patrols and others without, which show no difference in crime rates. But the increased foot patrols in question lasted only for one or two years. If they were continued for ten or twenty years, might not the orderly environment produced by them reduce the crime rate? No environmental change is likely to modify criminal habits once they have been formed, but when it comes to the *formation* of habits, an orderly environment—if it lasts long enough to influence the outlook of the young—may well reduce crime by favoring noncriminal habits.

ALTHOUGH he believes in deterrence as a way to control crime, Wilson believes in incapacitation more. "Almost no one doubts that incapacitation works: a man in prison cannot harm persons outside." On the (questionable) assumption that imprisoned criminals are unlikely to be replaced, he also seems to identify a reduction of the number of crimes committed by each prisoner, or by all prisoners, with a reduction of the crime rate.

The same assumption explains why, for some time now, prosecutors have tried to focus on career criminals in securing convictions and long-time imprisonment. By keeping career criminals behind bars, prosecutors hope to decrease the crime rate. But as Wilson points out, career criminals tend to be identified only after they have been convicted often and are reaching the end of their criminal careers. Most criminals become less active as they reach middle age, and before middle age few are convicted often enough to be identified as career criminals. Therefore Wilson proposes to imprison for a long time not (or not only) those who have the most convictions, but the offenders who are most likely to commit additional crimes in the future.

Peter Greenwood (another contributor to *Crime and Public Policy*) has made careful investigations in California (and others have in-

* The statistics Wilson relies on are not relevant to the question he addresses. They compare combinations of severity and probability, allowing only the uncontested conclusion that some combinations are less than optimal and may become optimal by increasing probability rather than severity. Given the current low probability of apprehension, this is likely to be the case for infrequent offenders (the majority) but not for the frequent offenders Wilson is concerned with. However, the two groups are not separated in the statistics he uses.

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directly confirmed his results elsewhere) concluding that, on the basis of such indications as juvenile convictions, drug use, etc., one can predict, with an 81-percent success rate, who will be a "low-rate" offender (committing slightly more than one burglary and slightly less than one robbery annually) and who will be a "high-rate" offender (no fewer than 93 burglaries and thirteen robberies per year). Greenwood calculates that if all convicted high-rate robbers and burglars served seven years in prison (most now serve less), "the number of robberies in the state would drop by about 20 percent." If the time served by low-rate robbers and burglars were reduced simultaneously to two years (most now serve longer), there would be no increase in the prison population.

Accordingly, Wilson proposes a system of "selective incapacitation" which would involve "keeping sentences for [low-rate offenders] short so as not to consume scarce prison space needed [for the high-rate offenders]." In effect, "Most offenders would probably have their sentences shortened and the space thereby freed would be allocated to the small number of high-rate offenders whom [*sic*] even the most determined opponents of prison would probably concede should be behind bars."

Wilson is aware of many potential objections to his proposal for selective incapacitation, ranging from doubts about the identification of high- and low-rate offenders to objections against punishing convicts for what they are likely to do, in addition to punishing them for what they have already done. He deals as well with these objections as one can. But he does not deal seriously with objections that seem more serious to me.

One concerns prison space, the scarcity of which he takes for granted. It requires between $50,000 and $75,000 to build a prison cell and about $15,000 a year or more to keep a prisoner in it. Wilson does not mention that these outrageous costs—which help explain the scarcity—are the effect not of uncontrollable factors, but of mismanagement. Expensive locations for construction are selected on entirely unwarranted grounds. Available buildings, unless built as prisons, are not utilized. Security features, included in all prisons, are needed only in some. Further, prisons, properly managed, could be self-supporting. But prisoners are given no incentives, and often no opportunity, to do productive work.

Under these circumstances I think it is misleading to base policy proposals on the scarcity of prison space, as though it were an altogether exogenous and unavoidable fact—although, even at the present cost, imprisonment is cheaper than the increase in crime to be expected if we did with less imprisonment. The trouble is that the cost of imprisonment is borne by taxpayers, whereas most of the cost of crime is borne by the victims.

ANOTHER objection concerns Wilson's belief that imprisoned criminals will not be replaced. This seems quite unrealistic. Suppose the most active dentists, shirtmakers, prostitutes, burglars, or car thieves in New York were incapacitated. I am sure that after a short drop the rates of dentistry, shirtmaking, prostitution, burglary, or car stealing would remain unaffected. These rates do not depend on whether particular persons engage in these activities, or are incapacitated. Rather, the rates depend on the net advantage actual practitioners obtain, and prospective practitioners expect, from these activities, compared to other activities available to them.

Expected comparative net advantage determines both the number of jewelers and of jewel thieves, of cars and car thieves. Incapacitation determines neither. If the expected comparative net advantage remains unchanged, so will the rate of activity, regardless of who is, or will be, active or incapacitated. If the advantage rises, so do the crimes. More of the gold chains people wear around their necks were snatched from them when the gold price was higher. In this respect, unlawful occupations do not differ from lawful ones except that some of the latter, such as dentistry, require training and a license, whereas burglary does not. It is easier to become a burglar.

But are there enough people ready to be enticed to replace the criminals currently practicing when they are incapacitated? Not everybody is willing and able to become a burglar or a dentist. And the net advantage of dentistry or burglary certainly is different for each person, depending on his moral preferences, his dexterity, and his situation in life, which determine the range of his other opportunities.

Yet experience indicates that there are enough potential dentists, or burglars, to replace any incapacitated ones if the average net advantage rises enough. These potential dentists or burglars were not lured into dentistry or crime before, because the average net advantage sufficed to attract neither more nor fewer than the current number of practitioners. But if more than the usual number of actual or potential practitioners were incapacitated, the rate of dentistry or burglary would drop temporarily. This would increase the net advantage to the remaining practitioners (the price of dental care, or of stolen goods, would rise), encouraging more new ones to enter, until enough did to decrease the net advantage once more to a level which would diminish the inflow of new entrants. Since the expected comparative net advantage is the benefit over cost, it can be influenced by increasing the cost—in the case of crime, the expected punishment. But incapacitation *per se*—i.e., apart from its punitive side-effects—plays no role.

I am not claiming that prospective dentists or burglars will engage in elaborate rational calculations to determine which profession to enter. Nonetheless, such calculations are useful in explaining their behavior, just as they help to explain the behavior of people migrating, or doing any number of other things.

THE actual or future high-rate offenders Wilson wants to incapacitate are indeed responsible for a high proportion of crimes: 6 percent of the criminal population commits about a third of all crimes. I have suggested why I think that their incapacitation will not affect

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the crime rate. But what about the low-rate offenders who commit the remaining two-thirds of all crimes? By reducing their punishment, Wilson's selective incapacitation would, I fear, encourage these low-rate offenders and actually increase the aggregate crime rate.

Wilson appears to believe that the high-rate offenders he wants to incapacitate start their criminal careers as identifiable future high-rate offenders. This seems unrealistic. They are likely to start as low-rate offenders and work their way up. They become high-rate offenders only because they find their offenses rewarding. And their offenses will be the more rewarding the milder the punishments they suffer initially, while they are still low-rate offenders. Wilson proposes to make their sentences shorter than they are now. This would encourage more nonoffenders to become offenders and more low-rate offenders to become high-rate offenders.

In discussing his proposal for selective incapacitation, Wilson scarcely mentions deterrence. He may well be right to neglect any deterrent effect on those he wants to incapacitate. Once offenders are identifiable as prospective high-rate offenders, they are likely to be too committed to be deterred by threats of punishment.

But Wilson is not right to neglect the decrease in deterrence to be expected from his proposal to shorten the imprisonment of low-rate offenders. They are deterrable precisely because they do not have —at least not yet—the characteristics of high-rate offenders. Low-rate offenders now average one burglary and one robbery a year. They will average more, once the threat of punishment is reduced; and there will be more of them. This could more than offset any likely decrease of the crimes committed by high-rate offenders.

Wilson is on much better ground with non-market-dependent crimes such as rape, or the taking of money by violence or fraud (as opposed to market-dependent crimes like burglary and car theft in which the proceeds can only be realized when they are sold). The rate of non-market-dependent crimes is determined, as is the rate of all crimes, by the comparative net advantage expected, which can be influenced by changing the cost—the punishment threatened. (There will be more rapes if the threatened punishment is a $5 fine than if it is five years in prison.) But since the rapist is himself the consumer of his proceeds, there is no market for rape. Incapacitated rapists, unlike incapacitated dentists or burglars, would not automatically be replaced, since their incapacitation would not raise the advantage of the crime to the remaining rapists and attract new offenders. Hence, incapacitating prospective high-rate rapists could reduce the rate of rape. However, unlike Wilson, I would not want to reduce the time served by low-rate rapists. To do so would encourage some to become high-rate rapists and it would also increase the total number of rapists.

Do I have anything reasonably feasible to propose that would reduce the crime rate, as Wilson's selective incapacitation would not, without overly increasing the prison population? I do.

As Wilson notes, most criminals start their careers as juveniles. They are given effective immunity from serious punishment by our juvenile-court system, which is supposed to rehabilitate rather than punish them but does neither. The immunity we have sentimentally given juveniles does not deter them from crime and even lures them into self-destructive and antisocial criminal careers. My first and most radical proposal is to do away with the juvenile-court system.

When children under thirteen commit offenses, they should be dealt with by parents and—where parental control is demonstrably lacking—by social agencies acting *in loco parentis*. Persons over thirteen should be dealt with by the laws and courts provided for adults (though for obvious reasons juveniles should be imprisoned separately from adults). Counsel would remain free to try to persuade the court that his young client is incompetent. But incompetence should no longer be assumed automatically on the basis of age.

At present most first offenders get probation. The first crime is on the house—a prospect that does not discourage first offenses. Still, I would not object to the practice, were it individualized, so that probation were given only when the first offense was really a first offense, and not just the first (non-juvenile) conviction.

A second conviction, at any rate, demonstrates that the first did not discourage the offender. It should lead to serious punishment regardless of whether or not the convict himself is likely to become a high-rate offender. Since most crimes are committed by young males (under thirty-five and often under twenty-five), punishment for young second offenders should be harsh enough to deter them and their peers from pursuing criminal careers. For second offenses, youth should be a reason for severity rather than a ground for leniency.

But where would I get the prison space, Wilson—indeed most criminologists—will ask at this point? There are two answers. In the short run my proposal would indeed exacerbate the crowding. Shortages of space would have to be dealt with by shortening the sentences of offenders over thirty-five to whatever degree necessary to make room for the younger convicts. Perhaps the simplest way to carry out this change would be to order parole boards not to consider anyone under thirty-five for parole (with few exceptions) and to grant parole more generously to older convicts.

In the long run I expect that the proposed policy would deter more from crime than the present policy. As a result, we might have a greater proportion of criminals in prison (since they would serve longer sentences) but fewer criminals altogether and therefore not necessarily more convicts in prison than we now have.

Let me summarize. I do not expect much from selective incapacitation and think shortening the sentences of low-rate offenders would be counterproductive. But if we abolished juvenile courts and gave lengthy sentences to young offenders, particularly second offenders, I believe we could deter them

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from crime and thus reduce the crime rate, even if, for reasons of space, we would have to shorten the sentences of older offenders.

UNTIL the current century the ancient profession of medicine probably killed as many patients as it cured. In its first hundred years the young science of criminology has done no better. But it is developing faster than medicine did. Wilson's work—and fortunately he is not alone—bids fair to lead to debate, reexamination, and policy changes which may actually increase the cost of crime to criminals and reduce it for society.

"Colonia" According to Naipaul

Roger Sandall

SINCE leaving his native Trinidad thirty-three years ago, V. S. Naipaul has written eight novels and seven books of social and political commentary, most of them dealing with Third World politics in a decidedly unaccommodating way. When the most recent of these, a report on Islamic fundamentalism called *Among the Believers*, was published two years ago, one reviewer alleged that Naipaul "underplays or perhaps misses the forms of foreign domination to which the Islamic revival is a deeply felt, if catastrophic, response." Yet to suggest that V. S. Naipaul somehow misses the effects of foreign domination in writing about the old colonial world is like saying that he has somehow mislaid his central theme. For in all the "half-made lands" he has visited through the years, the peripatetic Naipaul has found the most damaging consequence of colonialism to be precisely a legacy of destructive resentment.

Up to a point, of course, such resentment was only natural. In colonial societies, enforced subordination and arbitrary power were usually galling, and the background of slavery in the West Indies was a good deal worse. Naipaul first turned to examine these matters in a work of nonfiction, *The Middle Passage* (1962); and with his next such work, *The Loss of El Dorado* (1969), he showed impressive powers as a historian in bringing to life both the most banal and the most pitiable details of the slaves, the traders, and the plantation economy. In doing so, however, Naipaul came to see that historical disadvantages were only a beginning in trying to understand a colonial people. They were the background against which to inquire into the damaging and perhaps crippling effect this history had had upon post-colonial attitudes, values, and behavior.

A clue was to be found in Joseph Conrad. Naipaul reports that in the course of successive readings of *The Secret Agent* a certain passage took on a deepening significance. Karl Yundt, wrote Conrad, was a revolutionary intellectual who had never personally "raised so much as his little finger against the social edifice." Instead "he took the part of an insolent and venomous evoker of sinister impulses which lurk in the blind envy and exasperated vanity of ignorance, in the suffering and misery of poverty, in all the hopeful and noble illusions of righteous anger, pity, and revolt."

Naipaul tells us that when he first read this passage his eye was caught by the sinister impulses behind the noble illusions. But on a later reading another phrase stood out: "the exasperated vanity of ignorance." And perhaps one can see why, in the harsher political climate of the 1970's, these words took on a richer meaning for Naipaul. During the 1950's, when he wrote his West Indian novels, the vanity of colonial ignorance may have seemed merely comical. But when, in one country after another, this "exasperated vanity" suddenly exercised governmental power, a force for barbarism might spread throughout the world.

THE West Indian country for which Naipaul's apprehensions proved truly prophetic was Surinam, formerly Dutch Guyana. Since 1980 Surinam has been run by a military clique under Colonel Dési Bouterse, a man who had been warning for some time that he planned to stamp out parliamentary government as soon as practicable, and to establish a miniature Cuba replete with "neighborhood committees" and

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"popular militias" and the usual unneighborly and unpopular things. From his published photograph the colonel looked well-organized, with a neatly trimmed black beard and a digital watch which included a calculator. And in December 1982 he struck. Estimates of the number of prominent people shot have varied, but all effective political opposition to the colonel and his "revolutionary" NCO's has apparently been wiped out, the dead including a trade-union leader, an editor at a local news agency, and the head of the local bar association.

To understand the colonel, Naipaul's twenty-year-old psychological commentary (in *The Middle Passage*) on the Surinam independence movement remains invaluable. He was by no means unimpressed by Surinam—and certainly appeared to prefer it in some respects to both Trinidad and British Guyana. In Paramaribo he found himself taken up with enthusiasm by a local poet, and running his eyes over the town, he appreciatively noted the old Dutch colonial architecture with its "run-down provincial elegance." For their part the Dutch themselves seemed sensible and sympathetic. The unusual variety of the population—Javanese, Chinese, Indians, "Bush-Negroes," along with the majority of Negro-Dutch Creoles to which Colonel Bouterse evidently belongs—appeared to be going its pluralistic way in relative amity, while the late-colonial administration did its dogged best to work out a satisfactory constitution for the country before the great day of "independence" dawned.

Yet despite everything, a shadow had fallen across the land. All the signs indicated that a potentially violent nationalism was arising which proved that "the objection to colonialism in the West Indies is not only economic or political, or, as many believe, simply racial." Rather, it had to do with vague and general feelings of inferiority for which the public talk about "political liberation" and "economic equality" was a kind of rhetorical disguise.

As Naipaul saw it, the deepest and certainly the most ineradicable roots of the anti-colonial movement were psychological—they arose from the "distorted identity" of colonial peoples, along with that envious and exasperated sense of being on the fringe of a dominant civilization which they would always need, on which they would always be parasitic, but which, in the nature of things, would never be able to satisfy their even greater need for self-esteem:

> Europe, the Surinam nationalist says, is to be rejected as the sole source of enlightenment; Africa and Asia are to be brought in as well. But Europe is in the nationalist's bones, and he feels that Africa and Asia are contemptible and ridiculous. The Dutch language is to be rejected . . . and its place taken by—what? A limited local dialect which used to be called *talkie-talkie*.

But "talkie-talkie" was hardly a substitute for a developed language. And there could never be any serious or deep sympathy between the forest-dwelling Bush-Negroes and the thoroughly Westernized Surinamers of the towns. The irreconcilability of these aspirations seemed insoluble: though it was always possible, Naipaul concluded, that the attempted solution would be "violent and extreme." Enter, some twenty years later, with a smoking Kalashnikov in his hand, Colonel Dési Bouterse.

LIKE certain other authors to whom we attribute the invention of distinctive literary terrains, Naipaul might be credited with the invention of "Colonia"—though not so much its invention as the painfully accurate description of a political landscape marked by some or all of the following melancholy features: societies entirely created by colonialism, either for the purposes of slave plantations or as convict dumping grounds, and heir to the intractable resentment inherent in such arrangements (the West Indies). Tribal societies shattered by colonialism's modernizing impact and either drifting or collapsing into a shambles of post-colonial disorder (Zaire, Uganda, and now Zimbabwe). People trapped between traditions they cannot endure and a modernity they cannot achieve, uncertain which of these frustrations they resent the most (India). And everywhere, in every capital of every land, Westernized intellectuals created by Europe and America and then sent home to countries where they no longer truly belong, whose bitterness is expressed in a noisy public rejection of the West and all it stands for, combined with a private longing both for its amenities and for the prestige which only Western success and approval can bestow.

At home, these Westernized intellectuals have simplified politics into a jargon about class enemies and racial enemies; abroad, in the councils of the "nonaligned," they have simplified such matters as Third World poverty into the rhetorical demonology of anti-colonialism. What has given their pronunciamentos on behalf of the poor an added poignancy is that most of them are themselves the newly rich "new class" of the new societies—people for whom independence has meant first of all an abundance of well-paying, self-created sinecures. Indeed, the very extravagance of the salaries they have demanded and the cars they drive is a measure of their insecure status and their need for public esteem. They are the elite; they live more comfortably than anyone else in their own lands; yet they are unhappy. Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* speaks for them all, for as with Fanon himself, their wretchedness has nothing to do with poverty. Theirs is a misery of the spirit—the misery of colonial foxes, yearning for metropolitan grapes, which they are obliged to denounce to the world as sour.

The politics of sour grapes is nothing new. Nor is the compulsive destructiveness to which it often leads. Sociologically, some seventy years ago, it even received a degree of formal recognition in the work of the German philosopher Max Scheler. The combination of an envious longing and of an impotent inability to achieve some high ideal, and the malevolent steps by which the ideal is first denigrated, then its destruction sought, and finally some barbarous substitute raised up in its place, was a phenomenon to which Scheler gave the name *ressentiment*. In the 1920's *ressenti-*

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ment was invoked to explain the rise of Nazism in Germany, and given the evidence, it is surprising that it has been so little used to explain the varieties of "Left fascism" so prevalent in the Third World today. Its characteristic emotion is a kind of retributive vengefulness toward whichever class or race or cultural tradition impairs one's self-esteem; and its characteristic political expression consists of policies which satisfy no economic rationale but exist almost entirely to satisfy a need for revenge.

Although to the best of my knowledge Naipaul never makes use of the term *ressentiment*, perhaps from a fastidious distaste for jargon, the concept itself permeates his work. In another of his nonfiction books, *The Return of Eva Peron* (1980), explaining the milieu from which the Black Power careerist Michael X emerged in Trinidad, Naipaul speaks of "the hysteria and evasions of racial politics. And racial politics—preaching oppression and easy redemption, offering only the theory of the enemy, white, brown, yellow, black—have brought society close to collapse."

At a certain point "the theory of the enemy" as presented by Naipaul becomes hard to distinguish from the coarse and easy simplifications of ordinary scapegoating, or from the kind of full-fledged political paranoia exemplified for Naipaul in Peronism. Devoid of any serious policies, Peronism can only be defined in terms of its enemies. As listed by one member of the Peronist party, these are "American imperialism. And its native allies. The oligarchy, the dependent bourgeoisie, Zionism, and the 'sepoy' Left. By sepoys we mean the Communist party and socialism in general."

"What did we talk about?" asks the retired West Indian politician Ralph Singh, reminiscing about his life in Naipaul's novel, *The Mimic Men* (1967):

> We were, of course, of the Left. We were socialist. We stood for the dignity of the working man. We stood for the dignity of distress. We stood for the dignity of our island, the dignity of our indignity. Borrowed phrases! Left-wing, right-wing: did it matter? Did we believe in the abolition of private property? Was it relevant to the violation which was our subject?

All too plainly it was not. Wounded dignity, a hypersensitive colonial self-esteem which would only be satisfied when someone else was seen to be symbolically stripped and violated—these were the deep, unmentionable motives. Ralph Singh himself had long ceased to believe that the abolition of private property and the nationalization of the plantations and estates would serve any economic purpose. But there was now no going back. From one end to the other of the fictional island of Isabella the cry of "Nationalization!" was heard. Soon it ceased to have any meaning whatever. "Nationalization had become a word. It had no meaning . . . to some it was a word of fulfillment and to others a word of revenge."

A few years later, reporting from Zaire, Naipaul encountered an atmosphere of terrified uncertainty as the Zairois "new class" of demi-educated clerks, encouraged to plunder traders and shopkeepers and to confiscate their property, suddenly found itself bullied in turn by an exasperated and moody President—Mobutu Sese Seko, Guide of the Authentic Zairois Revolution, Father of the Nation, and disciplinarian supreme. The President's exasperation was justified: the nationalizations had achieved nothing at all. Carried out in the name of "Africanization" and "the dignity of Africa," they were, wrote Naipaul, "petty and bogus; they have often turned out to be a form of pillage and are part of no creative plan; they are as short-sighted, self-wounding, and nihilistic as they appear, a dismantling of what remains of the Belgian-created state." The pillaging completed, supplies of even the most ordinary necessities of urban life ran out, and the shelves were bare.

THE case of Uruguay, which, after long experience of democratic rule, almost willfully reenlisted in the ranks of "Colonia," was even more extreme. At the time of Naipaul's visit to Montevideo in the early 1970's, out of a workforce of just over a million, 250,000 were in government employ. The telephone department alone had forty-five grades of civil servant, and although the business it did was lamentably slow,

> the public, scattered among the messengers and the police dogs of the foyer, is uncomplaining: many of them are civil servants from other departments, with time on their hands. . . . The padding of the civil service, which began thirty years ago, in the time of wealth, disguises unemployment and urban purposelessness. Everyone knows this, but too many people benefit: the whole state has been led into this conspiracy against itself.

As life in this penniless wonderland slipped further and further into paralyzed incapability, many Uruguayans consoled themselves by denying the value of what could no longer be accomplished. Modernity could not be achieved internally: the level of science and technology was too low. Nor could it be bought externally: there was now no money to buy it. It therefore followed that the entire direction in which the modern world was moving had to be disavowed, discredited, dismissed: "We won't progress. What's progress, though? America? That's consuming and stressing, keeping up with the Joneses. We don't have that kind of shit here, if you pardon the expression." But what was publicly derided was secretly envied, longed for, nostalgically remembered as something which was once more substantial than a dream. Montevideo had handsome buildings, avenues, and parks. But these now had to be seen as the spendthrift grandeur of a people whose city had only the flimsiest fiscal base. "Their habits of wealth made them, profoundly, consumers, parasitic on the culture and technology of others."

This has become a theme which recurs throughout Naipaul's later books on India and Islam: the blind, uncomprehending, and resentful parasitism of the technologically backward on the technologically advanced, and the moral and emotional predicament of those who find themselves in this situation:

> The West, or the universal civilization it leads, is emotionally re-

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jected. It undermines; it threatens. But at the same time it is needed, for its machines, goods, medicines, warplanes, the remittances from the emigrants, the hospitals that might have a cure for calcium deficiency, the universities that will provide master's degrees in mass media. All the rejection of the West is contained within the assumption that there will always exist out there a living, creative civilization, oddly neutral, open to all to appeal to. Rejection, therefore, is not absolute rejection. It is also, for the community as a whole, a way of ceasing to strive intellectually. It is to be parasitic. . . .

To be consciously parasitic, to have to acknowledge openly one's impotence, is intolerable to colonial pride. And it is the extreme humiliation of this impotence that breeds the most extreme form of the politics of resentment—nihilism as an end in itself. In Uruguay this found expression in the gangs of urban middle-class guerrillas who called themselves Tupamaros. "They were destroyers. They had no program." And when in 1972 their parricidal fanaticism turned on the armed forces, they were themselves destroyed.

PRACTICALITY, and especially the practical matter of what is to be put in place of what is destroyed, has never been "Colonia's" strong point. "We zestfully abolished an order," says Ralph Singh in *The Mimic Men*. "We never defined our purpose. And it has happened in twenty countries." As one thing after another is rejected, and one economy after another nationalizes, and either expels or cripples its entrepreneurial classes, Naipaul finds throughout the ex-colonial world a growing dereliction. Imposing buildings erected by the late colonial rulers are converted into museums where the whispers of ancient attendants are the only voices heard. Then the museums themselves succumb to tropical rain; the roots of plants invade the masonry; and piece by piece the ruined masonry falls.

Sometimes, however, this dereliction is caused by deliberate destruction—the defaced pedestals and smashed floodlights and the vandalized and looted suburbs in what is left of the Belgian presence in Zaire: "The wish had only been to get rid of the old, to wipe out the memory of the intruder," says the narrator, Salim, in *A Bend in the River* (1979): "It was unnerving, the depth of that African rage, the wish to destroy, regardless of the consequences. . . ."

But equally common is the dereliction caused by complete incomprehension of the complexities of the social and economic life which has been either seized or inherited —complexities which, because unseen, are not even suspected to exist. In an early and poetic form this is the dereliction which comes to the splendid Trinidad estate of "Shorthills" when the all-consuming Indian Tulsi family moves into it in Naipaul's first novel, *A House for Mr. Biswas* (1961).*

Upon the arrival of the Tulsis the estate had orange groves, an avenue up to the house lined with palms, a cricket field used by local villagers, cocoa woods, and avocado trees. In the timber house "a folding screen separated the regal drawing room from the regal dining room. . . ." But an estate of these dimensions requires care and maintenance and that is something the Tulsis have never considered. First the children set mischievously to work. The lianas are stripped from the saman tree. Then the mango tree is cut down. Plundering of the orchards begins and the swimming pool is partly filled in. "Week by week the bush advanced and the estate, from looking neglected, began to look abandoned." Gradually the eroded cricket field turns to mud and manure, and slides into a gulley. And suddenly, in less than a morning, all the palms lining the avenue are cut down. Their hearts are eaten by the insatiable Mrs. Tulsi, who has heard of their medicinal value. A fire which breaks out sweeps through much of the estate, and as they contemplate its smoking desolation, the nearby villagers, a community of mixed French, Spanish, and Negro extraction (the estate having been owned by a French family), "were confirmed in their belief that their village had been taken over by vandals."

Yet self-inflicted dereliction of the kind portrayed by Naipaul has an innocence for which vandalism is obviously the wrong word. And indeed, in the novel, an Indian sense of fatality envelops the blind career of the Tulsis. What the Tulsis *want*—a world of orange groves and expansive rural grandeur—is fatefully at odds with what the Tulsis *are*, people who do not know how to care for or preserve. The dereliction they bring belongs to a familiar list of unintended effects. It is of an altogether different order from the dereliction to be found in Africa, in which the relation among envy, destructiveness, and ignorance is compounded by vanity—a vanity projected by the figure of Ferdinand in the novel *A Bend in the River*.

In the opinion of Salim the narrator, an Indian storekeeper and trader, Ferdinand is barely "out of the bush." But he has been to school, he has a lycée blazer, and he has listened to the dictatorial "Big Man" whose blaring speeches continually denounce the malignity of the West, foresee its replacement by a benign and vigorous Africa, and suggest that no achievement is too great for his own people. The result is that in his lycée blazer,

> Ferdinand saw himself as evolved and important, as in the colonial days. At the same time he saw himself as a new man of Africa, and important for that reason. Out of this staggering idea of his own importance, he had reduced Africa to himself; and the future of Africa was nothing more than the job he might do later on.

Ultimately it is not Ferdinand but another who inherits his boss's job. After "the revolution is radicalized" and the state seizes the Indian narrator's store, Citizen Théotime arrives as the new man in charge, and reduces the former owner Salim to a sort of undermanager, a stage on the path to making him a chauffeur. But Théotime is unable to play his role with ease, and the galling realization of this fact make him constantly malicious toward Salim:

> The trouble now was that he

* Recently reissued, with a new foreword by Naipaul, Random House, 481 pp., $17.95.

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didn't know what to do. He would have liked to live out his role in fact—to take over the running of the shop. He knew, though, that he knew nothing; and he was like a man enraged by his own helplessness. He was drunken, aggrieved, and threatening. . . . It was strange. He wanted me to acknowledge him as the boss. At the same time he wanted me to make allowances for him as an educated man and an African. He wanted both my respect and my tolerance, even my compassion. He wanted me, almost, to act out my subordinate role as a favor to him.

Not the least memorable figure in this novel is Raymond, a European hanger-on of the dictator from the old colonial days, a "historian" who, while making *sotto-voce* allusions to Mommsen, is able to move dexterously from the glories of the Pax Romana to the glories of the promised Pax Kinshasa without missing a historical beat. His home is in the multimillion-dollar extravaganza of the Presidential Domain, a suitable place for parties attended by visitors from American universities, and while a Joan Baez record plays softly in the background, he excuses himself to go and work on his "research." This involves a publication which has now occupied him for some time: selections from the Big Man's speeches—"the essential thoughts." As an example of the Big Man's more populistic manner, one of these speeches is set down verbatim. The reader feels it must be very close to some utterance of President Mobuto which the author of *A Bend in the River* had personally heard:

> Citoyens-citoyennes, monkey smart. Monkey smart like shit. Monkey can talk. You didn't know that? Well, I tell you now. Monkey can talk, but he keep it quiet. Monkey know that if he talk in front of man, man going to catch him and beat him and make him work. Make him carry load in hot sun. Make him paddle boat. Citoyens! Citoyennes! We will teach these people to be like monkey. We will send them to the bush and let them work their arse off.

In these words the new Maoist King of the Congo is dispatching his more uncontrollable enthusiasts (an unwholesome blend of Red Guards and Brown Shirts) off to the bush for a spell of redemptive labor. And because neither his tone nor his manner is attractive, it is the task of assorted academic aides-de-camp to make this sort of thing more palatable. Devastating events, arbitrary and savage, continually overtake these cosmetic endeavors, but the Raymonds of "Colonia," with a little help from their friends, usually escape across the river as the fires spread to their waterfront homes, or just manage to get the last plane out before the derelict cities fall. The resident population with whose lives the Raymonds have been playing, however, is not always so fortunate.

At a rather more rarefied academic level, these "scholars" whose specialties are usually in international relations, or development economics, or political science, or anthropology—are they really so different from those countercultural drifters described elsewhere by Naipaul in the following terms?

> People who substitute doctrine for knowledge and irritation for concern, the revolutionaries who visit centers of revolution with return air tickets, the hippies, the people who wish themselves on societies more fragile than their own, all those people who in the end do no more than celebrate their own security.

But perhaps the most representative of Naipaul's various apologists and camp followers is an Englishwoman, Gale Benson, knifed to death in the early 1970's in a Trinidad commune. The commune had been founded by Michael X, "a typical Trinidad con-man" who had impressed enough people in London to achieve a certain media fame before, in 1971, retiring to a corner of Trinidad where he more and more came to see his role, his destiny, and his fate, in terms of racial revenge. When Gale Benson chose to participate in these obsessions, she too became a part of that fate.

In recounting this true story in *The Return of Eva Peron*, Naipaul plainly shows some sympathy for the leading actors and for the world of the Trinidad slums out of which so many of them came. But for the mixture of vanity and self-deception which Benson herself embodied Naipaul had no sympathy at all: she "was as shallow and vain and parasitic as many middle-class dropouts of her time; she became as corrupt as her master; she was part of the corruption by which she was destroyed." And she could hardly claim to have been utterly ignorant of the risks. Vengeance requires victims, and to her killer she offered a throat which was gratefully, if unceremoniously, cut. In this mortal coming together of self-deceiving metropolitans and vindictive ex-colonials, Naipaul surely wants us to see a metaphor for our times.

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Progress?

THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION 1945-1980. By DIANE RAVITCH. *Basic Books. 384 pp. $19.95.*

Reviewed by PETER SKERRY

THE ferment over education reform of the 1960's and the emergence of neo-Marxism in the universities have, over the past decade or so, inspired a spate of revisionist histories of American educational institutions and policies. Against this tide, Diane Ravitch has stood almost alone as a voice of reason and moderation. One has looked forward, then, with some eagerness to *The Troubled Crusade,* her new history of American education in the postwar period. But although it has many virtues, this is a disappointing book.

Mrs. Ravitch begins with an examination of the battle over federal aid to education in the late 1940's. She skillfully recounts how that effort, led by conservative Senator Robert Taft, foundered on the shoals of race, religion, and federal control of the schools. She devotes particular attention to the acrimonious battles between Cardinal Spellman of New York and Eleanor Roosevelt over government aid to Catholic schools. Her discussion of the many areas of vehement disagreement between Catholics and liberals in the immediate postwar period offers a useful historical perspective that reminds us how subdued such tensions have become today. Indeed, in the light of those early battles, it is striking that the current debate over tuition-tax credits has been free of denominational animosities. In this sense the nation has traveled some distance toward tolerance, justifying, in one area at least, the tone of optimism pervading this book.

Mrs. Ravitch is even more attentive to the distance we have traveled with regard to federal intrusion into the schools. Her final chapter ably depicts the "iron triangle" of interest groups, executive-agency bureaucrats, and congressional staffers who have found, at least up until recently, common cause in providing more and more federal funds, and federal guidelines, to local education officials. Especially interesting is her treatment of the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act, in which Congress went one step further and mandated detailed individualized education plans for handicapped children while supplying only a fraction of the funds necessary to meet the costs involved.

In covering the ground between the early battles over federal aid and the state of affairs symbolized by today's "iron triangle," Mrs. Ravitch misses few points of interest. She takes note of the way educational interest groups grabbed on to the issue of national security as a rationale for the post-Sputnik National Defense Education Act and for federal funding of the National Science Foundation's innovative curricula. She manages to squeeze in chapters on the arteriosclerosis and eventual death of the Progressive Education Association, and on the loyalty-oath controversies of the early 1950's. She competently appraises the campus rebellions that began with the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley. And in her chapter on the alternative-education and free-school movements of the 1960's, she offers a sober historical perspective on those reformers who, in their eagerness to denounce the purportedly unprecedented failure of American schools to serve minority children, overlooked the fact that encounters between the schools and earlier generations of immigrants had hardly been smooth or felicitous.

As Mrs. Ravitch makes clear, the real impetus behind the growing federal role in educaton was the dilemma of race which the nation began to confront in the 1950's and which ultimately led to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. She provides a dispassionate account of the legal developments leading up to the Brown case, and shows how the seeds of confusion and dissension over the difference between desegregation and integration lay dormant in that momentous 1954 decision. Mrs. Ravitch then traces the perverse development of judicial opinion as educational institutions were directed to shift from color-blind policies, as prescribed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, to color-conscious policies. Here as elsewhere in the book she effectively illuminates misconceptions about ethnic and group relations that have influenced our educational policies.

MRS. RAVITCH'S effort to comprehend all these disparate aspects of postwar American education in a general history is most welcome, and in many respects successful. For despite the vast changes that have occurred in the schools over the past thirty-five years, this recent history has yet to receive much scholarly attention. Still, Mrs. Ravitch does not do as much with her subject as one would have hoped.

One problem is that despite, or perhaps because of, the very comprehensiveness of her effort, Mrs. Ravitch offers no clear idea or point of view to tie her history together. She does show at very great length that the federal role has grown enormously, and with it federal control of the schools. She does demonstrate that large-scale reforms have been less successful than more modest ones. And she does show conclusively how affirmative-action policies have led to quotas and reverse discrimination. But these are truths on their way to becoming truisms, and their treatment here is not enough to sustain this book.

A second and more serious problem is that in her evident concern to write a scrupulously "balanced" and "judicious" narrative (both words appear in the glowing jacket endorsements), Mrs. Ravitch has

PETER SKERRY *has written on issues of educational and social policy for* COMMENTARY, *the* Public Interest, Regulation, *and the* Wall Street Journal. *He is currently working on a book about Mexican-American politics.*

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

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

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not avoided the opposite pitfall, a tendency to shy away from the implications of her own evidence and the logic of her own argument.

This is not to say that Mrs. Ravitch maintains a totally neutral stance toward the events she recounts. She is, as I have noted, highly critical of racial quotas. She is also disparaging of bilingual education. In her chapter on "The New Politics of Education," she describes how a transitional program intended to aid non-English-speaking students has been transformed into a mandatory program meant to reinforce minority cultures. Summing up her findings on this and other such developments, she observes:

> The lesson of the federal categorical programs . . . , federal directives, and court orders, it appeared, was that each interest group had to look out for itself, to get as much federal protection and as many public dollars as possible, regardless of the effect on the institution. Lost in the new order of things was any conception of the common interest, the idea that made common schooling possible. Outside intervention assumed that local officials were not to be trusted to do the right thing, and distrust was a corrosive sentiment, especially in an institution where parents entrust their children to the care of strangers.

Yet having forcefully and eloquently brought her readers to this point, Mrs. Ravitch manages to lose track of it within four short pages, ending the chapter with these words:

> By 1980, regardless of who was elected President, there was no turning back to the days when local school boards were near-autonomous and when higher education was as remote from the government as were churches. The changed situation was a new fact of life, like the discovery of nuclear energy. . . . Much had been gained because of the active dedication of the federal government and the courts to the rights of all children. To the extent that the pursuit of good ends jeopardized equally valuable ends, like academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and diversity; to the extent that government programs gave new responsibilities to academic institutions while depriving them of the authority needed to carry out those responsibilities, there remained a compelling agenda for future educational reformers.

Here "balance" verges on becoming a balancing act. Having incisively portrayed the way in which interest groups gain access to the federal treasury and federal power so as to impose their regulations on local authorities, Mrs. Ravitch next counsels resignation toward such activities as toward acts of God. Having unmasked much educational reform as the sum of the efforts of self-interested actors, she invokes a vision of future educational reformers moved by some transcendent idea of the common good. Yet she offers no evidence that the "corrosive distrust" of local educators spawned by the new politics of education is about to change. Indeed, she makes it abundantly evident that the forces she has identified are firmly entrenched in our legal and political institutions.

WHAT then is the basis of Mrs. Ravitch's optimism? Largely, one feels, the remarkable educational progress made by black Americans in the postwar period. Among other indicators, Mrs. Ravitch notes that in 1960 about 40 percent of black youngsters graduated from high school, compared with about 67 percent of whites; in 1980, 70 percent of blacks graduated, compared with 82 percent of whites. At the very beginning of the book, Mrs. Ravitch cites the 1945 congressional testimony of Mrs. Florence Christmas, the teacher-principal of an all-black school with 190 students and 3 teachers in Hazlehurst, Mississippi. In an epilogue Mrs. Ravitch returns to Hazlehurst to report on education there today. Mrs. Christmas's school no longer exists. It has been replaced by a new and larger school with better facilities and better-paid teachers.

But serious problems persist in Hazlehurst. Some high-school graduates are barely literate. School facilities are falling into disrepair. Classroom discipline is lax. Above all, whites have abandoned the

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public schools and set up their own academy. Still, Mrs. Ravitch sees in Hazlehurst grounds for hope, not despair. Once again, her historical perspective stands her in good stead. She takes particular satisfaction in the work of Rowan Torrey, Mrs. Christmas's nephew and a recent graduate of all-white Millsaps College in Jackson, who has returned to Hazlehurst and begun to push for better schools. Reflecting on the developments in this small Southern community, she declares:

> In the crusade against ignorance, there have been no easy victories, but no lasting defeats. Those who have labored on behalf of American education have seen so many barriers scaled, so much hatred dispelled, so many possibilities remaining to provide the basis for future reconciliations.

With this, Mrs. Ravitch sweeps aside the bulk of her own argument against racial quotas and reverse discrimination. Certainly in the field of education, where busing has become a symbol of the sort of misguided policy which engenders more racial rancor than it cures, it is difficult to find "the basis for future reconciliation" that she somehow manages to discern. Indeed, what her comprehensive and scrupulously fair narrative makes obvious is the painful irony that while old race barriers may have been toppled, new ones have arisen in their place. Regrettably, this is one of many ironies which Diane Ravitch exposes but fails fully to confront.

Policeman and Bureaucrat

ANDROPOV: NEW CHALLENGE TO THE WEST. A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By ARNOLD BEICHMAN and MIKHAIL S. BERNSTAM. Introduction by ROBERT CONQUEST. *Stein & Day. 255 pp. $16.95.*

Reviewed by MAURICE FRIEDBERG

YURI ANDROPOV'S accession to power in the wake of Leonid Brezhnev's death on November 10,

MAURICE FRIEDBERG *is professor of Russian literature at the University of Illinois and the author of* A Decade of Euphoria: Western Literature in Post-Stalin Russia, *among other works.*

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

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1982, has understandably resulted in the appearance of several English-language books sketching out the career of the new Soviet leader. Inevitably, all are marred by telltale signs of hasty writing. Curiously, though, the research, hampered less by editorial deadlines than by Soviet secretiveness, is reasonably complete. This is particularly true of the most satisfactory study to appear to date, Arnold Beichman's and Mikhail S. Bernstam's *Andropov*. Often cliché-ridden and hardly free of purple prose, it is nevertheless to be welcomed as a closely reasoned treatment of an elusive subject whose importance hardly requires proof.

Of the book's authors, Arnold Beichman, a political journalist known above all for his *Nine Lies About America*, a brilliant debunking of chic articles of faith among a large segment of American opinion-makers, presumably supplied the general historical background. The impressive research in often obscure Soviet sources, it is safe to guess, was primarily carried out by Mikhail S. Bernstam, a young historian recently arrived here from the USSR. The book is solid testimony to the fruitfulness of such collaboration, accomplishing well what its authors set out to do: to put "into the context of the political and social history of the Soviet Union the dispersed bits and pieces of data about the political life of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov. . . ."

Apparently, the need to know these facts is not as self-evident as one might have hoped. As Robert Conquest points out in his introduction,

> there are those in the West who would . . . pay no attention to the fact that [Andropov] and those like him are the products of a history quite alien to our own and are the exemplars of a political psychology hardly seen in the West outside small sects of millenarian psychopaths. Indeed, though in the Soviet case the fact is disguised by Western-type vocabulary, the record and the motivations of a man like Andropov are as different from our own as those of any Ayatollah.

This book thus comes as a useful corrective to the image of Andropov fostered at first by Western media, which depicted the long-time head of the Soviet secret police as a closet liberal, a lover of American jazz, a debonair bon vivant with "Western tastes, a man of intellectual discrimination and tolerance."

ANDROPOV was born in 1914, just weeks before the outbreak of World War I, in the southern Russian city of Stavropol; nothing is known (so far) about his family. At age eighteen he moved to the northern province of Yaroslavl where, six years later (1938), he became First Secretary of the Young Communist League. As such, he was (together with Nikolai S. Patolichev, a future Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade) one of the two political bosses of the province. The third, significantly, was the man in charge of the half-million prisoners employed at the Volga Construction Project, then the country's largest undertaking under secret-police auspices. Thus, at twenty-four, "Andropov assisted in the administration of the province, half of which could be regarded as a Russian Auschwitz minus the gas chambers."

The war found Andropov in another northern province, the Karelo-Finnish Republic. But "Andropov himself never participated in any military actions, either as part of the regular army or in guerrilla operations." His war experiences were of a rather different nature. A week after the Nazi attack on the USSR, on June 22, 1941, Finland's military forces crossed the Soviet frontier and proceeded to reoccupy the territory seized from it by the Soviet Union two years earlier. That goal was achieved by September 1, but Finnish troops pressed on for another month, occupying also Petrozavodsk, the capital of the Soviet Karelo-Finnish Republic. Beichman and Bernstam write:

In fact, the entire Republic ceased

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to exist, and what was left unoccupied by the Finns overlapped with the White Sea-Baltic *kombinat*, the chain of forced-labor camps. The Soviets established a new capital in the remnants of the Karelo-Finnish Republic in Belomorsk, which at the same time was the administrative headquarters of the *kombinat*. The Soviet military headquarters also retreated to Belomorsk. In other words, the central committee of the Karelo-Finnish Republic Communist party, the government of the Republic, the Supreme Soviet, the Komsomol, and the military leadership for three years until 1944, resided within the territory of the prison camp.

These circumstances placed Andropov, then the Republic's secretary of the Young Communist League, and a number of other Soviet dignitaries, in an unusual physical setting:

> They were living in a prison camp with forced laborers. Unlike other party officials who knew of the Gulag archipelago from a distance and who, ideologically, accepted forced-labor camps as necessary, Andropov lived side by side with the Gulag system and saw it in operation each day.

It was during these years that Andropov may also have helped betray to the Finns a party comrade operating behind enemy lines.

Such was, in sum, Andropov's background *prior* to his eventual elevation to chairmanship of the USSR Council of Ministers State Security Committee, better known by its Russian acronym KGB. He was to hold this position for fifteen years, longer than any predecessor, leaving it only months before Brezhnev's demise. Andropov's successful progress through the Communist party's labyrinths of power was facilitated, Beichman and Bernstam suggest, by a powerful protector, the late Mikhail Suslov, long known as the guardian of Stalinist doctrinal purity.

Andropov's one significant assignment outside of his main career as party bureaucrat and secret policeman was in Hungary, where he spent some years on the staff of the Soviet embassy and served as Soviet ambassador in Budapest during the fateful days of the Hungarian revolution in the fall of 1956. Rehearsing Andropov's duplicity at that time is useful only insofar as it helps shed light on the "lessons" he may have learned. Beichman and Bernstam identify a number of them. The first was that the Chinese, and the Yugoslavs, were simply not to be trusted in their relations with the Soviet Union and the East European satellites. He may also have learned to mistrust intellectuals. "Probably the most important lesson Andropov learned during his tenure in Budapest was how weak and irresolute the Western democracies were in a crisis and how unwilling they were to exploit Soviet weakness."

SINCE people in power, when faced with choices, tend to resort to methods they know best, Andropov's background offers few grounds for rosy "liberal" prognostications. Indeed, to accept Andropov's much-discussed predilection for well-tailored Western suits, American jazz, and scotch whiskey as signs of democratic leanings is not only naive, but bespeaks a Western cultural arrogance of the most reprehensible sort. Another secret policeman of recent memory, Heinrich Himmler, showed many of these preferences; conversely, respect for democratic values is fully compatible with any national garb, cuisine, or music.

It was Yuri Andropov who crushed the Soviet liberal dissidents and who enlisted psychiatry (and mind-altering drugs) to help in the effort. It was Andropov who was chief of the KGB at the time of the plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II. It is he, as head of the Soviet state, who brought to a virtual halt the already small trickle of Jewish emigration, and who was behind the uncompromisingly hard line over the Korean airliner incident. By demonstrating the consistency of these positions with his political past, and by placing them firmly in the context of recent Soviet history, Beichman and Bernstam have performed a most valuable service.

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Critics of Society

EXILED IN PARADISE: GERMAN REFUGEE ARTISTS AND INTELLECTUALS IN AMERICA FROM THE 1930's TO THE PRESENT. By ANTHONY HEILBUT. *Viking. 506 pp. $20.00.*

Reviewed by PETER SHAW

OF ALL the waves of immigration to the United States, one of the smallest—that made up of the approximately 132,000 escapees from Nazi Germany who reached this country in the 1930's and early 40's—probably had the strongest impact on American culture. The members of this group were mostly Jewish, but some of the more famous—including Thomas Mann, Bertolt Brecht, Paul Tillich, and Joseph Schumpeter—were not (though Mann, his brother Heinrich, and Brecht were married to Jews). No sooner had the émigrés arrived than they began to exert an influence far disproportionate to their numbers on American science, social thought, the arts, the academy, and intellectual discourse in general. They quickly rose to prominent positions as writers and professors, fashion and news photographers, psychoanalysts, movie directors, orchestra conductors, and eventually presidents of academic associations. Remarkably, in many of the fields they entered they quickly began to produce cultural products that stood out as representative expressions of the American spirit and style.

Instead of a survey, Anthony Heilbut offers a roughly chronological account of the interaction between American society and the émigrés. There are separate chapters on the experiences of Mann, Brecht, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt, and the social theorist Theodor Adorno, as well as one on the émigré movie directors Max Ophuls, Ernst Lubitsch, Douglas Sirk, Billy Wilder, Fritz Lang, and Otto Preminger, who together brought sophistication of look and tone to American movies.

Heilbut also discusses at length the split between political Left and Right among the refugee social scientists. The leftists, who typically attacked American culture, are represented by Adorno, Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, and Max Horkheimer, founder of the Frankfurt School (renamed the Institute of Social Research in America); those who took a more favorable approach to America include the economists Joseph Schumpeter and Ludwig von Mises, the business analyst Peter Drucker, and the sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld. (Other prominent émigré artists and intellectuals who appear and reappear in the course of the narrative are the writers Stefan Zweig, Hermann Broch, and Lion Feuchtwanger; the literary critic Erich Heller; the theater director and teacher Erwin Piscator; the theologian Paul Tillich; the composer Arnold Schoenberg.)

When functioning as social critics, the émigrés took a special interest in American popular culture (or, as they tended to call it, mass culture), which they pioneered in making a subject for study. To their analyses of this subject, as to most other things, they brought a distinctive style—one compounded of worldliness, verbal brilliance, complexity, iconoclasm, and irreverence. Heilbut, himself the child of German émigrés, traces these characteristics partly to the grammatical peculiarities of the German language itself, and partly to the bohemian modes of Berlin in the 20's. The guiding spirit of the time was that of the free-floating *flâneur*, the café conversationalist and promenader always looking under society's skirts, subsisting above all on his oppositionist stance. Heilbut points out that later concepts like Hannah Arendt's "banality of evil" and Marcuse's "repressive tolerance" often had their origin in the daring verbal paradoxes so admired in the old Berlin days.

PETER SHAW *writes frequently about American culture for* COMMENTARY *and other magazines. His most recent book is* American Patriots and the Rituals of Revolution.

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After the Nazis, one might have expected the émigrés to abandon their insouciant twitting of society. And indeed, those in the unpolled majority seem to have developed far more concern for the stability of American institutions than they ever felt in the case of Weimar. Nevertheless, the iconoclastic tradition remained dominant among the intellectuals. Moreover, even the relatively few among them who dissented from the tradition of dissent never abandoned the witty-paradoxical style.

Heilbut's own stylistic and attitudinal preferences are evident from his assertion that the "best" of the émigrés were those who "took with them the spirit nourished in those cafés—the social concerns, the cultivated irony, the good sense." His own account, however, provokes the question whether good sense—or more precisely a sense of proportion—was not the very quality lacking in the most brilliant members of the group. At any rate, Heilbut, in giving prominence to those who felt ill-at-ease in America, and who dedicated themselves to criticizing the country, makes it appear that the most authentic émigré experience from the 1930's to the 1970's consisted of a series of adversary confrontations with the defects and crimes of American society.

Heilbut stresses the political radicalism that often underlay the artistic and intellectual innovations of those he regards as the best and the brightest. Thus the Bauhaus school of the 1920's is significant for introducing the "international style" of architecture not just as an aesthetic innovation but as a gesture of "socialist hope"; its sleek new skyscrapers of steel and glass were intended to replace the "graceless monuments to exploitation and discomfort" of "late capitalism." In Heilbut's view, the successful émigré movie directors of the 30's "realized" that they were faced with a "gap between the American audience and an ideal one that capitalism had almost wiped out." In a similar vein he greets as a "prophetic insight" the assertion by the social scientist Leo Lowenthal that in the 1940's the American who read the *Saturday Evening Post* was being turned into a "human robot."

The fear voiced by Lowenthal and others that Americans were ripe for totalitarianism was ominously reinforced, in Heilbut's opinion, by America's behavior in the cold war. His heroes are the émigrés who dismissed such American concerns as the development of a Soviet nuclear capacity (worries on this score are explained as a return of "childhood fears"). His villains are anti-Communists, who are treated as being more dangerous than what they opposed. Thus he not only finds the questions addressed to the Communist composer Hanns Eisler by a congressional investigating committee crude and inept, but declares that they "could have been formulated by the Nazis." He considers Thomas Mann's angry departure from the United States—after being criticized for pro-Soviet apologetics—as "not without justifica-

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tion." Mann, on leaving the U.S. for Switzerland in 1953, denounced the "barbarous infantilism" of America (the country that had given him asylum) and concluded that "this civilization of grabbers, fools, and gangsters deserves to perish."

Heilbut also finds justification for what he himself terms the "totally unsympathetic" attitude toward the petite bourgeoisie traditionally held by émigré intellectuals. He most approves this attitude when it is broadened into a more general indictment of capitalism and the United States. Thus, as between Hannah Arendt's view of totalitarianism as a uniquely modern phenomenon, and Franz Neumann's "Marxist analysis," Heilbut finds that Neumann's "has proved to be more prophetic," since he, unlike Miss Arendt, emphasized "the continuities and resemblances between all capitalist societies."

Heilbut does express reservations concerning the émigrés' adverse judgment of American *popular* culture. He does not, for instance, believe that mass entertainment was as ominous in its political implications as the social theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno maintained, or that the audience for it—"the bebopper, the jitterbugger, the housewife listening to her soap operas"—was "ripe for fascist dictatorship." But whereas Heilbut, who in the past has written on folklore and American jazz, has a nuanced appreciation of popular culture that enables him to see through such politically tendentious analyses, he can accept other comparisons with Nazism—even when they are of the grisliest kind—so long as they serve to condemn America at large. He honors Herbert Marcuse, for instance, for expanding the word "Auschwitz" to "include the victims of both Germany and the United States," and he cites another scholar's declaration that American actions in "Vietnam and Cambodia were almost as bad as Auschwitz."

For Heilbut, "one of the happiest products of the emigration" was the collective influence of Herbert Marcuse, Wilhelm Reich, and Erik Erikson on the counterculture and dissidence of the 1960's—something he is able to demonstrate all too

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convincingly. But the fact is that émigré thought carried farther than the temporary popularity of a few thinkers in the 60's. During the 40's and 50's many American intellectuals of less than radical persuasion derived their attitudes from the same social visions of the 1930's émigrés. One effect of the frequent sermons by 50's intellectuals on the dangers of automobile tailfins, television aerials, and "conformity" was to transmit to the 60's the exaggerated émigré fear of American culture.

In their capacities as teachers, practitioners of the arts, and critics, as well as by their mere presence on the scene, the German refugees of the 1930's markedly raised the level of cultural sophistication in the United States. But some of them got a number of basic things wrong, and not just about America. Rarely at a loss for the stunning generalization, they somehow never really came to terms with the debacle from which they had escaped. In this they proved inadequate to the irreducible uniqueness of their own historical experience.

Big News

A JOURNEY FOR OUR TIMES. By HARRISON E. SALISBURY. *Harper & Row. 546 pp. $22.50.*

Reviewed by SAMUEL MCCRACKEN

AS LONG ago as the time of Lincoln Steffens it was obvious that journalists could themselves make good "copy"; all the more so today, when the death of a network anchorman can get more coverage than that of a major public official. So it is not surprising that the New York *Times*'s Harrison Salisbury, having achieved the category "legendary," should have published the first volume of his memoirs.

It should be said at the outset that *A Journey for Our Times* is often engaging, a long work that holds the interest. Salisbury has been places, and he knows how to talk about where he has been. He does not underestimate his own importance—"Arcturus" is the sobriquet he bestows upon himself to characterize the brilliance of his early career—but neither does he overestimate the interest of his life for others.

Born in 1908 to a middle-class Minneapolis family on the downgrade, Salisbury, after a few semesters at the University of Minnesota, embarked on a career with the United Press that was to take him eventually to London during World War II and thence to Moscow, where he headed the New York *Times* bureau, and attained a reputation as this country's premier Russian expert. After further adventures reporting from places as diverse as Hanoi and Birmingham, Alabama, Salisbury returned to New York where he served (in the early 70's) as editor of the *Times*'s op-ed page before embarking on a productive retirement.

Salisbury's recollection of his beloved childhood home will resonate for anyone with a similar affection for some place in the past. It is odd, however, that he recalls the house's mansards ("almost as many . . . as Hawthorne's house had gables") when the photograph shows that it had none, or that he remembers his mother's boisterous playing of the "Warsaw Concerto" ("I grew up thinking it portrayed the Battle of Warsaw") when Addinsell's piece was not written until 1942.

Nor are these the only places where memory serves him ill. He remembers that James J. Hill fought E. H. Harriman and Jay Gould to a standstill, although the last of these died a decade before the Hill-Harriman fracas. Even from later years, he remembers some rather surprising things, such as that in 1942 the commanders of the Army Air Corps feared heavy German air attacks on the U.S. coast if the tide were not quickly turned. Well, perhaps they mistakenly believed that the Germans had bombers capable of crossing the Atlantic, even of returning home. And, perhaps most incomprehensibly, he remembers that Douglas MacArthur was the theater commander responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor.

SALISBURY's days with UP in Chi-

SAMUEL MCCRACKEN, *Assistant to the President of Boston University, is the author of* The War Against the Atom.

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cago coincided with the end of the Golden Age of enterprise in American journalism, and he recounts an instructive tale in this connection. One day the hard-bitten Chicago bureau chief told his reporters he had received a sensational and absolutely reliable tip: Al Capone had decided to rub out Mayor Anton Cermak because the latter, instead of maintaining a benevolent neutrality in the gang war between Capone and his rivals, had been playing footsie with Roger Touhy, leader of the disloyal opposition. The ceremony was planned for some Saturday morning on the steps of Chicago's city hall, a venue which, Capone believed, would limit damage to innocent bystanders. When the assassins left for city hall, UP would be informed so it could score a sensational scoop. Week after week, Salisbury and his colleagues waited in vain for the good news. Then one day in Miami a man named Giuseppe Zangara inconsiderately and without warning murdered Mayor Cermak in the course of a bungled attempt to kill President-elect Roosevelt.

Four decades later, ruminating on the ethical dilemma facing a reporter in Saigon who photographed the self-immolation of a Buddhist monk, Salisbury asks himself whether he and his colleagues ought to have warned Anton Cermak of the fate awaiting him. He concludes mildly, "I think I violated my civic responsibility," treating the matter rather as if it were a failure to pay a parking ticket. Salisbury does not appear to have asked himself what sort of business it was that turned a young idealist into a ruthless opportunist who considered his professional advancement worth everything, and another man's life (not to mention certain principles of democratic government) worth nothing.

SALISBURY, whose political development seems to have been arrested at the level of cracker-barrel radicalism (though he professes himself a lifelong Republican), hates what he calls the Bigs: Big Government, Big Labor, Big Spying. Conspicuously absent from his list is Big News. For most of his career, Salisbury worked for large and powerful corporations in the business of selling news, but when he criticizes them it is generally for refusing to use power rather than for abusing it; the possibility of abuse does not seem to occur to him. This is very evident in his treatment of the New York *Times*. Although he is now very hard on the senior *Times* editors who refused to print his heavily bowdlerized Moscow dispatches with the telltale slug, "Passed by Soviet censors," he omitted dealing with this incident in his book *Without Fear or Favor* (published by Times Books and subtitled "An Uncompromising Look at the New York *Times*")—even though the book does discuss certain ethical



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failures of the paper in the remote past. The possibility that the *Times*, in the course of becoming rich and powerful, might have done things it ought not to have done, does not appear to interest him very much.

Nor does it occur to him that he himself had any options in the matter. Salisbury's own characterization of his censored dispatches is devastating—he calls them "automatically biased," and reports having said at the time that their publication amounted to "a fraud on the American public—a dangerous one under the present conditions and a dismal one under the best of circumstances." It is certainly true that his readers at the time were denied the sharp reporting of Russia that he provides us today; daily life under Stalin, as now reported by Salisbury, was in some ways more illustrative of the total abuse of power than the more sensational and better-known horrors of the Great Purge. Yet it does not seem to have dawned on him then that he could have put an end to the matter by resigning his Moscow post and returning home and exposing the fraud, or even by merely threatening to resign.

IN SPITE of all this, the idea that pervades *A Journey for Our Times* is that the Truth is something beloved of journalists and despised by just about everyone else, especially those in authority. Time and again, as he tells it, Salisbury has gotten into hot water simply by telling the Truth (which turns out to be indistinguishable from his Story). In this connection, it is unfortunate that in this volume Salisbury has not yet worked his way up to the time of his 1966 trip to North Vietnam, which he chronicled in the book *In Hanoi: Behind the Lines*. That book, remarkable for its gullibility even as compared with the many similar accounts produced by other pilgrims to the North, reported without a trace of skepticism Pham Van Dong's claim that any postwar attempt by his government to annex South Vietnam would be "stupid" and "criminal." Salisbury further described, again without a trace of skepticism, the rosy postwar scenario proposed by the NLF delegate in Hanoi, beginning with restored postal service, open borders, and restoration of trade, and culminating (after "quite a few years," to be sure) in reunification, with all the details to be arranged by negotiation between North and South.

In the present volume, Salisbury's discussion of the Hanoi trip is limited to the remark that it earned him the wrath of Lyndon Johnson. We can thus await his promised second volume with interest, and not a little anticipation of further selective glimpses into the Truth as perceived by this "legendary" journalist.

Unconventional Truths

THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE. By THOMAS SOWELL. *Morrow. 324 pp. $15.95.*

Reviewed by STEVEN E. PLAUT

OVER the past years Thomas Sowell, an economist and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, has become one of America's most trenchant and perceptive commentators on the subject of race relations and ethnicity. Two previous books on these themes, *Ethnic America* and *Markets and Minorities*, have become required reading for anyone wishing to make sense of present-day reality in the United States. In his latest book, Sowell expands his horizon to analyze the issues of ethnic mobility, discrimination, and achievement in an international perspective.

At the center of Sowell's interest is the degree of socioeconomic success achieved by widely differing ethnic groups in different countries and eras. Why does group A do well economically while group B does not? The answer, conventional liberal wisdom notwithstanding, seems to have little connection with racism. There are simply too many cases, both of failure and of success, that defy explanation on racist grounds. For instance, black immigrants to America from the West Indies confront exactly the same amount of racism as other blacks (and also tend to come from poorer backgrounds), yet they not only do much better financially than other blacks, they do better than whites. Chinese throughout Asia have been victims of overt racial discrimination for generations, and for generations they have done better than the surrounding majority populations.

On the "failure" side, in Brazil and other parts of South America blacks face less racism than do American blacks; intermarriage is common and accepted; and race relations are best, surprisingly, where blacks are most concentrated—notably Bahia. Yet for all this tolerance, Brazil shows a larger gap in black-white earnings, social position, and education than does the United States.

Very little in ethnic economic history can be explained by "objective circumstances," including the objective circumstances of discrimination and cultural disadvantage. New immigrants to the United States generally did better than settled Americans. In the early 18th century, Scotch-Irish (i.e., Irish Protestants) settled first in the Appalachians, got better land, and had a language advantage over the Germans who arrived shortly thereafter. Within a generation, the Germans had achieved impressive economic success, often moving into the middle classes, while the Irish stayed behind in poverty, where many remain even today. In South America, Italians and Germans who faced discrimination and linguistic disadvantage did much better than their Iberian neighbors. "The cold fact," Sowell concludes, is that "there has been little correlation between the degree of discrimination in history and the economic results today."

Other "explanations" suffer the same fate. It is frequently argued that majority groups maintain their privileges through manipulating the political system to their advantage. Yet political power and economic success often turn out to have little in common. Overseas Chinese and Japanese, like the Italians and Germans in Brazil and Australia, generally avoided all political involvement, yet tended to

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rise to the top of the economic ladder. The Irish in America organized the most efficient political machines in the democratic world, yet stayed far down on the economic ladder until fairly recently. The Afrikaners control South Africa politically, but the British still dominate the economy.

Formal education has of course played an important role in the history of many groups, yet at best can only explain part of the story. "The Chinese, Japanese, and Jews were all rising economically before any significant portion of them completed high school." Formal education has been at least as much the *result* of economic success as its cause.

Some of Sowell's most interesting observations concern American blacks. Racial differences in testing, Sowell informs us, have little to do with economic success: blacks, Mexicans, and Indians from families with incomes over $50,000 score worse than Asian Americans from families earning less than $6,000. Blacks do *not* have the lowest incomes, IQ's, occupational status, or educational levels in America, or the most alcoholism or female-headed families. For couples where both husband and wife work, black couples earned more in 1970-71 than white couples.

To say so may be somewhat anticlimactic, but if anything is held in common by all successful ethnic groups, it would seem to be the willingness to work hard, save, follow opportunity, learn, and refrain from drink. The problem of the economically underprivileged can only be solved through the acquisition and assimilation of these qualities—certainly not through such government-mandated programs as quotas and reverse discrimination, which, Sowell shows, have done more harm than good.

The Economics and Politics of Race is thoroughly, almost dauntingly, researched, yet it is as readable as a novel. Sowell has an uncanny knack for choosing just the right set of historical illustrations and statistics to annihilate yet another commonplace that everyone "knows" to be true. In this book, as in his previous work, he has contributed enormously to clearing away cant and illuminating the world as it is.

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